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The twenty first (21 st) century has begun as a more challenging 
century than the international community has ever imagined or 
experienced. From the positive impact of the World Wide Web 
(www) and the internet, the international community is 
experiencing first hand the fabled global village. Further, with the 
realization of the decades-long dream for a united Europe in the 
European Union, and the consequential implications on trade, 
labor, education, environment, etc., the new century has become a 
very unIque one. 
On the negative side, however, the new century has also begun 
with unprecedented global health challenges, particularly, the 
AIDS/HIV scourge which is spreading the globe like wild fire. The 
threat of global terrorism has equally contributed in making the 
world more insecure than during the Cold War era. Peace in the 
Middle East has continued to elude both the affected region and 
the world. Thus, the once clearly identifiable hot spots of the world 
have multiplied to the point that it appears that no part of the world 
is immune to threats of violence or war. 
It is against this background that the topic of this work was chosen 
as follows: "The Evolving and Challenging Roles of Certain 
International Financial Institutions in Developing Countries under 
International Law with particular reference to Nigeria, South 
Korea, and Brazil. " The goal is to examine how these IFls have 
been impacted by these global challenges that were not in • 
contemplation when the IFls were created. We shall also analyze 
how the constituent instruments that created these IFls equipped or 
prepared them to combat these global challenges. Further, we shall 
critically examine the fate of the developing countries under the 
circumstance, using the selected countries of Nigeria, the Republic 
of Korea and Brazil as our practical samples. 
It is no secret that the developing countries and their fragile 
economies have been struggling all the way from the twentieth 
(20th) century into the twenty first (21 st) century. It is equally 
known that the roles of the IFIs have been evolving partly as a 
result of their internal developments, and partly as a result of 
external developments occurring in the international environment 
that they operate in. It is the realization of the foregoing, and with 
hopes of finding ways that the IFIs can positively impact the 
developing countries in their quest for sustained development, that 
this research is anchored. 
This research, therefore, aims to accomplish the following: (1) 
argue that the roles of the IFIs as conceived by their founding 
fathers were limited to Euro-American interests; and (2) in light of 
the developments both within these IFIs and in the international 
community, these roles have been greatly impacted, (3) that given 
the precarious nature of the economies of the developing countries, 
the IFIs must take due cognizance of that in formulating policies 
and practices that impact these economies, and (4) that failure to 
show sensitivity to the economies of the developing countries will 
result in catastrophic consequences for both the developing 
countries and the international community. 
The limitation placed on this work can not permit one to claim to 
have exhausted all the ingredients of this novel topic. My hope is 
that this will signal the beginning of further and more robust 
exploration of this area of international law . Hopefully, we have 
begun a crusade that will attract more positive attention of the IFIs 
to the precarious state of the economies of the developing 
countries. If that is all we have accomplished here, we shall have 
made a very good effort. 
J 
Sacram(!Jlto, April 2007 S.C.OGBODO 
• 
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THEORETICAL EXAMINATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
I INTRODUCTION 
In order to better appreciate the relationship between international law and 
the international financial institutions (IFIs), it is pertinent to make some 
critical distinctions or clarifications. The first is that the IFIs comprise of two 
major components: the international organizationsl and the international 
.monetary system2. Second, is an appreciation of the origin of both the 
international organizations and the international monetary system as products 
of multilateral treaties of sovereign states. Third, is to make a clarification of 
1. International organizations in this context refer only to the organizations whose membership comprise of 
governments or other governmental agencies or organs. 
2 .. Intemation~l monetary system in this context will permit all organizations, institutions, and agencies that deal 




the fact that the Bretton Woods institutions3 are not the only ones envisaged 
in this research4, rather; they form an integral and very important component 
of the entire International Financial Institutions that we plan to cover. Fourth, 
is to address the question of whether or not the IFIs come under the 
regulation of international law and the implications of such regulation. 
While the use of the words, "international monetary system," may not create 
illusions in appreciation and understanding, the use of the words, 
"international organizations" cause some conceptual confusion. Why? 
Because a lot of people confuse international organizations5 with non-
governmental organizations, otherwise popularly called NOOs.6 Such groups 
that are called NOOs are outside the purview of our research because they are 
principally comprised of individual or private membership. Further, most of 
3 The Bretton Woods institutions are those that were created at the conclusion of the United Nations conference that 
held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in the United States of America in 1944. The conference gave birth to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). 
Although the conference had set out to establish a tripartite organization called the International Trade Organization 
(ITO), the failure of the ITO gave birth to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
4 ?ther institutions envisaged in this research are those that were created outside the Bretton Woods conference, 
which nonetheless, play very critical and important financial and monetary roles in the affairs ofthe developing 
COuntries. For example, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Union, the Paris Club and the London 
Club. 
5. Supra, note 3. 
6 No~-goventmental organizations (NGOS) are comprised of individual members who come together to form such a 




them focus on causes that are limited to their community or state or country 
such that they lack the spread and impact of theinternational organization s. 
Consequently, our research will focus mainly on those two major groups that 
comprise the international financial institutions (IF Is ) - international 
organizations and the international monetary system. In light of the 
foregoing, we shall attempt to define and elaborate on the legal meaning of 
the key components of this work by first striving to analyze the theoretical 
definition of international law. 
II INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law is the branch of the law that confers rights and demands 
obligations from subjects in international relationships.7 Subjects of 
international law, indeed, like subjects of any given legal order, implies such 
entities that the norms of the legal order in question apply to, as well as the 
P
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), Africa Health Organization (AHO), American Association of Retired 
ersons (AARP), etc. 
7 Okeke, C.N., The Expansion of New Subjects of Contemporary International Law Through Their Treaty-Making , 
3 
• 
regulation of their conduct, by the imposition of duties and conferment of 
rights. 8 
Theoretically, international law has been broken into two main components 
as follows: international private law and the international public law. 
International private law involves international relationship between 
individuals while international public law, on the contrary, involves 
international relationship between states, public agencies or organizations. 
For the purposes of our inquiry, we shall be limiting our focus on 
international public law because of the states, international public agencies 
and organizations subject of our review. 
Although international law dominates almost every aspect of our existence, 
particularly, in the new 'global village' that the world has developed into, 
yet, questions still arise whether international law is a true law. Apparently, 
the unique features of international law lend credence to the debate as to the 
authenticity of international law in the comity of laws. Some of the peculiar 
J 
Capacity,1973. 
8 Ibid, p. 181 , 
4 
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characteristics of international law include the following9: 
1. There is no single legislative source of international law. All countries 
of the world and the international organizations are empowered to enact 
international laws. 1 0 
2. There is no world court that is exclusively empowered to interpret 
international laws. There are many courts and tribunals that are 
empowered to hear and interpret international law if the parties bring 
their cases before the courts. 1 1 
3. There is also no world executive branch that is empowered to enforce 
international laws. Consequently, states and organizations mayor may 
not respect international legal obligations. 12 
Another point that must be addressed here, not so much in justification of 
the authenticity of international law as much as in thedetermination of the 
status of the IFIs under international law , is to review the sources of 
intemationallaw. The sources of international hiw form the basis for the 
9 Cheeseman, H.R., Contemporary Business Law, 3rd ed, 2000, p. 165 
10 Ibid 
11 Ibid J 
12 Ibid , 
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adjudication of international disputes by international courts. 13 According 
to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice14, there 
are four major sources of international law as follows15: 
1. Treaties and conventions -
Treaties and convention's are synonymous with legislations made by 
sovereign states at the international level. Treaties are agreements or 
contracts entered into between two or more states by the authorized 
representatives of the states and duly ratified by the heads of government 
of the respective states. While bilateral treaties are made between two 
states; multilateral treaties are made among more than two states. 
Conventions, on the contrary, although enjoying the same prestige as 
treaties, are entered into by duly authorized representatives of 
international organizations 16. 
13 Ibid 
14 OthelWise called the ICJ Statute 
15 It is noteworthy that most courts rely on the hierarchy of the sources in their application and authority, 
Consequently, most courts will apply and accord more authority to treaties and conventions before they apply any 
other source on the list. 
16 Some examples of the conventions include the United Nations Convention against Corruption (signing began in 
~003), the UJlited Nations Convention of the Carriage of Goods by Sea, the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
;r ~he International Sale of Goods, the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, the United 




Custom is the general pattern of relationship between two or more states 
over a reasonably long period of time, which has become obligatory in 
such a relationship. In order for a practice to become a binding custom in 
international law, it must enjoy two critical qualities as followsI7: 
(a) It must be a consistent and recurring practice over a reasonably long 
period of time.I8 
(b) It must be a binding practice, not one done out of courtesy.I9 
Such practice can be found in official government statements, diplomatic 
correspondences, policy statements, press releases, speeches, and other 
government sources. Since international customs, like domestic customs, 
are constantly evolving, such established and internationally recognized 
customs generally result in formal treaties between or among such 
states.20 
3. General principles of law -
• 
The international courts may also refer to the general principles of law 
17 Cheeseman, H.R., supra, p. 166 




applicable to civilized nations21. Such laws are typically laws applicable 
to the disputing nations which may be traced to their constitutions, 
statutes, regulations, common law, or other sources oflaw.22 
4. Judicial decisions and teachings. 
Although international courts emphasize the point that they are not bound 
like the national courts by the doctrine of stare decisis,23 they 
nevertheless, refer to their past decisions for guidance. Also, the courts 
refer to the teachings and writings of the most qualified legal scholars of 
~1 , -1 
the states in dispute for guidance and direction.24 jtvt'l7 F":'+.'/'7£? 7 
A variety of courts have jurisdiction to decide cases arising from 
international law. Such courts are generally called the international courts. 
The most notable are the following courts: 
1. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) -
20 Ibid 
21 .This qualification that the general principles oflaw must meet the acceptance or recognition of 'civilized 
natIons', have raised intellectual dust as to whose standard of civilization was intended by the drafters of the statute. 
Certainly, the word 'civilized' is very subjective and depends a lot on the perspective of the party applying the 
~~n~~rd. No doubt, what an African considers 'civilized' varies to a great extent from what an American considers 
2cIVlhzed'. Ditto for South Koreans and Brazilians. 
2 Cheeseman, H.R., supra, p. 167 
~3 .T~ principle encourages national courts to attempt as much as judicially feasible to follow their past rulings and 
eClSlOns in prder to promote judicial harmony and stability. However, international courts make a strong effort to 
~sert that they are not guided by the principle even when they refer to their own past decisions. 
Cheeseman, \l.R., supra, p. 167. 
8 
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The ICJ is popularly called the World Court25. It is located in The Hague 
in Netherlands and serves as the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations. Only nations or sovereign states may bring suit before the ICJ 
arising from bilateral or multilateral relationships26, and the court may be 
requested by the General Assembly, the Security Council27 or other 
organs and specialized agencies28 of the United Nations to give an 
advisory opinion on any legal question. The court is composd of 15 
judges with nine-year tenures, and not more than two judges may be 
appointed from the same country. 
The ICJ's jurisdiction is, however, limited by the following factors: 
(a) nations must voluntarily agree to allow the court to hear a 
case29, and 
(b) nations are not bound by a decision of the ICJ.30 
25 See the UN Charter of 1945, supra. Chapter XIV of the UN Charter created The International Court of Justice 
(ICI), and designated the court as "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations." The Court was empowered to 
"function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice" and forms an integral part of the Charter. (Article 92) • 
26 .Article 93 (1) provides that all Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the ICJ. 
ArtiCle 93 (2) provides, however, that a state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to 
the Statute of the ICJ if they meet certain conditions set by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the 
Security Council. 
;~ Article 96 (1) of the UN Charter, supra. 
29 Art~cle 96 ~) of the UN Charter, supra. 
30 Art~cle 94 (1) of the UN Charter, supra. 
ArtICle 94 (2) <tthe UN Charter, supra. 
9 
The ICJ may resolve a case by awarding monetary damages to the successful 
party or injunctive relief to the aggrieved party. It may also authorize the 
Security Council to take further action.31 
2. The European Court of Justice -
The ECJ is the judicial branch of the European Union. It is located in 
Luxembourg and has jurisdiction to enforce European Union law. The court 
is composed of judges appointed to represent each member of the EU, and 
they serve a six-year tenure. Although the ECJ lacks the enforcement 
capability, it relies upon the national courts for the enforcement of its 
decisions. 
3. Other International Courts -
Other international courts have been created by other treaties32 to adjudicate 
the disputes that are bound to arise from the application and interpretation of 
the treaty in question. 
4. National Courts -
The national courts of member states form the bulk of the international court 
31 Ibid 
~ See for eiample, the courts created by the treaties that created the regional organizations like Andean Common 
arket (ANCOM), The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Central American Common , 
10 
• 
system because they adjudicate the majority of cases arising from 
intemationallaw. They also possess the enforcement machinery to ensure 
that the decision of the court is obeyed. While some countries have 
,. designated courts for international disputes, others channel such cases 
through their regular court system.33 
III INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
International organizations are those whose membership consists of 
sovereign governments that come together in pursuance of mutual benefits 
based upon multilateral cooperation.34 As we stated earlier, such 
organizations are formed by the instrumentality of a multilateral treaty signed 
by a group of countries. International organizations, therefore, derive their 
legitimacy from the most important source of international law - treaty. A 
typical example and the most important of all international organizations is 
Market, etc. 
33 ~n the United States, for example, commercial disputes between U.S. companies and foreign governments or 
PartIes may be brought in the federal court under the Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C., 1350). The statute permits a 
noncitizen to ~ue another noncitizen in federal district court if the breach outside the U.S. was in violation of a U.S. 
treaty or the law of nations. 
34 Supra, note 3., 
11 
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the United Nations35 which was created by a multilateral treaty signed on 
October 24, 1945. 
The origin of modern 'universal' international organization can be traced to 
the Versailles Treaty of 1919 at the end of World War I. The treaty gave birth 
to the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization36. 
However, the League failed to live up to its mandate by its failure to prevent 
such peace-threatening actions of some of the members. For example, the 
League could not avert the invasion of China by Japan in 1931, or the 
invasion of Finland by the Soviet Union which resulted in the expulsion of 
the Soviet Union from the League in 1939. The continued aggression of 
Germany at the time could not be contained under the machinery of the 
League which ultimately resulted in the outbreak of World War II (1939-
1945). After World War II, the leaders of the victorious Allied Powers 
decided to form a new organization to replace the League of Nations, thus, 
the United Nations was formed. 3 7 
35 The United Nations Charter came into force on October 24, 1945. 
36 The Versailles Peace Treaty was signed in 1919 after the end of World War I (1914 - 1918). The objective of 
~ Treaty was. to establish a multilateral organization that will maintain international peace and security, thus, the 
a~e Of1'latlOns was established in 1920. However, the League failed to live up to the task due to the non-
~;rticlpation of the United States and the expulsion of the Soviet Union. 
Note 34, suWa 
12 
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The importance of these international organizations, like the United Nations, 
cannot be over-emphasized in the orderly and peaceful relationship of the 
world and in the management of international business38. Given the 
tremendous changes that the world is constantly faced with, particularly, in 
the twenty-first (21 st) century, the need for a more orderly world becomes 
more paramount. The concept of globalization39 has, indeed, reduced the 
world to a global village. As the world continues to be more interconnected, 
the physical barriers that separated one part of the world from another are 
dismantled. As labor, goods, services, information, technology, etc., are 
transported from one part of the world to another, so are drugs, crimes, 
diseases, terrorism40, etc. 
Consequently, these institutions have grown to supplement some of the 
functions of national governments. They serve as sources of information or 
~8 It is important to note that within the UN alone, there are 28 major organizations whose functions facilitate 
mternational exchange of goods, services, money, and information. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called 
these organizations "soft infrastructure" for international trade .. 
~9 Our focus will be limited to economic globalization although there are other dimensions of globalization that 
~c1udes technological, political, cultural, environmental, etc. Economic globalization has been defined as the .. 
mternational integration of goods, technology, labor, and capital; that is, firms implement global strategies that link 
and coordinate their international activities on a worldwide basis. See Mathew J. Slaughter and Phillip Swagel, Does 
Globalization Lower Wages and Export Jobs? (Washington, DC; IMF, 1997), p.l, cited in Donald A. Ball, et aI, 
International Business: The Challenge of Global Competition, 10th ed, 2006. 
40 ~though there have been previous acts of international terrorism that affected different parts of the world with 
V~g num¥ler of casualties, the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States gave a new meaning to terrorism 
w en the US President, George W. Bush, declared a war on terrorism. Pursuant to the war on terrorism, the US has 
13 
sources of financing41. They also serve as a source of regulation or a source 
of jobs42. Increasingly, they provide many services on behalf of the member 
states that mutually benefit the members as well as non-members.43 The size 
and influence of these organizations differ, as well as the areas of their 
operations44. While some are better known due to their political and 
economic impact on the international arena, others are more confined to 
specific and limited geographical areas.45 
Regardless, these organizations qualify to be called 'international' because 
they meet the criteria of being comprised of two or more States in their 
membership. They also qualify to be called 'organizations,' because they 
meet the criteria of having specific and general goals and objectives. Some of 
the well-known ones include the United Nations and its predecessor, the 
League of Nations, the European Union (EU), the International Labor 
invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. 
~1 For example, see the UN Commission on International Trade Law which sets conditions and protocols for 
mternational transactions. 
42 The International Civil Aviation Organization coordinates all international agreements regulating the smooth 
operation of commercial airlines across the globe. The World Health Organization coordinates the standardization of " 
Pharmaceutical quality and the names of drugs, while the Protocols of the universal Postal Union coordinate the 




is The wide popularity enjoyed by the World Health Organization cannot be attributed to the International 
elecommunication Union which coordinates and allots air wave frequencies to international operators. Although , 
14 
Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), etc. 
IV INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 
The international monetary system, on the other hand, is a group of 
organizations that deal specifically with monetary and fiscal policy 
fonnulation and enforcement. Again, the international monetary system was a 
product of multilateral treaties signed by a group of countries. Thus, they 
derive their legitimacy under international law from the most important 
source of international law - the treaty. Some of these organizations, like 
universal international organizations, consist of sovereign states. On the 
contrary, while some of the organizations are not specifically comprised of 
sovereign states, they are financed and controlled by the governments behind 
their formation. The common characteristic underlying the organizations in 
the international monetary system is the fact that they are limited to solely 
monetary policy formulation and enforcement in their respective 
environment. 
i 
both organizatiQns serve very critical purposes in the facilitation of international trade, yet the WHO has become a 
15 
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It is noteworthy that a few of the international organizations may enjoy all 
the characteristics of both an international organization as well as an 
international monetary system. A good example is the United Nations. It is 
comprised of member states while its goals and objectives cover every 
conceivable human concern and activity. It is one of the world's largest 
employers,46 and has offices and operations in virtually all parts of the 
world. The United Nations is also one of the key players in the monetary 
environment, making rules and regulations that tremendously impact the 
world's economy, while providing critical enforcement tools and agencies 
that monitor and enforce compliance. In the same vein, the European 
Union47 has developed into another major player in the international 
better known organization. 
46' It is estimated that about 8,600 people from 170 countries make up the UN staff. The Secretary-General and his 
staff take an oath not to seek or receive instructions from any governmental or outside authority. In addition to the 
core staff, over 52,000 people work for the UN and its related organizations worldwide. See Ball, D.A., et aI, 
~temational Business: The Challenge of Global Competition, 10th ed, 2006, p. 122. 
TiusThe ED, which came into existence by the Treaty of Rome 1958, is a supranational entity of European countries. 
means that the ED is a regional government representing all the members of the union in their quest for 
econo~c and political integration. As a supranational entity, the ED must be distinguished from international 
~aruz~tions like the UN or from treaty created entities like NAFT A. While the latter relies upon the goodwill and 
1 .t of. Its I¥mbers for cooperation and income, the ED enjoys the power and privilege to tax its members, to enact 
1




monetary environment. Unlike the United Nations, the EU's membership is 
limited to sovereign nations in Europe that have come together to form a 
supra-national state or the United States of Europe as it is jokingly described. 
With the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), and the 
introduction of the euro asa common currency in the Union,48 the European 
Union has become a critical actor in the monetary environment. Some of the 
organizations under the international monetary system include the United 
Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the World Bank (IBRD), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
etc. 
V THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE IFIs 
It is important to also clarify that the Bretton Woods conference gave birth to 
the key components of modem day international financial institutions 
{IFIs ).49 Although the Bretton Woods conference successfully mid-wifed the 
4
J
8 Ibid, p. 1}S. The euro became the official currency of the countries within the European Monetary Union on 
anuary 1, 2002 . 
. 49 The Bretton ~oods conference was held in 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in the United States of 
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United Nations (UN~O , the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD/WORLD 
BANK), it nevertheless failed to establish the tripartite International Trade 
Organization (ITO), which was intended to be the implementation 
organization for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
Consequently, the GATT was adopted as a compromise by the conveners of 
the conference with a promise to continue work on the imperfect agreement. 
By default, therefore, the GATT assumed the status of both an agreement as 
well as the implementation organization. That untidy situation was eventually 
corrected by the Uruguay Round of Talks51 which created the World Trade 
Organization which was empowered to administer not just the GATT52, but 
the additional GATS53 and TRIPS54, thereby expanding the scope of the 
new organization beyond the limited trade in products which GATT dealt 
with. 
America. It gave birth to the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, and set the stage for the GATT after the efforts at • 
establishing the ITO failed. The GATT, however, was established later from the conferences that were held between 
1946 and 1948. 
~o ~rior to the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, there had been the United Nations Declaration of26 5ttions on January 1, 1942. The San Francisco Conference of 1945 gave birth to the United Nations. 
52 The Uruguay Round of Talks lasted for eight years, beginning from 1986 and ending in 1994. 
53 General 4.greement on Tariffs and Trade. 
5 General Agreement on Trade in Services. 
4 General Agrefment for the Protection of Intellectual Properties. 
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The conveners of the conferences that gave birth to all the IFIs were 
sovereign nations. In exercise of their sovereign rights to enter into a treaty 
with other sovereign nations, they convened, negotiated and agreed to enter 
into the agreements that gave rise to the respective IFIs. By so doing, they 
satisfied all the conditions of membership for the respective organizations 
and agreed to be bound by the obligations attaching thereto and be conferred 
with all the benefits accruing therefrom. But more importantly, they 
conferred upon the IFIs the requisite rights, powers, privileges and 
immunities that are needed for their independent existence as well as 
effective operation in the international arena. Such rights and privileges 
include the conferment of a distinct legal personality upon the institution, the 
treaty clauses empowerment, the explicit authority to develop relations with 
other inter-government organizations and non-government organizations, etc. 
As creations of the sovereign nations under their exercise of their treaty-
making powers, the IFIs are, therefore, recognizable subjects of international 
• law. Moreover, they are equipped with all the tools for independent existence 
and operation as subjects of international law. Further, these 'subjects' have, 
J 
from inception, asserted their presence and claimed their rights in the , 
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international arena for so long that there presence and influence is well 
documented. 
VI APPLICATION OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE IFIs 
In order to address the question whether the IFIs are governed by the general 
principles of international law; let us examine for a moment the question of 
whether the IFIs are qualified subj ects of international law . If they so qualify, 
then there will be no scintilla of doubt that they are so governed. If, on the 
contrary, they do not qualify as subjects of international law, then they are 
outside the governance of international law. 
Generally speaking, the subjects of a legal system are the persons or entities 
to whom the law attributes rights and duties.55 According to Professor 
Okeke56, if the question is posed, "Who is the subject of a certain legal 
. order?', this means: to whom do the norms of this legal order apply, whose 
55 Okeke, C.N., The expansion of new subjects of contemporary international law through their treaty-making 
capacity, 197J, which cited Spiropolous, L'individu en droit international, on the same topic of the subjects of a law 




conduct does this order regulate or license by imposing duties or conferring 
rights". This litmus test for determining who is subjected to a given legal 
order applies with equal force to both domestic and local law, as well as to 
international law. Also arising from the litmus test is the issue of the indirect 
application of a law to certain persons or entities. Situations abound where a 
law may not be directly applicable to certain persons or groups, nonetheless, 
the law will impact the activities of such persons or groups indirectly. But for 
now, we must be guided by the analysis of Spiropolous when he emphasized 
that the subject of a juridical system must be immediatelJRnddirectly 
impacted by that system.57 By the analysis of Spiropolous, it implies and I 
agree that if a juridical system fails to immediately and directly impact a 
person or entity, then that person or entity was not intended to be subjected to 
that system. 
Another legal dimension to the question of whether or not the IFls are 
subjects of intemationallaw arises from the classical or traditionalist 
definition of intemationallaw. According to the classical or traditionalist 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~~d~~~~ed, tqat is to say, one who is directly qualified or obligated by the rules of a juridical system.' 
, 57 SUpra, note 16. , 
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definition,58 "international law directly concerns certain entities alone59, 
principally States, and reaches individuals only through the medium of such 
entities by obligating or permitting the latter to regulate or license individual 
conduct in certain ways. " Thus, from the classical or traditionalist 
perspective, intemationallaw was created to immediately and directly 
regulate the relationship of sovereign states as well as their related entities60. 
Assuming we proceed on the truth of this perspective, which I respectfully 
disagree with61, it is therefore not in doubt whether the IFls are subjects of 
intemationallaw. The IFls we stated earlier are creations of the sovereign 
states. By their creation, the states also conferred upon the IFls all the 
requisite rights and privileges for the exercise of their legal and corporate 
pesonality. It is my position, therefore, that the IFls were borne in mind in 
the formulation of the classical and traditionalist definition of international 
58 Okeke, C.N., supra. P.9 
59 The emphasis of Spiropoulos on the direct application of international law is amplified in this classical definition. 
60 Many scholars and writers equate international law with the law of nations, thus re-inforcing the classical and 
traditionalist view. See Renault in Encyclopedia Juridique, French ed., Paris 1888, t.1, p.429. Also see Ahrens in the 
same publication, all quoted in Okeke, supra. 
61 My disagreement with the classical or traditionalist perception of international law is in appreciation of the 
gr~und-breaking work begun by Professor C.N. Okeke which recognized, at the time, the new and emerging subjects 
~~Intemationallaw. Such emerging subjects like The Holy See, Internationally Umecognized States, National 
. Iberation Movements, as well as International Organizations, have become full and active members of the 
~te~tionalicommunity since then. See Okeke, C.N., supra. The modem perception of international law as well as 
Its subjects must, while giving supremacy to sovereign states and individuals, also accord due recognition and 
appreciation to t~e critical roles thatthe other actors in the international community play. 
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law by the unambiguous inclusion of "state entities" among the subjects of 
the law. Clearly, the IFIs fall squarely within the perception of the classical 
or traditionalist's legal prism. Thus, they are intended to be immediately and 
directly subjected to, and they are clearly subjects of the general principles of 
intemationallaw. 
VII CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing, we have established that the IFIs were creations of 
sovereign states for the purpose of international cooperation on monetary and 
financial matters. It is our position that the IFIs qualify as subjects of 
. international law because they fall within the purview of institutions created 
by sovereign states under the classical or traditionalist perception of 
international law. Further, even under the expanded and more contemporary 
perception of international law, the IFIs, as key actors in the international 
.. 
arena possess most of the characteristics expected of subjects of international 
law. The roles that the IFIs were created to play, and indeed, the roles that 
i 
they currently play, are of such tremendous consequence that to deny them , 
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their due recognition in international law will amount to ignorance. 
We also do appreciate the fact that not all the subjects of a legal system will 
influence the legal system with the same size and weight. The same applies 
not just in thecomity of nations but a Iso in the comity of the IFIs. Thus, the 
International Court of Justice in recognizing the international legal 
personality of the Untied Nations in the Reparations of Injuries case, stated 
as follows: 
"The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their 
nature or in the extent of their rights .... "62 
Regardless of the size and influence wielded by any IFI as a bona fide subject 
of international law , such IFI must ipso facto possess certain identifiable 
qualities that must confer the status of a legal personality to such IFI under 
international law . 
Okeke enumerated some essential elements that must be attributable to a 





1. The subject must have duties or responsibilities under that legal system. 
2. The subject must have some rights conferred upon it under that legal 
system. 
3. The subject must possess the capacity to enter into contractual or other 
legal relations with other subjects of the system, as well as the capacity to 
seek redress under the system. 
From the foregoing, therefore, it is clear that the IFIs have obligations under 
intemationallaw which imposes a wide range of duties upon them for their 
actions in the international arena. Simultaneously, they enjoy a wide range of 
rights and privileges under the international law system64. Finally, they 
possess the capacity to enter into contractual relationships and also to enforce 
their rights under the legal system.65 Having exhausted the issue of the legal 
personality of the IFIs under international law, let us now tum our attention 
to the historical developments that gave rise to the formation of the IFIs. 
~i See the ICJ's comments in its Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries, Ie] Reports, 1949, p.178 
Okeke, Supra p.19 







INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONs\ND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
I INTRODUCTION 
The current relationship existing between most developing economies and 
the International Financial Institutions (hereinafter referred to as IFIs) was 
PJi./VJ-, '0 
developed chiefly by two historical developments. The first development was 
-'- ,~ 7'· -~-- ---
the outbreak of World War n66, and the aftermath of it. The second 
development, particularly, with regard to most colonies of the developed 
countries, was the attainment of political independence by the former 
colonies67 . 
66 World War II spanned from1939 - 1945, in an attempt by the Allied Forces to defeat 
the threat of German dominance led by Adolph Hitler. 
67 AJllOng the former colonies include many African nations, including Nigeria, which 







The current relationship existing between most developing economies and 
the International Financial Institutions (hereinafter referred to as IFls) was 
developed chiefly by two historical developments. The first development was 
the outbreak of World War n68 , and the aftermath of it. The second 
development, particularly, with regard to most colonies of the developed 
countries, was the attainment of political independence by the former 
1 
. 69 
co omes . 
However, in order to better address the origin of the relationship between the 
IFIs and the developing countries during this period, it will be appropriate, if 
not necessary, to understudy the period covering the slavery era, the internal f -----, 
management era, and finally, the poskindependence era. Such a distinctive 
coverage will, no doubt, shed better historical light on how the relationship 
between the IFls was developed and cemented over a long period of time. 
Further, it will shed more light on how the IFls became increasingly 
is pertinent to note that the United States was not a fonner colonial power. 
68 World War II spanned from 1 939 - 1945, in an attempt by the Allied Forces to defeat 
the threat of Gennan dominance led by Adolph Hitler. 
69 Among the fonner colonies include many African nations, including Nigeria, which 
~as a fODIner colony ofthe United Kingdom. Nigeria became independent on October 1, 1960. It 
IS pertinent to note that the United States was not a fonner colonial power. , 
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important in the management of the financial, monetary and political affairs 
of the developing countries. 
II WORLDWARIIANDITSAFTERMATH 
After W orId War II, most of Europe and other parts of the world were in 
ruins. There was urgent need to re-build the damages caused by the war as 
well as facilitate international trade on a multilateral and nondiscriminatory 
basis. A series of conferences were held to fashion out these institutions and 
agreements. The most prominent was held in 1944 at Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire, in the United States, where the organizations and agreements on 
the regulation of the new financial and economic relations were developed. 
The Bretton Woods conference successfully gave birth to the Bretton Woods 
System. 
Generally, the term "Bretton Woods System" comprises the International 
Ii 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
) 
Development (IBRD or the World Bank), and the General Agreement on , 
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Tariffs and Trade (GATT).70 The GATT, however, was developed in another 
series of conferences, which spanned from the fall of 1946 to mid-1948. The 
GATT was designed as a multilateral agreement that will succeed the Havana 
Charter and the International Trade Organization, reflecting commercial 
policy provisions similar to the Havana Charter chapter on commercial 
policy. 
While the IMF was created to ~epair the disintegration of the international 
monetary system after the War, and the World Bank was designed to 
stimulate and support foreign investment which had declined to insignificant 
( 
level, the GATT was created to reverse the protectionist and discriminatory 
------ ( ~ 
yracti~_s that had multiplied during the post-war depression years. IMF and 
~
GATT were expected to collaborate on exchange policies and trade policies . 
. In essence, IMF, the World Bank and GATT were designed to help the 
<: --, 
. developed nations achieve their multiple objectives of full employment, freer 
. and expanding trade, as well as stable exchange rates.71 
-
70 ~orsefield, Keith J., The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965,3 ed, 1969 
71 M · elel, G.M., The Bretton Woods Agreement - 25 Years After, 39 Stanford L. Rev. 
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Whilst the IMF and W orId Bank became instantly effective after their 
,-- ------
creation, the GATT, ~ll.the contrary, was ineffective and virtually non-
~-------------~- ! TZ' -- if Y 7 /PvVy.~ ~ 
existent. However, in 1994, the GATT was reinvigorated by the Uruguay 
Round of talks. The apparent ineffectiveness of the GATT before the 
Uruguay Round of talks has been attributed to what some commentators 
called its "birth defects."n The framers of GATT never intended it to be an 
organization, but rather an agreement that will codify the results of the tariff 
negotiations as well as some general protective clauses, which would prevent 
evasion of the tariff commitments. Hence, GATT was originally planned to 
be an embodiment of the results of the tariff negotiations, while the 
International Trade Organization (ITO) was planned to be the organizational 
't-- __________ ----.,. 
framework for the implementation of the GATT provisions. 
Like the IMF and the W orId Bank, the initiatives for the formation of an ITO 
<-----
and GATT came chiefly from the United States during the end of W orId War 
235,237,245-246 (1971); reprinted in Jackson, J.R., Davey, W.J., Sykes, A.O. Jr., Legal 
Problems of International Economic Relations, 3 ed., West Publishing Co., 279 (1995). 
R . 72 J51ckson, J.H., Davey, W.J., Sykes, Jr, A.O., Legal Problems of International Economic 




II. These initiatives can be traced to two main sources in the American 
economic policy at the end of the war. The first source was the general 
"Reciprocal Trade Agreements" program, which originated from the 1934 
Act, which empowered the United States President to negotiate mutual 
reductions on tariffs. The second source was the realization by the United 
States of the important role played by international economic affairs in the 
genesis of Wodd War II. The ITO and GATT were thus conceived to achieve 
the dual objective of providing a multilateral medium for negotiating mutual 
tariffs reduction and a viable regulator of international economic affairs. 
At the inception of the United Nations in 1945, the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC), was established as the principal organ for the 
coordination of economic and social issues. The economic issues that 
ECOSOC cover includes trade, transport, economic development, and 
industrialization. The social issues include housing, women's right, racial 


























national crime, youth development, the environment, etc.73 During the 
Council's first meeting in February 1946, the United States introduced a 
resolution calling for the convening of a "United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Employment." The resolution was adopted with the principal goal 
of drafting a charter for an international trade organization. 74 
In the fall of 1946, a committee met in London to consider a "Suggested 
Charter for an International Trade Organization" drafted by the United States 
government. 75 In early 1947, a drafting subcommittee met at Lake Success, 
New York. 76 The full preparatory conference convened again in Geneva, 
beginning in April 1947, and ending in October 1947.77 It was at this Geneva 
conference that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
drafted, and some progress was made with the tariff negotiations and the ITO 
73 Ball, McCulloch, Frantz, Geringer, Minor, International Business: The Challenge of 
Global Competition, 9 ed. McGraw Hill, 149 (2004) 
. 74 U.S. State Dept. Press Release, Dec. 16, 1945, reproduced in 13 Dept. State Bulletin 
970 (1945); 1 U.N. ECOSOC Resolution 13, U.N. Doc. E122 (1946). 
75 See London Report, First Session of the Preparatory Committee (1946); U.N. Doc. 
EPCT/CIVI-66 (1946). 
76 
See New York Report, U.N Doc. EPCT/34 (1947); U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.61W.58 (1947) 
77 
1 
.see U.N. Docs EPCT/A/SRlI-43; EPCT/B/SRlI-33 (1947); U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/SR 




. It is worthy of note that the tariff agreements were negotiated under the 
extended authority of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1945. The 
United States Congress had hoped that the President would submit the ITO 
charter to them for approval. However, when the early drafts of the General 
Agreement included some provisional semblance of an organization, 
members of Congress criticized the drafts on the ground that the President 
had no authority to accept international organization membership for the 
United States without congressional approval. Congress had expected that 
GATT would be a subsidiary agreement under the ITO charter, depending 
upon the ITO charter and the ITO secretariat for servicing and enforcement. 
·a!his expectation was based upon the fact that most of the general clauses in 
GATT were drawn from comparable clauses drafted for the ITO.78 
78 See Hearings on the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed ITO before the House 
and Means Comm., 80th Congress 1 st Sess. (1947); Hearings on Operation of the Trade 





Due to the foregoing reasons and more, neither the ITO charter nor the 
GATT was able to pass the litmus test of Congressional assent before the 
expiration of the extended Trade Agreement Act in 1948. The GATT, for 
instance, needed Parliamentary approval by the Legislature of the other 
countries before they could assent to some of the general clauses. However, 
in order to avert a complete loss of their efforts, the 22 original members of 
GATT signed in late 1947, a "Protocol of Provisional Application" (PPA), 
which became effective on January 1,1948.79 Since then, GATT has been 
applied by virtue of this protocol with hopes that at the inception of the ITO 
charter, the Protocol would give way to an unrestricted application of GATT. 
Unfortunately, this expectation never came through. Although the Havana 
conference completed the draft charter of the ITO in early 1948, the United 
States Congress had by then gone through a lot of changes that for two years 
the President could not get them to approve the ITO, thus causing the demise 
Ii 
of the ITO. Without the ITO, GATT consequently became by default, the 
-
o 7: Protocol of Provisional Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
ctober 30, 1947,61 Stat. Pts.5,6, TIAS No. 1700,55 UNTS 308. 
, 
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central organization for coordinating national policies on international trade. 
However, the search for a replacement of ITO continued. 
At the ninth session of the Contracting Parties of GATT, held between 
October 1954 and May 1955, a number of amendments were proposed for 
GATT and a draft charter for the proposed Organization for Trade 
Cooperation (OTC), was completed.80 Unfortunately, the OTC charter, like 
its predecessor (ITO charter), was again rejected by the United States 
Congress. The amendments to GATT were, however, accepted under the 
authority of the then existing Trade Agreements Act. The inability to approve 
\ 
an organization that will exercise regulatory oversight over GATT, created 
the anomaly whereby the nation participants to GATT were referred to as 
"contracting parties", rather than as "members." 
80 See GATT, 3rd Suppl. BISD (1955); Agreement on the Organization for Trade 




By the end of the eight-year Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of trade 
negotiations, there had emerged what had eluded all previous efforts - a new 
and better-defined international organization and treaty in the form of a 
World Trade Organization81. The Uruguay Round did not only succeed in 
the formation of the WTO, but also made substantial revisions in the dispute 
settlement procedures. Also, while GATT dealt almost entirely with trade in 
products, the Uruguay Round included provisions for trade in services 
(GATS), and another for the protection of intellectual property (TRIPS), 
procurement, investment and agriculture. The new WTO is thus charged with 
the responsibility of administering these treaties with hopes of a better 
regulation of international trade. Further, unlike the predecessor, the WTO is 
no longer a collection of ad hoc agreement, Panel reports and understandings 
of the parties82. Rather, all trade obligations are comprehensively dealt with 
under the WTO and member states are obligated to all the provisions of all 
the agreements. 
!1 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
8~und of 4fultilateral Trade Negotiations (1994) 33 I.L.M. 1125. 
Id. See also Cameron, J and Gray, K.R., Principles ofIntemational Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 
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Interestingly, the formation of WTO during the Uruguay Round occurred by 
historical accident. The agenda and the negotiating structure prepared by the 
ministers at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986, did not include the 
drafting of any organizational charter. Moreover, the planners were aware of 
the opposition of the United States Congress, which had earlier struck down 
two attempts at forming such organization. In any case, a group called the 
FOGS was formed to consider the "Future of the GATT System." 
The FOGS group focused on the GATT's relationship with the monetary part 
of the Bretton Woods system and on designing the new Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM). 




In May of 1990, the Government of Canada was the first to formally propose 
the formation of a W orId Trade Organization.83 The European Union was in 
support of this proposal, but suggested a Multilateral Trade Organization 
(MTO). The Ministerial Meeting held in Brussels in December 1990, ended 
in an impasse. Afterwards, the then GATT Director-General, Arthur Dunkel, 
intervened and encouraged the negotiators to go ahead and produce a 
complete rough draft of the negotiation results. The draft that was presented 
contained a draft charter for a new organization to be called Multilateral 
Trade Organization (MTO). From 1990 until December 1993, the negotiators 
worked out their differences and the oppositions to the draft charter, 
especially the name MTO. This lasted until December 1993, when the 
negotiators agreed to a charter proposal with a change of name back to W orId 
Trade Organization (WTO). In April 1994, the proposal was finally 
formalized at the Morocco summit and ready to be submitted to the 





Unlike the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 1994 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) covers a much 
wider range of trade. It extends beyond goods and now covers services, 
intellectual property, procurement, investment, agriculture, etc. Furthermore, 
the new trade regime is no longer a collection of ad hoc agreements. An 
important principle contained in the WTO Agreement is that member states 
have to accept the obligations contained in all the provisions of the 
agreement as they cannot pick and choose. 
As international relations have become increasingly dominated by economic 
factors, the WTO system has moved away from its former, more power-
oriented diplomatic approach to a better enhanced rule-oriented approach, as 
well as an impartial dispute settlement system. Since it is imperative that 
there be fairness in international economic relations, the developing countries 
. $hould be given the opportunity to challenge the trade practices of 
/·;~eonomically strong countries that usually dominate international 





III THE MARSHALL PLAN 
Although the Bretton Woods System was already in the making prior to the 
end of World War II, it provided the initial support system for the urgent 
reconstruction of Europe after the war. Further, the very supportive efforts of 
then U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, helped fuel the enormous 
financial and logistics support that the United States lent to the reconstruction 
efforts. The plan proposed and implemented by George C. Marshall was so 
successful that it became popularly known as the Marshall Plan.
84 
The Plan was started in 1948 and was so successful that, in two years of 
implementation (1950), Europe had achieved a level of industrial production 
that was 138 percent more than the level reached in 1938. Part of the Plan 
called for the creation of the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC) in 1947. The OEEC was charged with the 
. implementation of the Marshall Plan and the facilitation of economic 
• 
integration within Europe. By 1961, the OEEC was transformed into the 
i'9 84 jValker, Martin, "George Marshall: His Plan Helped Rebuild Europe," Europe, April 
;' 97, pp L2-23; Ball, McCulloch, Frantz, Geringer, Minor, ibid, p.162 
, 
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
IV DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS SECONDARY BENEFICIARIES 
Of THE IFIs 
By the end of W orld War II, most of the presently developing economies 
were either under colonial government or just emerging from colonial rule 
into political independence.85 For those still under colonial government, the 
support they received from the Bretton Woods System and company were 
aimed at sustaining the colonial governments and their limited social, 
economic and political programs. On the contrary, those emerging from 
colonial rule were rudely shocked at the realization that political 
independence was meaningless without economic and financial 
independence.86 They realized to their chagrin that they were, in effect, still 
tied to the apron string of the former colonial powers that they fought, most 
,times bitterly, for political independence. 
~d In Africa, most of the countries were still under colonial rule after World War II. Nigeria, for example, became 
86 ependent~n October 1,1960. 






V DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE 
ATTAINMENT 
Upon the attainment of political independence, most of the developing 
countries realized that they lacked the institutional framework as well as the 
economic and industrial base to meet the new challenges of independence. 
The new political leaders realized to their disappointment that they had to 
depend financially on the former colonial masters that they fought for 
political independence. This dependence on the former colonial masters, no 
doubt, came with a price for the newly independent nations. Thus began a 
relationship between the developing nations and the countries and 
organizations that provided the financial lifeline. 
i 
Vol. 27" No.2, 1997. 
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VI THE DEBT BURDEN 
The reliance of the developing countries upon the financial and technical 
assistance of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) has given rise to 
the cncept of debt burden. 87 The weight of the debt burden on African 
countries, and indeed, other Third W orld88 countries, has become so 
unbearable that the figures speak for themselves. The rate at which the debt 
of third world countries is increasing exponentially can be illustrated by the 
fact that in 1970, the total debt of sub-Saharan Africa countries was 3.7 
billion dollars. Thirteen years later, in 1983, it had skyrocketed to 36.8 billion 
dollars. 
By the year 1990, it had reached the sky limit of 161 billion dollars. 89 
The cost of debt servicing adds a human dimension to the implications of the 
debt burden on the citizens of any country. According to the United Nations 
~? Th~ huge cost of servicing developmental loans obtained by developing countries from the International 
lllancial Institutions (IFIs). 
: The phrase "Third World" is credited to Alfred Sauvy who in 1952 patterned the phrase after the Third Estate of 
~1789 French Revolution. Third World countries have become synonymous with the group of new nations of 
n, ~a, Asia, and Latin America. They are also classified as the less developed, developing, underdeveloped, the 
8~n:dustrialized, the poor, the backward, and/or. the So~t~ern cou~tries. .. . 
'W 1 RD, rle External Debt of Sub-Saharan Africa: Orzgzn, Magnztude and ImpizcatlOns for ActIOn (K.L. Krumm) 
" Or d Bank Staf[Working Paper No. 741, Table One. 
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Human Development Report of 1997,90 Africa alone could have saved the 
lives of 21 million children by the year 2000 if the countries had kept the 
money devoted to servicing foreign debts. Tanzania, for example, spent 
between 1997-98, $189.2 million on debt servicing compared to $65.8 
million spent on health care. Another country, Mauritania, spent $87.8 
million in 1998 on debt servicing, five times more than the meager $17.4 
million spent on health care.91 In the same 1998, Mozambique spent $159 
million on debt servicing compared to the $40 million spent on health care.92 
VII THE DEBT ORIGIN 
As we stated earlier, the second platform that gave rise to the relationship 
between developing nations and the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs), was the attainment of political independence by the former colonies of 
the developed countries. With respect to these former colonies, the genesis of 
~~ tn:mp, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997,93, available at http://www.undp.org/hdroI1997/97.htm. 
La Fnedman, E.A., Debt Relief in 1999: Only One Step on a Long Journey, 3 Yale Human Rights & Development 
w Journal 191 2000 92 ',. httmWORLD BANK, Mozambique at a Glance, 2, 1999, available at 
M j/~.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/moz aag.pdf. See also, IMF & Int'l Dev. Ass'n Republic of 
ozamblque, Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (RIPe) Completion Point Document, 15, 1999, 
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their debt burden can then be traced to the colonial period.93 For the 
purposes of this thesis, therefore, colonial period will be analyzed from both 
theslavery phase 94 and theinternal management phase 95, as well as the 
post-colonial phase 96during which time most developing countries 
accumulated (and still accumulating) more sovereign debts. It is critical to 
understudy the era from the different phases because of the different modus 
operandi implemented by the colonial masters during the different periods in 
question. Such a distinctive analysis will also shed better light on the 
changing roles of the IFls in the developing countries. 
Presently, however, some commentators have attempted to play down the 
historical origin of the debt burden in the developing countries. They have 
focused upon the debt acquired by the new leaders of these countries in their 
efforts to justify their political mandate in the provision of basic amenities, or 
to preserve their national security in the face of domestic strife and 
;vailable at http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/country-caselMozambique/mozcompl.pdf. 
93 Okeke, C.N., The Debt Burden: An African Perspective, The International Lawyer, Vo1.35, No.4, 200l. 
94 Slavery phase will be limited to African and other colonies subject of the slavery experience. 
5 Internal management phase will cover the period immediately after the abolition of slavery by the national 
~~vernments of the slavery merchants. This period covers the colonialization era. 
Wh.en the Bretton Woods conference gave birth to the major IFIs in 1944, almost all of the developing countries 
~ere StIllSolonies of the developed/industrialized nations. For example, in Africa, only a handful was independent 
th°m the colonial rule during that period, thanks to the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 which shared Africa among 
e colonial powers. , 
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conflicts,97 or in stolen funds and other corrupt practices of the ruling 
elite.98 While recognizing the huge proportion of the sovereign debt 
accumulated by the new leaders, this author, nevertheless, believes that a 
comprehensive account of the origin of the debt burden must start from the 
colonial era. 
SLAVERY PHASE 
During the initial period of discovering the "black" colonies, particularly in 
Africa, the colonial masters, like good merchants, targeted the people for 
exportation to the commercial farms and industries of the west. Their goal 
was to "recruit" strong and able-bodied men and women that can be "sold" 
for good prices in Europe and later, America. The stronger they came, the 
better the price for them. Hundreds of thousands of the strongest and ablest 
men and women from different parts of the continent were "bought" through 
~7 It ~s reported that out of Africa's 250 billion dollars debt burden, about 20% is related to arms credit. See , 
W USsalll, 1., and Underwood, J., "The Problems of Sub-Saharan Africa's Debt and the Solutions, " Washington, 
. orid Bank Publications 1989 98 P ,. 
ta eter Komer, et al described such governments as cleptocracies, where the leadership class loots or squanders the 
s ~e treasury to the point that it accelerates the sovereign debt of the country. See Peter Komer, et al in The IMF 
~c~e D.ebt Cr~sis,.1986, ?'. 36. Many l~aders of.the developing countries ar~ .notorious for corruption while in 
te 'bi WIth th~Ir tamted VISIOn that publIc office IS the fastest means to acqumng wealth, they have developed a 
un~ e repmatIOn for looting the public treasury with impunity. Classical examples are Zaire under Mobutu, Haiti 
erDuvalier, the Philippines under Marcos, Nicaragua under Somoza, Uganda under Amin, the Central African , 
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inducement from local chiefs and in many instances through force. In other 
cases, some parents were compelled to "sell" their errant and stubborn 
children to the human merchants. In extreme circumstances, some were 
kidnapped from the villages and sold into slavery without the consent or 
knowledge of their parents. 
As the transaction became more lucrative, the operators became more 
desperate. In the bid to ship more and more of these unfortunate people to 
Europe and America, the ships were almost always over-loaded. Many were 
reported to have died during transit. Those that took ill and could no longer 
inake it to their destinations as healthy and "profitable" labor force were 
""reportedly thrown over-board. In the final analysis, the number of Africans 
were taken into slavery can never be known, but it still accounts for the 
unjustified and unprovoked displacement and dislocation of any human 
under Bokassa, and Nigeria under Abacha. Recently, two Nigerian state Governors have been arrested in 
on char~es of money laundering. 
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INTERNAL MANAGEMENT PHASE 
~ 
Given the huge financial losses suffered by the merchants in their bid to take 
Africans into slavery, coupled with the increasing riots and resistance of the 
slaves at different stages of their captivity, the merchants began to modify 
their operational mechanism. More importantly, with the growing public 
opinion in Europe and America against the slavery practice, it became 
increasingly difficult to continue with the trade. The promulgation of the 
Emancipation Proclamation in America99 and the abolition of slavery in all 
British territories in the 1800s, compelled the traders to re-direct their efforts. 
In the light of these legislative prohibitions against slavery in America and 
Europe, the merchants changed their strategy by retaining the labor in Africa 
and working them for the same economic goal. In order to accomplish this 
new goal, the colonial masters began to infiltrate the local people through 
their chiefs and existing governmental structures. 1 00 The infiltration began 
{-. 
~'--
------------------.~ T~s was a proclamation issued by President Abraham Lincoln on January 1, 1863, declaring free all Negro 
~:~~ the seceded States. It was later reinforced by the 13th Amendment of 1865, which freed the slaves in the 
il\'f"'U1lll1g eight states. 
Davidso~, B, AFRICA IN HISTORY, 286 (1991). According to the author, " ..... (the) process of infiltration, 
advanced until the stage of 'effective occupation' could be reached, behind the screen of 'treaties of 

















on a veiled peaceful and good faith effort to develop and support the existing 
government. Some of the chiefs were induced with gifts and presents. Other 
chiefs suspecting mischief and bad-faith resisted the intrusion and invasion of 
the strangers into their communities. However, due to their limited access to 
superior firearms, the local chiefs could not withstand the more powerful 
invaders. Eventually, the resisting local chiefs surrendered to the invaders32. 
And in order to retain the remnants of their authority became agents of their 
new colonial masters. 
It is pertinent to note that this era includes the convocation of the infamous 
Berlin Conference 101 in Berlin, Germany. At the invitation of the German 
Chancellor, Bismarck, the major European powers - the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, etc., met in Berlin and agreed to 
divide the African continent among themselves on the basis of who got where 
first. Consequently, Africa was partitioned according to the conquest area of 
the conquering European power, and as a result, historical and cultural 
-------------------------------------------------------------
~ef~ Who could seldom or never have understood the intention of their new 'protectors.' See also Okeke, C.N., Int'l 
lOW in the 1)Tigerian Legal System, supra. 
1 The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 was convened by Germany with a view to having the European powers agree 
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boundaries were altered permanently. 
After the local authorities surrendered to the overbearing force and influence 
of the colonial masters 1 02, the latter began to engage in the smoke-screen 
exercise of signing the "treaties of protection" with the local authorities. The 
only justifiable reason for such exercise can be found in the need of the 
colonial masters to have some kind of semblance of validity conferred upon 
them for their subsequent game plan. If not, how else can it be justified that 
after intimidating and compelling the local chiefs to surrender their 
sovereignty, the same chiefs will willingly agree to sign a treaty of 
protection. In any case, most of the chiefs were illiterates who could neither 
read nor write and lacked the ability to fully appreciate the ramifications of 
the contents of the treaties. 1 03 In light of the circumstances of the so-called 
treaties, some commentators have argued, and rightly so, that the treaties of 
~~ the modus of colonizing the newly discovered rich continent of Africa without confusion and conflict. 
F 2 S~ch force and intimidation was manifested by colonial rulers in different forms and styles. For example, Sir 
~~~enck ~ugard, the former Governor of Northern Nigeria was reported to have "preceded negotiations with short 
;: ~ actIOns in orde~ to place himself in a position of strength." Another coloni~l mas.ter, Consul Ra~ph Moor of 
d Ig~r Coast ProtectIve was reported to have "moved up and down the Cross River wIth troops shellmg and 
l~;troYm~ ~illages before settling down to make 'treaties of friendship' with the frightened people." 
DavIdson, B., Africa in History: Themes and Outlines, 286, 1991. , 
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cession lacked validity under international law .104 
During the colonization era, the colonial powers embarked upon a double-
pronged exploitation of the African continent. First, they mined the various 
rich mineral resources including gold, diamond, uranium, coal, tin, copper, 
etc., and exported them to their national countries and other parts of Europe 
and America to service their local industries and for profit. Second, in the 
process of acquiring the needed machinery for the exploitation as well as 
sourcing funds to run their Western style government with its expensive 
taste, they engaged in accumulating huge national debts on behalf of the 
colony. The result was that while Africa was deprived of its natural resources 
without adequate compensation in local infrastructure or foreign exchange, 
the colonial government was acquiring national debts for generations yet 
unborn. 
-~-------
~~ Se~ Okeke, C.N., International Law in the Nigerian Legal System, supra. Umozurike O. Umozurike, 
Ma rnaiftion~ljLaw and Colonialism in Africa, 3 E. Africa Law Rev. 47 (1970). Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the 






By the time most former colonies became independent in late 1950s and 1960s, they 
had been exploited and marginalized for decades. By the time of political 
independence, most of the former colonies had accumulated huge national debts 
through their colonial governments. In most instances, the struggle for political 
independence completely overshadowed the issue of the national debt that the new 
independent countries must cope with. The colonial masters also succeeded in 
planting very fertile seeds of discord, distrust, and suspicion in the various groups 
that were in the vanguard to wrest political power from them. The colonial policy of 
divide-and-rule was very effective, and resulted in the different group's inability to 
close ranks as a united front. In the process, the new leaders missed the golden 
opportunity to request for formal handover and accounting from the colonial 
powers. Upon political independence, therefore, most of the former colonies were 
uncertain of what their national debts were, and in the circumstances where the 
amount was certain, neither could they ascertain the veracity of the amount. 





Under the post-colonial phase, the developing countries fell into more debt as a 
result of the following practicesl05: 
1. indebted industrialization 
2. neglect of agricultural developments 
3. failure to diversify exports 
4. debt-inducing social reforms 
5. cleptocracy 
6. developmental gigantomania 
7. indebted militarization 
INDEBTED INDUSTRIALIZATION: 
According to Peter Komer, many developing countries started to engage in the 
practice of 'indebted industrialization' 106 or forced industrialization as early as in 
. the 1930s when the Latin American countries introduced it. The practice was later 
adopted by Asian and African countries after the Second World War when foreign 
--
~rovinces (1915), (1921) 3 NLR 24 (1921) 2 A.c. 399. 
See Komer Peter et aI, The IMF and the Debt Crisis, supra, footnote 95. 
See Komer et aI, p. 32 which cited Friedman (1981) as the origin of the concept. I have, however, interpreted 
concept as being synonymous with 'forced industrialization', because the developing countries were compelled 
embark upon such industrialization under the exigencies of the moment. This position is supported by Canitrot 
p. 918) when the author stated that the practice 'was not the product of a sovereign decision derived from an 
philosophy' but rather 'the only socially viable alternative, as a consequence of the international economic , 
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exchange income from raw materials dropped drastically due to the international 
economic crisis. However, the practice is most prominent in the newly 
industrializing countries 1 07 which have advanced substantially in the industrial 
production and manufacture of some products. The logic behind such a practice is 
that since the developing countries lack the ability to earn more foreign exchange 
from the economically distressed developed countries, the scarce foreign exchange 
available should be saved for importation of essential goods and machinery. 
Consequently, the developing countries implemented import substitution, which 
started with the substitution of imported consumer goods, and graduated to the 
substitution of investment goods by domestic production. 
Such a practice was not planned for, but rather forced upon the developing 
countries in reaction to a sudden drop in their foreign exchange earning capabilities 
as a result of economic or political crisis in the developed countries. As a result of 
the forced industrialization or indebted industrialization, the developing countries 
were also compelled to borrow more loans from the international banks in order to 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
~riSis .... ' This passage was quoted by Komer et aI, in p.32 
S 07 The Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) include the four Asian tigers (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
;Uth Korea), Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand, and Chile. These countries are classified as the NICs by the 
orld Bank because they possess the following characteristics: (I ) fast-growing, middle-income or higher 
economies, (2) they possess a heavy concentration of foreign investment, and (3) they export large quantities of 
:anUfactured goods, including high-tech products. Recently, due to the fact that the economies of the four Asian 
In~rs h.av~ out-paced the others in the group, the tigers have earned a distinct classification of the Newly 
C UStrialIzed Economies (NIEs). See Donald Ball et al., International Business: The Challenge of Global 










finance the capital intensive industries. The anticipated savings in scarce foreign 
exchange did not materialize as more foreign exchange was needed and sought for 
in order to activate the new industries. Additionally, by concentrating almost all the 
scarce foreign exchange in the new industries meant that little or none was allocated 
to agriculture. The agricultural sector suffered neglect which inevitably resulted in 
shortage in food production, which in tum, compelled the government to begin to 
import food. The foreign corporations that were engaged to initiate and establish the 
new industries contributed their fair share in the depletion of the scarce foreign 
exchange by such practices as 'profit transfers and artificially high-priced 
imports. ' 108 
With a view to amending the practice of import substitution and yet maintaining the ' 
goal of conserving scarce foreign exchange, some developing countries began to 
practice export industrialization by exporting manufactured goods. A good example 
is Brazil which has engaged in massive production of industrial goods for export. 
JJnfortunately, neither the import substitution nor the export industrialization has 
y transformed Brazil and other developing countries into the high foreign 
earning countries that they aspire to. Rather, the developing countries 















~CT OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR: 
As we highlighted in the preceding section, one of the fallouts of indebted or forced 
industrialization was the neglect of the agricultural sector with the attendant 
consequences for the economy. Such neglect usually creates food shortage which 
compels the government to embark upon food importation. 
Although the government may not completely abandon the agricultural sector 
development, however, such development may be so narrowly tailored towards 
export. According to Komer et aI, such practice tends to imitate 'the policies of 
their former colonial masters, who often confined the agricultural sector to the 
export of one product only - as a cheap raw material for use in the colonial centers. ' 
The powerful influence of foreign corporations in the developing countries further 
ensures that the governments follow such narrow agricultural development paths. 
The 'vicious circle' 109 that results from the neglect of the agricultural sector 
becomes inevitable. As more people are forced to abandon the rural areas to 
the urban areas (cities) in search of better paying jobs, the cost of servicing 
the urban areas increase. Such cost is financed from the funds that could 










the demand for more imported food increases which further drains the scarce 
foreign exchange. In order to finance the increased pressure on the scarce 
foreign exchange, the governments typically resort to increased external 
borrowing and increased export production for the limited agricultural 
investment. 
FAILURE TO DIVERSIFY EXPORTS: 
Another familiar cause of the debt crisis in developing countries is the failure 
of the countries to diversify their foreign exchange earning sources. By 
limiting their major source of foreign exchange to one or two raw materials, 
the countries end up loading all their proverbial eggs in one or two baskets 
with the attendant risks to the one or two baskets. 
Typically, when there is a sudden drop in the demand of the raw material that 
forms the bulk of the foreign exchange source of a developing country, all 
$,e economic and financial planning that were tied to the source suffer 
. legatively.ll 0 In the wake of the economic shock from a drop in foreign 
revenue, the import prices for essentials like oil, capital goods and 
of was the case of the countries that earned most of their foreign exchange from copper in 197417 5. After the 







imported food become higher. While the government is not earning enough 
foreign exchange, at the same time; it is forced to pay more in imported 
goods, oil and machinery. Again, in order to finance the increased demand 
for foreign exchange, most developing countries resort to external borrowing 
or compensatory financing 111 with hopes that the situation will be 
temporary. 
DEBT-INDUCING SOCIAL REFORMS: 
Under this situation, the government of the developing country either came 
into power on the platform of social reforms 112 or suddenly transforms into 
a social reform government. In either case, however, the government begins 
t~ embark upon such expensive and foreign exchange draining practices like 
Q1".l~al'lr. in real wages, subsidizing social services like education, health, 
lie transportation, etc. With the sudden increase in real wages, the 
"~\.IULr. for imported goods increase, this in tum drains scarce foreign 
eXchange because their economies relied heavily on copper. The same situation occurred in Nigeria during 
slumps of the early 80s because the country relies on crude oil for most of its foreign exchange earnings. 
fr p. 35 This is the type of external borrowing targeted for the relief of the foreign exchange shortage which 
om l} SUdden drop in the country's foreign exchange earnings. 
example, the government of Allende in Chile from 1970-1973. Also, the government of Manley in Jamaica 
1976 . , 
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The subsidization of social services coupled with increase in real wages 
imply that the cost of running the government has increased exponentially 
while the government revenue remains stagnant or lower.113 In order to 
continue with such program of social reforms, the government must find new 
sources to fill the gaps created by the deficits. The situation becomes 
compounded by the reluctance of international creditors to continue to 
finance economically unviable social reform programs. Consequently, the 
government inevitably seeks recourse to the IFIs in order to remain credit-
worthy and hopefully pull out of the debt crisis.114 
CLEPTOCRACY: 
According to Peter Komer et aI, cleptocracy is the practice whereby the 
'state-class under the repressive leadership of one clan pile up wealth in so 
uninhibitedly in foreign exchange accounts or squander such huge sums on 
luxury consumption that corruption and self-enrichment become the central 
cause of the debt crisis. I IS Further, 'the direct access of these classes to the 
finance ministries, the central banks and the customs authorities enables them 
------------------113 Ibid 
114 Ibid 
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. \1f!llUI 
to operate illegally' .116 Some of the common illegal activities of this rogue 
class involve 'the smuggling or raw materials, the diversion of scarce foreign 
exchange reserves for private use and the forging of import licenses' .117 
As a result of these illegal activities, the affected country suffers massive 
capital flight from its economy.118 Unfortunately, the bulk of the capital 
that is illegally taken out of the economy eventually re-enters the same 
economy as foreign loans.119 The affected country thus finds itself in the 
situation where it is paying premium in fees and interest for money that 
originally belonged to it. 120 
DEVELOPMENTAL GIGANTOMANIA: 
Developmental gigantomania121 differs from indebted (forced) 
ization 122 because it is not a product of a government's reaction to 
"'''U"l3l3ive drop in foreign exchange earnings from raw materials. Rather, it is 
Ibid 
Ibid 
by the desire of the developing country 'to realize ambitious 
It is estimated that capital flight from Mexico in 1981 and 1982 totaled $12.3 and $13.15 thousand million. 
Ibid 
Times, December 1, 1983). Also, it is estimated that between 1976 and 1983, capital flight from 
amounted to about $35 thousand million. (Information from the Central Bank of Argentina quoted in HB, 
3, 1983) 
'Ibid J 
classification was used by Komer et aI, supra, p. 38. , 
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infrastructural projects in the shortest possible time.' 123 The idea behind 
such accelerated developmental projects is that the government hopes that the 
projects will in tum generate the much needed foreign exchange, and 
ultimately increase state revenue. But what the government fails to factor into 
the plan is the added cost of maintaining the projects as well as the expensive 
machineries needed to run them. 124 
In the process, the government invests huge amounts of scarce foreign 
exchange into the projects. In order to sustain the demands of machineries 
and maintenance, government is compelled to borrow from external creditors 
thereby adding to the debt crisis. 125 
INDEBTED MILITARIZATION: 
This is the process whereby developing countries accumulate more debt by 
their desire to increase their military arsenals and ammunitions. Some of the 




A good example is the 'gigantic' infrastructural development of the Ajaokuta Steel industry by the Nigerian 
After many years of spending billions of dollars on the ambitious steel development project, the 




desire to defend themselves from their neighboring enemies126 or political 
enemies127. Others have been driven by the desire to exert their political 
independence or military might. 128 While others exploit the l?1ilitarization 
policy as a clever means of enrichment and corruption. 129 
Regardless of the motive, most developing countries allocate and expend 
substantial portions of their national budget to the militarization policy.130 
Since most developing countries lack the industrial base for the production of 
the arms and military equipments, they wind up buying from the 
industrialized countries. The already scarce foreign exchange is spent and 
borrowed in order to finance the ambitious militarization policy. 
In light of the huge consequences of continued burden of national debt on 
developing economies, there have been divergent recommendations on how 
Examples of the countries that spent much on their military in order to protect themselves from their neighbors 
Israel, Pakistan, South Korea, all of them spending over 20% of their budget on military expenditure in 1980 . 
. The Argentine government spent huge sums on arms acquisition immediately before and after their war with the 
Over the disputed Falklands Island. • 
T~e Egyptian government spends a substantial percent of its national budget on arms acquisition, partly to 
TIts ~lita~ might and partly to prevent internal and external aggressions. 
he ~hgenan government has lost substantial amounts of foreign exchange on the sharp practices associated 
........ ~ Importation under the military governments. In order to cover one scandal, the then military headquarters 
m Lagos was set ablaze. 
,u~cordi~~ to the US ACDA report in 1983, the following developing countries spent over 20% of their budget 
OIllmthtary expenditure: South Yemen (45.7%), Ethiopia (42.6%), Syria (35.4%), Israel (34.2%), North 
(30.0%), Chad (29.0%), Mozambique (28.9%), South Korea (28.4%), Zimbabwe (25.9%), Mauritania 
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best to ameliorate the situation, or at best, resolve it. While some 
commentators have proffered suggestions for better and more humane 
servicing options, others have preferred ways to "relief'13l the debts by 
working out better payment mechanism, while writing-off a substantial part 
thereof. Lately, there has been a very concerted and vociferous clamor for 
total and unconditional "forgiveness" 1 32 of the national debts. " --, . - -- -
From the divergent proposals for solving the debt issue, there appears to be a 
recent effort directed at what we consider to be escaping or avoiding the debt 
obligation. 13 3 For our present purpose, we prefer to classify this approach as 
th~scap~ or av~£dance ___ approach. This approach focuses primarily on how 
best to escape or avoid the obligation of current debt repayment. With so 
many convincing arguments rooted on moral and legal jurisprudence, the 
proponents of the escape or avoidance approach have attempted to persuade 
.. 9%), Peru (24.4%), Jordan (23.4%), Pakistan (23.2%), Burundi (22.2%), Burma (22.1 %), Uganda (20.6%), 
(20.6%), and Mali (20.5%) 
The Group 00 (G7), comprising the industrialized nations; United States of America, United Kingdom, 
, France, Japan, Italy, and Canada, initiated this approach by agreeing to a two-thirds reduction of all 
debts owed by the HIPC countries to the individual members. See HIPC Debt Initiative, World Bank, 2000, 
.worldbank.org/hipc/aboutlhipcbr/hipcbr.htm 
Current President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, is in the forefront as one ofthe most consistent and 
:eous.thampions of total debt forgiveness. Nigeria, which is the largest black nation in the world, is burdened 
whopping national debt of$30 billion. According 0 Obasanjo, no country can make meaningful development , 
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and cajole the creditor institutions to erase the entire national debts with more 
liberal conditions or without any conditions. 
While this approach appears to be gathering momentum in the arena of public 
opinion, it is yet to translate into cOEcrete resu1ts. ] 34 :r~e_~e]?_~s~!ill hang 
over the indebted countries like an albatross, while the weight continues to 
, --
crush the daylight out of the poor segments of the citizenry. (,uA' . cItc'l-l./l' ,-::--kl~ 
On the contrary, while the developing nations must seek ways to escape or 
avoid the burden of their current nati~nal debts, greater emphasis must be 
made at preventing additional debt or re-accumulation of debt after the L~¥Lf<-~ 
...,.,-----------
debt is forgiven. This approach is called the preventive approach. 
,---.-
. approach focuses primarily on a soul-searching journey of 
how these nations arrived at this embarrassing debt burden cross 
The idea is that unless a critical analysis of how these debts were 
, the weight of such huge national debt. 
, ~::~kek~, C.N., supra, note ~o. Se~ .al.so, Obasan~o,. supra, note 22. .. . 
, ,ntly, ill the face ofmountmg cntIcisms over hIS mcessant overseas tnps m search of debt forgIveness, 
President Olusegun Obasanjo admitted embarrassingly that his trips have yielded little or no concrete 
solution perspectives were developed by the author. The idea arose from what the author perceived as a 
eff<}rt to address the developing world debt burden from the limited perspective of 'how to escape' rather 
to avoid.' In my humble view, escape is short- term remedy, while avoidance is long-term remedy, and 












accumulated and mis-applied, these nations may never find long-lasting 
solutions to the debt crises. I will elaborate on this further in the concluding 
paragraph of this thesis. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
? 
The developing countries are the products ,of the former colonies which the 
colonial powers l?illaged for many decades. On the contrary, the developed 
countries136 are the products ofth~former_ col()l1iaL.Rg_~~r~;J_hat exploited 
th~r fQl!1l~I QQI~)llies. During the Second World War (1939-45), most of the 
-developing countries served as political colonies of the developed countries. 
<:---------------------
It was during this period that the colonial governments accumulated the 
cinitial national debts for the colonies through the international financial 
6 UUU .. aUuns that were established under the Marshall Plan and Bretton ----- .-------
,oo~ system. As we have shown earlier, thes~fi~cial institutions were 
"~Ul\,:;ally created to facilitate the re-habilitation of devastated Europe. 
- ---- .....-
, th1colonial governments borrowed from the financial 





Further, upon political independence, the emerging states and their young 
and inexperienced leaders realized to th~ir chagrin_t1!:at they needed financial 
and technical support from the international financial organizations in order 
to maintain political credibility and respect. Lacking knowledge of how to 
create these resource~}?~ally, they resorted to the jnternational financial 
organizations with their stringent conditions. Political expediency demanded -_._--
that the new political leaders seek "quick fix" approaches through the 
international financial institutions. Thus began the journey to the present debt 




6 ~he United States of America is the only developed country that did not have political colonies during the 







INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTI;J;l!.llONfmDER 
INTERNATIONAL LA W 
I INTRODUCTION 
International financial institutions (IFIs)137 comprise of two major 
components: the international organizations138 and the international 
monetary system. 139 The critical question for us to address at this point is 
the relationship between international law and the international financial 
institutions (IFIs). In other words, do these international financial 
institutions qualify to be classified as recognizable subjects of international 
law? By extension, do these institutions possess internationally recognizable 
personalities? Can they, assuming they possess international personalities, 
--------------------
137 I~temational financial institutions (IFIs) are used in this work as the same as international financial 
~;garuzation~ (IFOs). It is the author's preference to adopt the IFIs in the context of this work. 
8 IntematlOnal organization in this context refers only to organizations which membership comprise of 
~~~ernme.nts or g?vemmental agencies. . . . .. .. 
'. h The llltematlOnal monetary system is the legal regime that compnses a group of mternatlOnal orgamzatlOns 







engage in such critical functions like treaty making? The determination of the 
legal standing of these institutions under international law will go a long way 
to assist us in the determination of other pertinent questions that 
consequentially follow. For instance, do these international financial 
institutions have the legal capacity to claim an international right and be 
accountable for an international duty under international law? Can these 
institutions subject their beneficiaries to international obligations that are 
legally binding under international law? In a situation of dispute in the 
relationship between an international institution and a beneficiary partner, 
what legal recourse, under international law, is available to the aggrieved 
party? What enforcement tools are available, assuming one of the parties 
prevail? These and some other consequential questions follow from a 
determination of the legal standing of international financial institutions, 
indeed, any international institution, under international law. 
-------------------------------------------------------------










i!n~ ...... p we proceed further on our inquiry into the relationship between 
iilternationallaw and international financial institutions,140 it is pertinent to 
pause and make a critical distinction or clarification. While the use of the 
words, "international monetary system,"141 may not create illusions in 
appreciation and understanding, the use of the words "international 
organizations," cause some conceptual confusion. Why? This confusion arise 
, -pecause a lot of people confuse international organizations with non-
llluc;utal organizations (NGOs). International organizations are those 
~,.,aU1LaLlUll" whose membership consists of sovereign nations or 
\I.llUllC;Ul>S. Non-governmental organizations or NGOs, as they are 
called, are comprised of individual members who have joined 
in pursuance of common public goals or objectives. 
to better appreciate the place of international financial institutions 
the context of international organizations in the sphere of international 
. we shall apply the following four approaches: 142 













III ~ODES OF APPROACH 
1. THE INDUCTIVE APPROACH 
Under the Inductive Approach, an international organization possesses 
some rights and duties, which are expressly conferred upon it. These 
rights and duties derive from the constituent instrument of the 
organization. And from the exercise of these rights and duties, the 
organization asserts its international personality in the arena of 
international law. It is worthy of note that these rights and duties may be 
expressly conferred or implied from the constituent instrument. 143 The 
emphasis of this approach is the will of the States in forming the 
international organization. 
2.· THE OBJECTIVE APPROACH 
the Objective Approach, the determining factor in analyzing the 
onal personality of an international organization is the structural 
Such analysis demands a critical review of its composition, voting 
~owers of International Organizations,' British Yearbook of International Law, 1970. See also Okeke, 
expansion of new subjects of contemporary international law through their treaty-making capacity, 1973 













procedure, functions, and the powers of the organization. According to 
the proponents of this approach, if an international organization lacks the 
requisite structural content, then it may lack the credibility to claim 
international personality. Contrary to the Inductive Approach, the 
Objective Approach de-emphasizes the will of the States that formed the 
international organization. Rather, if the international organization 
satisfies certain criteria, it will be conferred with international personality 
by the international legal order. 144 
3. THE FORMAL APPROACH 
Under the Formal Approach, an international organization must enjoy 
international personality if the organization is endowed with such rights 
and duties. Such determination can be made by reviewing the provisions 
of the instrument setting up the organization. By implication, if the 
constituent instrument expresses the desire that the organization should 














4. THE MATERIAL APPROACH 
Under the Material Approach, it is acknowledged that general and customary international 
law determines the scope of the international personality of an international organization. 
Regardless of the international personality of an organization, it may still be limited by its 
constitution. For instance, the constitution of the organization may prevent the organization 
from performing certain legal acts or the acts that the organization wishes to perform may 
exceed the limit permitted by its constitution.145 
The four approaches 146 have shed some light on how best to determine 
the intemationallegal personality of an international organization. While 
they seem to help us chart the course of determining the status of 
iilternational organizations under international law, there appears to be 
'I1Vll1~ lingering questions on the subject. For example, under the 
Approach, what happens if the organization lacks the capacity 
carry out the will of the States expressed in the constituent 
..... u"'ut? In other words, does the mere expression of the will 
~~"'-VUL more) by the States sufficient to confer full international 
Ss· eyerste<», Objective International Personality of International Organizations, 1963, p.46. 











personality on an organization? What happens when the organization 
fails to assert its rights and acknowledge its obligations under 
intemationallaw? 
While the Objective Approach appears, in my opinion, to be the most 
practical approach, it still calls into question the distinction between 
"structure" and "function". That an organization is properly structured 
does not necessarily imply that the organization is functional. But we 
must proceed on the assumption that structure under this approach is 
synonymous with functionality. And hopefully, that the organization will 
make effective use of the structures already put in place by the founders. 
The Formal Approach also appears to emphasize the structure of the 
organization and the provisions of the instrument. It asserts that the 
• 
Critical determinant of the status of an international organization is the 
Constituent instrument. Thus, if the constituent instrument expressly 
The four approaches are the Inductive, Objective, Formal, and Material Approaches. 
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endowS the organization with international personality, then the 
organization need not do more. 
The Material Approach focuses upon the role of the general and 
customary international law in determining the status of an international 
organization under international law. It also recognizes the limitations 
that could be placed by the constituent instrument of the organization. 
Given the usefulness of the four approaches, I believe that an 
international organization may be properly structured and endowed with 
the general international personality. However, much depends on the 
functionality of the organization in the international arena. 
• 
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IV ~TERNATIONAL LAW 
International law is the law that confers rights and demands obligations from 
subjects in international relationships. Subjects of international law, indeed, 
like subjects of any given legal order, implies such entities that the norms of 
the legal order in question apply to, as well as the regulation of their conduct, 
by the imposition of duties and conferment of rights. 14 7 
International law has been broken into two main components as follows: 
~t'~li~ t' , .,~ J I 




International private law involves international relationship between 
individuals. International public law, on the contrary, involves international 
relationship between agencies. For the purposes of our inquiry, we shall be 
limiting our focus on international public law because of the international 
agencies or organizations subject of our review. 
• 
------------------~7 ~keke, C.N., The Expansion of New Subjects of Contemporary International Law through Their Treaty-Making 
paclty, Rotterdam University Press, 1973. 
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V INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY 
It is worthy of note that the earlier interpretation of international law and its 
subjects deprived all other entities, except sovereign states, of legal 
personality under international law. The assumption was that since nation-
states have historically been recognized as subjects of international law, they 
automatically enjoy the status of "international personality." Consequently, 
nation-states are endowed with rights and duties directly supplied by 
intemationallaw.148 This position, according to Okeke, was a direct 
consequence of the basic premise of the classical view of international law, 
which denied almost all entities other than states personality in international 
law.l49 
Presently, a lot has changed since the classical view was the dominant theory 
in intemationallaw. International organizations have grown in number and 
influence, 150 so have other players in the international arena, making 
enormous contributions to the world that the continued denial of their 
-------------------
~:~ Kirgis, Frederic, L, Jr., International Organizations in Their Legal Setting, 2nd Ed, West Publishing Co, 1993. 
ISO Okeke, ,supra, note 38. 






influence will amount to ignorance.15l 
Given the rapid development of these organizations and their consequences 
in the global arena, other non-sovereign entities have been recognized and 
accorded legal personality under internationallaw.152 Specifically, the 
International Law Commission noted in its commentary to the Draft Articles 
on the Law of Treaties of 1969, that entities other than States might possess 
international personality.153 These non-sovereign entities include, but are 
not limited to, organizations like the United Nations. 154 Also, included in 
this non-state entities are colonies155, which are on their way to statehood, 
and 'communities' which have been customarily described as States because 
oftheir political cohesion, their internal autonomy and their historical 
status.156 




~53. Yearbook of International Law Commission (1962-11), p.37. See also Okeke, C.N., The Expansion of New 
l~bJects of Contemporary International Law Through Their Treaty-Making Capacity, 1973, p.182 . 
. D.4 See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the UN case, IC] Reports, 1949, p.185. Also, Whiteman, 
l
,gest, 1963, Vol 1 p 548 55 . ,. . 




Legal authorities157 and judicial decisions158 on the question of the legal 
personality of international organizations lend credence to the fact that 
international organizations, indeed, enjoy international legal personality. 
Beginning with an assessment of the League of Nations to the United 
Nations, there seems to exist credible evidence that international 
organizations are recognizable subjects of international law, with requisite 
legal personality. 
Writing on the status of the League of Nations, Oppenheim-McNair159 
asserted as follows: 
"The League appears to be a subject of international law and an international 
person side by side with several States ........ not being a State, and neither 
owning territories nor ruling over citizens, the League does not possess 
sovereignty in the sense of state sovereignty. However, being an international 
person sui generis, the League is the subj ect of many rights which as a rule 
can be exercised by sovereign States." 
--------------------------------------------------------------
!56 Yearbook of International Law Commission (1953-11), p.95. The Holy See also falls under this category. 
1~7 Okeke, supra note 150. See also, Oppenheim-McNair, International Law, Vol 1, 4th edition, 361 







With respect to the United Nations, and in furtherance of the proposition that 
international organizations possess international personality, the International 
Court of Justice, in its Advisory Opinion 160 in the matter of the Reparations 
for Injuries Suffere_d in the Service of the United Nations, 161held that the 
United Nations possessed international personality. Further, the court held 
"'----------~ 
that since the United Nations possessed the requisite international 
personality, it equally was entitled to bring suit for reparations under 
r-----
intemationallaw. The Reparations matter arose out of the assassination of 
the United Nations staff, named Count Bernadotte, while working in 
.Palestine. The Court's opinion was sought by the United Nations with a view 
to bringing a claim of reparations against the Palestinians. In the Opinion, the 
court held that the United Nations possessed international personality, as well 
as the right and capacity to bring an international claim for reparations. Part 
-,,----
of the Court's Opinion reads as follows: 
----------------------------------------------------------
~~9 See Oppenheim-McNair, supra, note 154. 
b ~ Although Article 34( 1) of the ICJ Statute provides that" Only states may be parties in (contentious) cases 
_fre ore the Court," the United Nations and its specialized agencies are entitled to apply and obtain advisory opinions 
s om the ICJ pursuant to Article 96 of the United Nations Charter. It was in exercise of Article 96 that the UN 
l~~ght the advisory opinion of the ICJ in the subject matter. 





"That it is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is 
not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of 
a State. Still less is the same thing as saying that it is a 'super state,' 
whatever that expression may mean .......... what it does mean is that it is a 
subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and 
duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international 
c1aims."162 
~ . 
VI TREATY-MAKING CAPACITY 
The capacity of an international organization to enter into a treaty constitutes 
an important aspect of the international personality of the international 
organization. Pursuant to this objective, the International Law Commission 
has codified two comprehensive laws on the law of treaties. The 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties primarily deals with treaties entered into 
• 
between nation-states 1 63 On the contrary, the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
------------------~~2 Ibid. See also, Detter, Law-Making by International Organizations, Stockholm, 1965, pp 271-318, on the 
~~rna~ional personal.ity of the European Eco.nomic Communities (ECC). . 
. VIenna ConventlOn on the Law of Treatles, May 23,1969,1155 U.N.T.S. 331; entered mto force January 27, 
80 
the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or 
Between International Organizations, 164 deals with treaties entered into 
between nation-states and international organizations on the one hand, or 
between international organizations, on the other hand. 
Furthermore, Article 6 of the 1986 Vienna Convention states: 
"The capacity of an international organization to conclude treaties is 
governed by the rules of that organization." 
This provision of Article 6, we are told, 165 was a product of a compromise 
between differing approaches espoused by blocs of states during the drafting 
process. One side argued that the capacity of an international organization to 
conclude treaties exists as a matter of customary international law, though the 
authority to conclude any given treaties could be denied by the rules of the 
particular organization. The other side argued that an organization's capacity 
depended solely on its own rules. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1980. 
~4 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or Between 
(lternational Organizations, March 21,1986, U.N. Doc. AlCONF. 129/15 (1986),25 Int'l Legal Materials 543 
1:86), referenced in Kirgis, supra note 148. 
o 5 See Hartman, The Capacity of International Organizations to Conclude Treaties, in Agreements of International 
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As a result of these disagreements, some commentators have argued that the 
capacity of an international organization to conclude treaties depended on the 
following factors; the international personality of the organization, the 
functional necessity for a given organization to conclude treaties if it is to 
perform its tasks, or the familiar constitutional doctrine of implied 
powers.l66 
VII MEMBERSHIP 
Each international organization has different conditions for membership. 
Some of the conditions can be time-consuming and cumbersome167, while 
others can be relatively smooth. Generally, the constituent instrument of the 
organization will stipulate the conditions for membership in the organization. 
While the conditions may seem straightforward and uncomplicated, due to 
the political implications of new membership, existing members may subj ect 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUpra. 
166 See Hartmann, supra note 162. 
1,67 .t: good example was in the early years of the United Nations, as well as at the height of the Cold War. The 
Situation was so bad during the height of the Cold War that candidates favored by the Soviet Union could not get 
~nough of~he Western votes to be admitted, and candidates favored by the West were vetoed in the Security Council 











potentially new members to undue scrutiny and opposition. 
It is important to state that regardless of the characterization of an 
organization's constituent instrument168, the universally acceptable mode of 
becoming a member is by the process of accession. In other words, after a 
potential member-state applies to the membership of the organization, the 
onus will be on the new member-state to prove that it has satisfied all the 
conditions of membership. After the member-state proves satisfactorily that it 
has satisfied all the conditions, the member will then accede to the 
constituent instrument of the organization. The process of accession differs 
from one country to another, but the acceptability of membership depends on 
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'. VIII INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
International organizations are organizations whose membership consists of 
sovereign governments that come together in pursuance of mutual benefits 
based on multilateral cooperation. 169 
Modem 'universal' international organization can be traced to the Versailles 
Treaty 170 at the end of World War 1. The treaty gave birth to the League of 
Nations and the International Labor Organization. 171 From the ashes of the 
League after World War II, came the United Nations. 172 The importance of 
. the United Nations, as well as other complementary institutions cannot be 
over-emphasized in the world of business and in the orderly relationship of 
the world. Given the tremendous changes that the world is constantly faced 
with, particularly, in the twenty-first (21 st) century, the need for a more 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
168 The constituent instrument of an international organization may be characterized as a Charter, a Protocol, an • 
Agreement, , an Article, etc. 
~69 This classification distinguishes International Organizations from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). 
l;e latter comprises of individuals as members with a common societal objective or goal. 
. 0 The Versailles Treaty of 1920 gave birth to the League of Nations. The League is known as the first multilateral 
~emational political institution. It existed until the end of World War II, and was finally wound up on April 18, 
17
46 on a simple resolution of the Assembly of the League. . 
1 Ibid 
172 See the UNO at www.un.org 
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orderly world becomes more paramount. The concept of globalization173 
has, indeed, reduced the world to the fabled global village. As the world 
continues to be more interconnected, the physical barriers' that separated one 
part of the world from another are dismantled. As labor, goods, services, 
information, technology, etc. are transported from one part of the world to 
another, so are drugs, crimes, disease, terrorism, etc.174 , ----- ., 
Consequently, these institutions have grown to supplement some of the 
functions of the national governments. 1 75 They serve as sources of 
information176 or sources of financing. 177 They also serve as a source of 
regulation178 or a source of jobs.179 Increasingly, they provide many 
services on behalf of the member states that mutually benefit the members as 
well as non-members. 
173 Although the term 'globalization' has been widely applied to include political, social, environmental, historical, 
geographical, and cultural implications of globalization, however; we will limit the application in this work to 
economic globalization. Thus, economic globalization is defined as the international integration of goods, 
technology, labor, and capital, whereby firms implement global strategies that link and coordinate their international 
~tivities on a worldwide basis. See Slaughter, M.1. and Swagel, P., Does Globalization Lower Wages and Export 
obs? (Washington, DC: IMF, 1997), p.l. Contrast with Lubbers, R.F.M., "General Introduction," The Globalization 
tEe.onomy and Society, December 30, 1996; Riggs, F.W., "Globalization Is a Fuzzy Term but It May Convey 
I
P7eclai Meanings," The Theme of the IPSA World Congress 2000, July 1999. 
4 Ibid 
gs Ball, D. A., et aI, International Business: The Challenge of Global Competition, 10th ed, 2006, p. 120 
1 6 See the UNO, supra, note 169 









The size and influence of these organizations differ as well as the areas of 
their operations. While some are better known due to their political and 
economic impact on the international arena, others are more confined to 
specific and limited geographical areas.180 
Regardless, these organizations qualify to be called 'international,' because 
they meet the criteria of being comprised of two or more States in their 
membership. They also qualify to be called 'organizations,' because they meet 
the criteria of having specific and general goals and obj ectives.18I Some of 
the well-known ones include the United Nations and its predecessor, the 
League of Nations, the European Union (EU), the World Bank (International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (F AO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------g8 Many agencies of the UN serve in the regulatory capacities. 
18~ The United Nations as well as its agencies is reputed to be the world's largest employer. See note 169, supra 










IX INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 
The international monetary system is driven by the international monetary 
law. International monetary law was essentially created by the Articles of 
Agreement of the IMF. According to Sir Joseph Gold,182 "before the 
~----~-- --- - ---, 
Articles of Agreement of the Fund came into existence, international 
monetary law, whether customary or conventional, was negligible. "183 
Thus, the Articles of Agreement of the Fund and the interpretation and 
application of the Articles have principally shaped the development of 
modem day international monetary law.184 The reason lies in the practice of 
states prior to World War II. Before the war, "monetary affairs were matters 
of domestic, not international concern ", thus, "the terms 'international 
~ 1---_ --- ----__ _ _______ _ 
~=..., 
monetary relations' and 'international monetary law' were essentially 
'----- -~ 
181 According to McNamara Carter, an organization is a group of people intentionally organized to accomplish an 
overall, commo~ goal or set of goals. • 
182 Sir Joseph Gold is an internationally recognized authority on the development of modem day international 
monetary law. He served as a member of the Legal Department of the IMF from 1946 to 1960, as General Counsel 
and Director of the Legal Department from 1960 to 1979, and as Senior Consultant to the Fund thereafter. In those 
~~pacit~es: he played critical roles in the creation and development of international monetary law as a distinct branch 
pubhc mternationallaw. 











unknown. "185 This situation was confirmed by Sir Gold when he stated as 
..------- ~ .-------
follows: "in the past, states exercised an almost unrestrained freedom to deal 
~-~--------------- ---
with their balances of payments, even though the policies of one state had an 
/-, )~ 'r '--( -:J- 'l-~{I ~), i111pact on the balances of p'pym~!lts of 00!!!s. "186 
~?'Jd-J~t '--
The Catholic Church's prohibition of usury through their Canon Law was the~-}([/ 
(~;(.~. 
closest example of a rule of international monetary law before the creation of 
the Fund.I8? The application of the law within the mainly European Catholic 
community as well as the violation of the law, limited the acceptability of the 
law internationally. 188 Another significant attempt at creating an 
international monetary law was the Latin Monetary Union of 1865. The -----------"'\ -.;- ...., ~ 
treaty creating the union was entered into by France, Italy, Belgium, r--_____ _ 
Switzerland, a~~gTeece, pursuant to which the states agreed to accept the -'--- '--, 
gold and silver coins of the members in settlement of financial '~e~,", t,[c; i=)." ....... , L ----- ,-------~~ 
transactions.I89 Again, the limited scope of the union as well as the 
-------------------------------------
~85 Zamora, Stephen, SIR JOSEPH GOLD AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
AW, 23 Int'l Law 1009,1989. 
~86 Gold, J, Law and Change in International Monetary Relations, 31 REC.A.B. CITY N.Y. 223, 1976. 
p87 Einzig, P., THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 109-10, 2nd ed, 1970; SHUSTER, M.R., THE 
InUBLI~ INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MONEY 11-14, 1973; Schwarzenberger, The Principles and Standards f 
18tematlOnai Economic Law, 1966, 1 RECEUIL DES COURS 1,63. 
I 8 Einzig, supra note 163 
l'~ Nussbaum, A., MONEY IN THE LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL, 1950. See also, Mann, F.A., 
E LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 463, 4th ed., 1982 
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violations robbed it of an international stature. 190 
From the foregoing, one can appreciate the conclusions reached by Professor 
Stephen Zamora19l when he wrote: 
"In short, the IMF Agreement was preceded by a haphazard pattern of 
international (mostly bilateral) agreements adopted by political rulers, 
usually for the purpose of stabilizing foreign exchange markets. While 
international monetary law was notexactly nonexistent, it was, as Sir Joseph 
(Gold) has pointed, "negligible." The international agreements that were 
adopted were usually short-lived. They did not provide for mechanisms of 
international enforcement. " 
The international monetary system, therefore, is a group of organizations 
dealing specifically with monetary policy formulation and enforcement. 
Some of these organizations, like typical international organizations, consist 
of member states. On the contrary, while some are not specifically comprised 
of member states, they, however, are financed and controlled by the 
governments behind their formation. 192 The common characteristic 
-------------------------
190 Ibid 
. 191 Supra, footnote 161 










underlying the organizations in the international monetary system is the fact 
.. that they are limited to solely monetary policy formulation and enforcement 
in their respective environment. 
For instance, the United Nations 193 is the umbrella of all international 
organizations. It is comprised of member states. Its goals and objectives 
cover every conceivable human concern and activity. It is one of the world's 
largest employers, and it has offices and operations in virtually all parts of 
the world. The United Nations is also classified as one of the major players in 
theintemational monetary system, making rules and regulations that 
tremendously impact the world's economy, while providing critical 
enforcement tools and agencies.194 By contrast, the European Union195 has 
developed into another major player in the international monetary system. 
Unlike the United Nations, the EU is made up of sovereign nations in Europe 
that have come together to form a supra-national state or the United States of 
-------------------------














Intemationallaw serves as the critical regulatory tool of the activities of . 
intemational organizations and international monetary systems as 
subjects of internationallaw.198 Without the vibrant regulation and 
monitoring of international law , international organizations and 
international monetary systems would be confronted, on a daily basis, 
with issues that would make their operations sluggish. 
As the activities of these institutions expand, so is the emergence of new 
and more challenging issues. Some of the issues were not anticipated by 
the founding fathers of these institutions probably as a result of the 
limitations of that era. 
While appreciating the new and more challenging issues confronting 
these institutions, it must be borne in mind that not all institutions can 
legally claim to be called international organizations under international 










first pass the litmus test of international personality. 199 If such an 
organization meets the criteria for recognition as an international 
organization, then it can assert itself on the international arena by 
claiming rights and observing duties in internationallaw.200 Further, 
such an organization may avail itself of the capacity to enter into legally 
binding treaties with sovereign States or with other international 
organizations under the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.20 1 But in order to exercise this right, the rules of the 
organization must empower the organization to enter into a treaty.202 
However, as Kirgis203 reminded us, "the subjects of law in any legal 
system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of 
their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community." 
But such subjects must meet the minimum criteria under the community 
,standard of membership. 
£1l98 Okeke, supra, note 144 
Supra, notes 157, 158, 159, 160, 161 and 162. 
Ibid 
Supra, note 164. 
Ibid 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM AND COMPANY UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 
I INTRODUCTION 
During the end of the World War II (1939-1945)204, the major players205 
sought to create an economic and financial system that would facilitate 
international trade on a multilateral and nondiscriminatory basis. The four-
year war had taken great to1l206 on all the major players in Europe207, 
America and Asia, as well as on the minor participants in Africa208. 
-t04 The term, "Second World War" is more commonplace in the United Kingdom and Canada, while the tenn 
:World War II" is preferred by American publishers. For example, the Oxford University Press uses The Oxford 
CO'!'panion to the Second World War in the United Kingdom, and The Oxford Companion to World War II in the 
:ruted States. For further reading visit http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World War II, last visited on February 23,2007 
.05 The World War II was fought between the Allied Powers and the Axis Powers. The conflict involved anned 
t~ ~om.oveI:.seventy.natio~s and r~sulted in the death. of ove~ sixty.million people .. The m~jor playe~s on the 
. bhhed sId~ mcluded SovIet Umon, Umted States of Amenca, Umted Kingdom, and Chma, whIle the major players • 
the AxIS side included Gennany, Japan, and Italy. The Allied Powers emerged victorious. 
The economies of Europe, China and Japan were completely destroyed by the war. Both sides in the conflict 
enormous casualties, for example, it is estimated that the Allied Powers lost over seventeen million of their 
and OVer thirty three million civilians. The Axis Powers lost an estimated eight million military personnel 
Over twelve million civilians. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/world War II, last visited February 23, 2007. 
Footnote 164, supra. 
The minor participants of the war on the Allied side included Philippines, India, New Zealand, South Africa, 
etc., while those on the Axis side included Hungary, Romania, Finland, Croatia, Slovakia, Thailand, etc. 
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A series of conferences209 were held to fashion these institutions21 0 and 
agreements. The most important was held in 1944 at Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire, in the United States of America, where the institutions and 
agreements on the regulation of the financial and economic relations were 
developed211. The main achievement of the Bretton Woods Conference was 
the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD-the World Bank). 
As conceived by the Conference, the term "Bretton Woods System", 
comprise the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD-the World Bank), and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, however, was developed in another series of conferences, which 
209 Some of the international conferences that preceded the Bretton Woods conference include: The Atlantic 
Charter of 1941, The United Nations Declaration of26 Nations on January 1, 1942 (It is noteworthy that the UNO 
was not formed until 1945); The Moscow Declaration of 1943; The Dumbarton Oaks Conference of 1944; The Yalta 
gonference of 1945; and The San Francisco Conference of 1945 which finally gave birth to the United Nations • 
rganization (UNO). 
~10 These institutions include the 'original' Bretton Woods institutions like the IMF, The World Bank and the 
1 ATT. Although the WTO took over from the GATT, it was created later in 1994 but became operative on January 
~99~. ~owever, for the purposes of this work, we have grouped them all under the title of the international 
. nClalmstitutions (IFls). 
~ll Although the preceding conferences to the Bretton Woods conference focused primarily on the developments 
s:am the Second World War, it is important to emphasize that the political leaders were also aiming not just on a 
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spanned from the fall of 1946 to mid-1948 .212 The GATT was designed as a 
Jl1ultilateral agreement that will succeed the originally conceived Havana 
Charter and the International Trade Organization (ITO )213, while embodying 
commercial policy provisions essentially similar to the Havana Charter 
chapter on commercial policy. The ITO failed to materialize because some of 
the governments failed to ratify the ITO charter, consequently; the ITO was 
not ratified as a de jure organization, and GATT became a de facto 
'international trade organization.214 
While the IMF was intended to repair the disintegration that had befallen the 
international monetary system prior to the W ar215, and the W orId Bank was 
designed to stimulate and support foreign investment which had declined to 
. insignificant amounts,216 the GATT was intended to reverse the 
~2 Horsefield, Keith J., The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965, 3 vols, 1969; Mason, Edward S. & Asher, 
2 bert E., IMF, The International Monetary Fund, 1966-1971 (1984). 
Or
B T.he Hava~a Conference of 1948 succeeded in drawing up a charter for the fonnation of the International Trade 
garuzation (ITO). • 
~~4 Curzon G, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy, New York, Praeger, 1965. 
S 5 As a result of the discriminatory and retaliatory trade practices that responded to the US enactment of the 
, lIlooth-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, the international monetary system was adversely affected in the uncontrolled and 
\lnregulated trade war. Infact, the international monetary system as it was then known lost control of the system and 
~~entual1y lost credibility. 
19~ The decline of foreign investment and trade was so drastic that world trade plummeted from $5.7 billion in 
'''rh9 to $.1.9 billion in 1932 while unemployment increased sharply within the same period. For further reading see 
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protectionist and discriminatory trade practices that had multiplied during the 
pre-war depression years.217 The Fund and GATT were to collaborate on 
exchange policies and trade policies. In combination, the Fund, the World 
Bank, and GATT, were designed to help the advanced industrial countries 
achieve the multiple objectives of full employment, freer and expanding 
trade, and stable exchange rates.218 The framers of these institutions had 
hoped that GATT will serve "the ideal of an international organization that 
would function in the trade areas much as it was hoped the UN would 
function in the political and peacekeeping areas."219 However, the GATT 
did not live up to the expectations of the framers. According to Jackson, J.H., 
etal, the "birth defects" that GATT had suffered from inception prevented it 
from fully living up to the ideal of the founding fathers.220 The framers of 
GATT never intended it to be an organization, but rather an agreement to 
~.dallasfed.org/fed/annua1!2002/ar02f.html, (June 30, 2004). This data was cited by Ball, D et aI, International 
Business: The Challenge of Global Competition, 10th ed, p.95, 2006. 
217 Some COmmentators have traced the origin of the pre-war depression years to the enactment of the Smooth-
HaWley Tariff Act, 1930, by the US Congress and the subsequent signing of the bill by President Herbert Hoover. 
According to the commentators, the bill was enacted as a result of the lobby of the us farmers who wanted to ensure 
SOUle level of protection from foreign competition by the imposition of heavy tariffs on imported agricultural 
pro~ucts. Consequently, the bill sparked a trade war "characterized by tit-for-tat tariffs and protectionism between 
~lllgnations, which soon engulfed most of the world's economies." Ibid I; Meier, G.M., The Bretton Woods Agreement - 25 Years After, 39 Stanford Law Rev. 235, 237, 245-246 
~ 71); reprinted in 1.H. Jackson, W.J. Davey, A.O. Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems ofInternational Economic Relations, 
2 ed., West Publishing Co., 279 (1995). 





embody the results of the tariff negotiations as well as some general 
protective clauses, which would prevent evasion of the tariff commitments. 
Whilst GATT was originally planed to embody the results of the tariff 
negotiations, the International Trade Organization (ITO), was planned to be 
the organizational framework for the implementation of the GATT 
provisions.221 
Like the IMF and the W orId Bank, the initiatives for the formation of an ITO 
and a GATT came chiefly from the United States of America, during the end 
of World War II. The motivation for this initiative can be traced to two main 
sources in the American economic policy222 at the end of the war. The first 
source was the general "Reciprocal Trade Agreements" program that 
originated with the 1934 Act,223 which enabled the United States President 
220 Jackson, J.H., Davey, W.J., Sykes, A.O., Jr., supra, note 41. 
221 Ibid 
222 Noting that the "tariff wars" that greeted the Smooth-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 was one of the major economic 
causes of the World War II, the American economic policy after the war was aimed chiefly at preventing a re-
~ccurrence of the events that gave rise to the war. Thus the government began the process of enacting the Reciprocal 
fade Agreements program as well as the formation of the ITO and GATT as major regulators of the international 
economic affairs 
22 . 
If 3 See the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RT AA), 1934. The RT AA was an amendment to the 1930 Smooth-
aWley Tariff Act. The RT AA granted the president the power to make foreign trade agreements with other nations 
on the basis of a mutual reduction of duties, contrary to the prevailing practice whereby Congress set import duties, 
~~lyat high protectionist levels. It may be worthy of note that between 1934 and 1947 (GATT formation), U.S. 




to negotiate mutual reductions of tariffs. The second source was the 
realization by the United States224 of the important role played by 
international economic affairs in the genesis of W orId War II. The ITO and 
GATT were thus conceived to achieve the dual objective of providing a 
multilateral medium for negotiating mutual tariffs reduction and a viable 
regulator of international economic affairs.225 
In addition to the core Bretton Woods institutions like the IMF, the W orId 
Bank and the ITO/GATT, other organizations were formed to facilitate the 
re-activation and coordination of international trade. Hence, at the inception 
of the United Nations in 1945, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 
was also established226. During the Council's first meeting in February 
1946, the United States introduced a resolution calling for the convening of a 
"United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment." The resolution was 
adopted with the principal goal of drafting a charter for an international trade 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~neWed by the Congress until it was replaced in 1962 by the Trade Expansion Act, which was granted to President 
o~ F. Kennedy to empower him to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements with the European Common Market 
~hiCh Was formed in 1957. 
2
24 Supra footnote 181 and 182 
25 Ibid 





organization. 22 7 
In the fall of 1946, a committee met in London to consider a "Suggested 
Charter for an International Trade Organization", drafted by the United States 
govemment.228 In early 1947, a drafting subcommittee met at Lake Success, 
New York, while beginning in April to October of 1947, the full preparatory 
conference convened again in Geneva.229 It was at this Geneva conference 
that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was drafted, and 
some progress was made with the tariff negotiations and the ITO charter. 
It is worthy of note that the tariff agreements were being negotiated under the 
extended authority of the 1945 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.230 The 
United States Congress had hoped that the ITO Charter would be submitted 
to them for approva1.231 Thus, when early drafts of the General Agreement 
included some provisional semblance of an organization, the provisions were 
-
1945. The latest amendments can be found at 24 U.S.T. 2225, T.LA.S. 7739. 
~27U.S. State Dept. Press Release, Dec 16,1945, reproduced in 13 Dept. State Bulletin 970 (1945); 1 U.N. 
2 COSOC Res. 13, U.N. Doc. E/22 (1946) 
228 London Report, First Session of the Preparatory Committee (1946); U.N. Doc. EPCT ICIIII-66 (1946) 
E29 New York Report, U.N. Doc. EPCT/34 (1947); U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.6!W.58 (1947); Also U.N. Docs. 
2~CTIA!SR/I-43; EPCTIBISR/I-33 (1947); U.N. Doc. EPCT/TAC/SR. 1-28 (1947). 
l' 0 Supra footnote 182. The RTAA 1945 was a product of the renewal of the original 1934 Act. President Harry 
,~an used the power of the 1945 Act to authorize the US to join the other countries engaged in tariff negotiations 
W ch later culminated in the formation of the GATT on October 30, 1947. 
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intensely criticized by the Congress on the grounds that the President lacked 
authority to accept international organization membership for the United 
States without congressional approva1.232 Congress had expected that the 
GATT would be a subsidiary.agreement under the ITO charter, depending 
upon the ITO secretariat for servicing and enforcement. This expectation was 
based upon the recognition by Congress that most of the general clauses in 
the GATT were drawn from comparable clauses drafted for the ITO.233 
Due to the foregoing reasons and more234, neither the ITO Charter, nor the 
GATT was able to pass the litmus test of becoming effective before the 
expiration of the United States extended Trade Agreement Act in 1948. The 
GATT for instance, needed parliamentary approval by some of the other 
countries235 in order to accept many of its general clauses.236 However, in 
231 The ITO was a product of the RTAA 1945. The US Congress reasonably expected that the ITO will be 
presented to them for approval. 
232 Hearings on the Trade Agreements Act and the Proposed ITO Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 80th 
C~ng. 1 st Sess. (1947); Hearings on Operation of the Trade Agreements Act and Proposed ITO Before the Senate 
Fmance Comm., 80th Congo 1 st Sess. (1947) 
233 Supra footnotes 189, 190 and 191. 
234 The political enthusiasm for the ITQ and GATT had waned by the expiration ofthe extended Trade Agreement 
Act 1948. The victory of the Republican Party in the 1946 mid-term elections for Congress frustrated all the political 
~nthusiasm that the Democratic Party had brought in pushing for the ITO and GATT. 
~ The other countries that were signatories to the GATT in 1947 include the Commonwealth of Australia, the 
C . gdom of Belgium, the United States of Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, the Republic of Chile, the Republic of 
hina, the Republic of Cuba, the Czechoslovak Republic, the French Republic, India, Lebanon, the Grand-Duchy of 
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order to avert a complete loss of the entire effort, the 23 original members of 
GATT signed in late 1947, a "Protocol of Provisional Application" (PPA), 
which became effective on January 1, 1948.237 Since then, the GATT has 
been applied only through this protocol with hopes that at the inception of the 
ITO Charter, the Protocol of Provisional Application would give way to a 
definite application of the GATT. 
Unfortunately, this expectation never came through. Although the Havana 
conference completed the draft charter of the ITO in early 1948, the United 
States Congress had by then gone through a lot of changes that prevented the 
President from convincing them to approve their hitherto wanted baby238, 
and thus the ITO became a still-born baby239. At the demise of the ITO, 
Luxemburg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Kingdom of Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, 
Syria, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
236 Some ofthe GATT general clauses include Article I (General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment), Article II 
(Schedules of Concessions), Article III (National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation), Article V 
{Freedom of Transit), etc. 
237 Protocol of Provisional Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. Pts. 
~6: TIAS No.1700, 55 UNTS 308. The Protocol was signed by the original 23 members of the GATT, including the 
mted States of America. i38 Upon the death in 1945 of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his Vice President, Harry Truman took over. In 
. 946, the Republican Party won the mid-term elections in the US Congress. Consequently, the new Democratic 
Harry Truman, had to deal with a rather uncooperative Congress from 1946 until 1948 when he was 
President with a Democratic Congress. Truman was so frustrated with the Republican Congress that he 
them the "do nothing" Congress ostensibly in reference to their inability to pass the bills on his nationalized 




GATT therefore became by default, the central organization for coordinating 
national policies on international trade.240 With the addition of new 
members, it became apparent that GATT was not fashioned to undertake the 
onerous responsibility of coordinating the GATT trade policies, again re-
igniting the search for a more effective coordinating organization. 
At the ninth session of the Contracting Parties of GATT, held from October 
1954 to May 1955, a number of amendments were proposed to GATT and a 
draft charter for the proposed Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC) was 
completed.241 The United States Congress again rejected the OTC charter, 
like its predecessor the ITO charter. However, the amendments to the GATT 
were accepted under the authority of the then existing USTrade Agreements 
Act. The inability to form a coordinating organization for the GATT 
consequently gave rise to the situation whereby the nation participants in 
GATT are not called "members", but rather are called "contracting 
------------------
240 Ibid 
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parties.242 
According to Jackson, J.H., et aI, at the commencement of the Uruguay 
Round of TaIks243 in 1986, the" birth defects" that hindered the efficiency of 
GATT can be summarized as follows:244 
1) GATT application was controversial, flawed and still "provisional, " 
although the GATT rules did apply as binding international treaty 
obligations. Grandfather rights still existed, even though they were 
originally intended to be temporary. A number of other institutional 
problems stemmed from this basic treaty structure, including the 
difficulty of the amendment process, its uncertain relationship to 
242 GATT Article XXV(1) provides that "Representatives of the contracting parties shall meet from time to time 
for the purpose of giving effect to those provisions of this Agreement which involve joint action and, generally, with 
a ~iew to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement. Wherever reference is made in 
this Agreement to the contracting parties acting jointly they are designated as the CONTRACTING PARTIES." 
Article XXV (3) provides that each contracting party shall be entitled to have one vote at all meetings of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES. Further, Article XXV (4) provides that decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
be taken by a majority of the votes cast, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement. See also Article 
on Acceptance, Entry into Force and Registration. 
The GATT operated by organizing and coordinating a series of multilateral negotiations known as "trade 
Until the Kennedy Round in 1964, the previous GATT trade rounds concentrated on tariffs reduction. The 
Round produced an agreement on anti-dumping and development. The Tokyo Round of 1973 followed suit 
producing agreement on non-tariff barriers. A comprehensive list of the GATT Round of Talks is as follows: (1) 
-'~\'-'UlJ<L - 1947 (2) Annecy(France) - 1949 (3) Torquay(UK) - 1951 (4) Geneva - 1956 (5) Dillon Round-
965 (6) Kennedy Round - 196411967 (7) Tokyo Round - 197311979 (8) Uruguay Round - 198611994 (9) 
Round - 200112005 
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domestic laws, and the lack of a unified dispute settlement procedure, 
questions of membership, and the ill-defined powers of the contracting 
parties . 
. 2) The amending provisions of the General Agreement were such that it 
was considered nearly impossible to amend it. The delay required by 
the treaty acceptance process, the difficulty of obtaining the required 
number of acceptances, the shift in bargaining power involved under 
the amending procedure in the context of a large membership and the 
fact that even when an amendment is effective it will not apply to 
countries which do not accept it, are all the reasons why the amending 
procedure had fallen into disuse. This caused a certain rigidity and 
inability to develop rules to accommodate the many new developments 
in international trade and other economic interdependence subjects. 
One result was the development of an elaborate system of "side 
agreements or codes, " which created additional problems. 
J 











~ A key problem was the relationship to GATT of these many side 
agreements, which in most cases were stand-alone treaties, but which 
were intimately linked to the GATT treaty structure itself. It was 
unclear in some circumstances what this relationship was and whether 
an obligation contained in a side agreement would prevail over one 
contained in the General Agreement or vice versa. In any event, since 
the side agreements tended to have a series of separate procedures for 
various matters including dispute settlement, there was certain 
inefficiency in the potential 'forum shopping. " Side agreements bound 
only governments, which accepted them, and the opportunity for 
countries to pick and choose led to "GATT a la carte. " 
4) The relationship of the GATT treaty system to domestic law in a variety 
a/GATT member countries was very murky. This might have existed in 
any event, regardless of the basic treaty structure, since national legal 
systems differ so widely. Nevertheless, it seemed that some more 
attention could be given to the possibility of certain international treaty 
J 










implemented domestically. More attention has been given to this 
question in recent years, sometimes under the rubric "transparency. " 
It should be noted that the General Agreement itselfhas several clauses 
(e.g. Article A) that are related to transparency, dealing with 
publication and administration of trade regulations. 
5) There were a number of troublesome problems with respect to 
membership, or "contracting party status, " in the GATT system. There 
were various ways by which a nation could become a "member" of 
GATT or one of the side agreements. In some cases, a territory that did 
not have full independent international sovereignty could obtain 
membership. In certain cases, former colonies could be sponsored for 
membership and enter GATT with very little substantive commitment, 
reducing the "terrain of reciprocity, " and leading to criticisms of 
unfairness. The General Agreement had an "opt out" clause (Article 
XX\V) by which individual GATT contracting parties could opt out of 
a GATT relationship with other parties, at one time only (when one of 
J 
them originally enters GATT). Furthermore, there were a number of , 
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instances where there was an effective "opt out" at a later time, with 
murky legal results. Article XXI with an exception for "national 
security" purposes is related to this issue. 
··.6) The powers of the Contracting Parties defined in the General 
Agreement were very ambiguous. Indeed, they were so broad that they 
could be the subjects of abuse (although they have not been so abused). 
There were a number of unsettled and disquieting issues, such as the 
power of the contracting parties to interpret the General Agreement 
and the relationship of actions of the contracting parties to some of the 
side agreements. Furthermore, the decision making process left much 
to be desired. The so-called "consensus approach, " which had evolved 
to ameliorate some of the problems of a one-nation, one-vote structure, 
had slowed the decision making process and made it hard to confront 
difficult issues. The GATT Council had been created out of whole cloth 
by resolution of the Contracting Parties, and had been delegated 













7) The dispute settlement processes of GATT were one of the more 
intriguing institutional developments of the institution. The treaty 
language was very sparse indeed, but many decades of the practice had 
resulted in a considerable amount of exegesis. A Tokyo Round 
"understanding" elaborated and formalized many of the dispute 
settlement procedures that had developed in the early decades of GATT 
practice. 
8) Finally, there was a long festering problem with respect to the 
relationship of GATT to the other Bretton Woods institutions, 
particularly, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
At the end of the eight-year Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of trade 
negotiations, there had emerged what had eluded all previous efforts - a 
and better-defined international organization and treaty structure in 
name of a World Trade Organization (WTO). The Uruguay Round did 










revisions in the dispute settlement procedures.245 Furthermore, while the 
GATT dealt almost entirely with trade in products, the Uruguay Round 
added a treaty for trade in services (GATS), and another for the protection 
of intellectual property (TRIPS). The WTO, is thus, charged with the 
responsibility of administering these three treaties with a view to a better 
regulation of international trade and services.246 
It must be clarified that the formation of WTO during the Uruguay 
Round247 was not planned and was not anticipated. The agenda and 
negotiating structure prepared by the ministers at Punta del Este, Uruguay, 
in September 1986, did not include the drafting of any organizational 
charter. Moreover, the planners did not want to incur the opposition of the 
United States Congress, which had earlier struck down two attempts at 
forming such organization.248 However, a group was formed to consider 
The Uruguay Round created the unique Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) as the main WTO agreement • 
settling disputes. Also, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) was created to handle all the cases arising under the 
The DSB is made up of all member governments, usually represented by an official at the level of an 
or its equivalent. The DSB also creates a permanent seven-member committee called the Appellate 
. The members of the AB serve four-year terms and are individuals that are not affiliated with any government. 
~.wto.org/englishltratop e/dispu e/dispu e.htm, last visited June 27, 2006 
Ibid 
See the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (1994), Pub. L. No 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809. 
SUpra, footnote 197 
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the "Future of the GATT system", conveniently called the FOGS group. 
The FOGS group focused on the GATT's relationship to the monetary 
part of the Bretton Woods system and on designing the new Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism (TPRM). 
In May of 1990, the government of Canada was the first to formally 
propose the formation of a W orId Trade Organization. The European 
Union was in support of this proposal, but suggested a Multilateral Trade 
Organization (MTO). The Ministerial Meeting held in Brussels in 
December of 1990 ended in an impasse. Afterwards, the then GATT 
Director-General, Arthur Dunkel, intervened and encouraged the 
negotiators to go ahead and produce a complete rough draft of the 
UULlVll results. The draft that was presented contained a draft charter 
a new organization to be called MTO. 
that time until December of 1993, the negotiators worked out their 
es and the oppositions of the draft charter, especially, the name-










charter proposal with a change of name back to WTO. In April 1994, the 
proposal was finally formalized at the Morocc0249 summit and ready to 
be submitted to the respective governments for ratification250. 
reviewed the historical background of the Bretton Woods institutions 
~!which form the bulk of the IFIs, it is equally important that we review the 
11nstitutional framework of these IFIs, starting with the IMF. 
'~'>c: 
The Uruguay Round Final Act was signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, on April 15, 1994. It subsequently came into 
~n Jall)lary 1, 1995, thus giving birth to the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
at December 11, 2005, the WTO has 149 members. See 
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) 
'INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The Articles of Agreement25l of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
sets out the institutional framework of the Fund. The Articles provide for 
the following: 
i) A Board of Governors, 
ii) An Executive Board, 
. iii) A Managing Director, and 
Jv) A staff of international civil servants. 
highest authority of the IMF is the Board of Governors.252 The 
consists of one Governor and one Alternate Governor, appointed by 
of the IMF's member countries. The Governors are usually ministers 
~YV.":Lo.org/engl1Sh/thewto e/whatls e/whatls e.htrn, last visited June 19,2006. 
~ Arilcles of Agreement of the IMF which is the legal document that created and empowered the Fund, 
Into force in December 1945. For a complete reading of the Articles, visit 
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finance or heads of central banks in their own countries. The Articles 
provide that the Board of Governors may establish a Council as a 
permanent body of the IMF at the ministerial or comparable level to 
supervise the management and functioning of the international monetary 
system and to consider any proposals to amend the Articles of Agreement. 
However, the Board has not established the Council. Rather, an Interim 
Committee was established at the 1974 Annual Meetings . 
. The Interim Committee is composed of 24 IMF Governors. The 
.. Committee meets twice a year to fashion out how best to provide 
ministerial guidance to the Executive Board. It reports to the IMF's Board 
of Governors on the management and functioning of the international 
system and on proposals to amend the Articles of Agreement. 
1974, there was also established a Joint Ministerial Committee of the 
of Governors of the Bank and the IMF on the Transfer of Real 
to Developing Countries (the Development Committee). The 









UU.lvUL Committee, which has 24 members, also advises and reports 
the two Boards of Governors on development issues. 
Board of Governors normally meets once a year,253 but it may meet 
vote by mail. Over the years, the Board has delegated many of its 
"'~'TTa .. " to the Executive Board.254 Thus, while the Board of Governors is 
into the permanent decision-making organ of the IMF.255 The 
has its headquarters in Washington, D.C. The Executive Board 
y consists of 24 Executive Directors, who are appointed or elected 
member countries. 
Executive Board deals with a wide variety of policy, operational, and 
tive matters. These matters include surveillance of members' 
rate policies, provision of IMF financial assistance to member 
XII (2) of the Articles of Agreement, 1945. 
c,,·nnt...~te 90 , supra. 
XII (3) of the Articles of Agreement, 1945. 
delegation of permanent decision making authority arose by default. Since the Board of Governors which 
ranking authority meets once a year, the Executive Board consequently makes the daily decisions 
for the effective management of the Fund. 
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countries, consultations with members, and comprehensive studies on 
issues of importance to the membership. 
The Executive Board also selects the Managing Director of the IMF, who 
serves as Chairman of the Board and as the head of the IMF's staff. The 
Managing Director conducts the day-to-day business of the IMF .256 
The next IFI to be reviewed, the IBRD, commonly called the World Bank, is 
another Bretton Woods creation. 
~ J t • . , 
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III INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT (WORLD BANK) -
lli'STITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The institutional framework of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (World Bank), is contained in Article V of the Bank's 
constitution which is otherwise called the "Organization and Management 
Article."257 This Article V is very similar to the Fund's Articles XII and 
XIII. 
The Board of Governor of the Bank, like that of the Fund, consists of one 
governor and one alternate, appointed by each member country. The two 
boards meet in joint session once a year. Also, like the Fund, the daily 
operation of the Bank is delegated to the executive directors. 
The Board of Governor is, however, the highest authority of the Bank. The 
Article XII (4) of the Articles of Agreement, 1945.The current IMF Managing Director is Rodrigo de Rato, who 
formerly the Minister of Finance of Spain. His five year term began on June 7, 2004. 
The Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1944 (hereinafter 
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powers include the admission of new members, increase or decrease of the 
capital sto'ck of the Bank, suspension of a member, determination of the 
remuneration of directors, and other reserved functions.258 
The Articles of Agreement of the Bank provided for twelve executive 
directors of whom: 
(i) Five shall be appointed, one by each of the five members having the 
largest number of shares; 
(ii) Seven shall be elected ........ by all the Governors other than those 
appointed by the five members ...... 259 
In accord with the agreement at Bretton Woods, the member countries having 
, the largest number of shares were, in order, the United States, the United 
Kilgdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France. The Soviet Union, however, 
failed to ratify the Articles of Agreement, thus, India moved up to the fifth 
to as IBRD Articles of Agreement), 
IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 2. 
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position.260 
Executive directors and their alternates were to be appointed or elected for 
two-year terms. Article V, section 4( e) of the Articles of Agreement, provides 
that the Executive Directors shall function in continuous session at the 
principal office of the Bank and shall meet as often as the business of the 
Bank may require. 
The president of the Bank is the chief executive officer, "responsible for the 
organization, appointment and dismissal of the officers and staff, subject to 
the general control of the Executive Directors."261 In the recruitment of 
staff, the president must be influenced primarily by the "paramount 
importance of securing the highest standards of efficiency and have technical 
260 Mason, E.S. & Asher, R.E., The World Bank since Bretton Woods, (1973), 29. Several explanations have been 
o~ered for the failure of the Soviet Union to ratify the Articles of Agreement of the Bank and the Fund. By their 
faIlure to ratify the Articles, the Fund quota relegated the Soviet Union to third place in number of votes in both the 
~und and the Bank, after the United States and the United Kingdom. No veto power was given to any member while , 
fr und membership required making available a substantial amount of information hitherto undivulged, and borrowing 
~m the Bank involved exacting investigations. Further, a general purpose of the Bank and the Fund to promote 
~nvate trade within freer markets was of little interest to the Soviet Union. At a meeting of the General Assembly of 
"be United Nations in 1947, the Soviet representative charged that the Bretton Woods institutions were merely 
/anches of the Wall Street" and that the Bank was "subordinated to political purposes which make it the instrument 
~ one great power." See also, Knorr, K, "The Bretton Woods Institution in Transition," International Organization, 
01. 2,1948,35-36. 
261 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 5(b). 
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competence" and also "pay due regards to the importance of recruiting 
personnel on as wide a geographical basis as possible."262 
Notwithstanding the similarity in the provisions of the Fund and the Bank 
with respect to organization and management, there exists, however, certain 
differences between the two. Article V, section 6, provides for an advisory 
council "selected by the Board of Governors, including representatives of 
banking, commercial, industrial, labor and agricultural interests .... " The 
charter provides that "the Council shall meet annually and on such other 
occasions as the Bank may request." It is noteworthy that although a 
distinguished group was appointed initially, the Council quickly fell into 
disuse and has never been revived. 
Article V, section 9, also authorizes the Bank to "establish agencies or branch 
offices in the territories of any member of the Bank." Section 1 0 of the same 
Article V, authorizes the establishment of regional offices, which "shall be 
adVised by a regional council representative of the entire area and selected in 
------------------
262 !Ban Articles of Agreement, Article V, section S(d), 
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such manner as the Bank may decide." This ideal has also been abandoned 
and the Bank has developed as a highly centralized institution, with all 
fundamental decisions being made in Washington. 
The GATT, we stated earlier, was designed to be the tripartite component of 
the other Bretton Woods institutions, namely; the IMF and the World Bank. 
However, due to some bureaucratic complications263, the GATT became 
formalized in another series of conferences, which spanned from the fall of 
1946 to mid-1948. Consequently, although started at the Bretton Woods 





IV GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT) 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF GATT 
The "General Articles" of the General Agreement comprise the basic trade 
policy commitments of the contracting parties. The thirty-eight articles 
contain detailed rules and obligations designed generally to prevent nations 
from pursuing "beggar-thy neighbor" trade policies, which would be self-
defeating if emulated, by other nations. 
It is important to emphasize that GATT is not a single agreement, but is a 
series of over two hundred agreements, protocols, process-verbaux, etc.264 
Some of these protocols are amendments to the text of the general articles, 
while many are corrections or revisions (in light of the re-negotiations) of the 
tariff schedules. Special "side agreements" have been completed in the 
• 
Context of GATT, which fill out details of the obligations on certain subjects, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~:! See Meier, G.M., supra. 
Jackson, Davey & Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems ofIntemational Economic Relations, 1995. 
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but these apply only to the signatories of the side agreements.265 
The central core of the GATT system of international obligations is contained 
in Article II. This Article embodies the tariff schedules and expresses the 
detailed commitments by each country to limit tariffs on particular items by 
the amount negotiated and specified in its tariff schedule. Another important 
GATT obligation is contained in Article I, which deals with the "Most 
Favored Nation" (MFN) clause. This clause represents a central feature of the 
GATT obligation system, based on the non-discrimination principle. Under 
the MFN clause, each member of GATT is obligated to treat other GATT 
members at least as well as it treats any other country with regard to imports 
or exports. A third important GATT obligation is contained in Article III, 
which deals with the national treatment obligation. While the MFN clause 
provides a non-discriminatory principle for the treatment of imports from 
foreign nations, the national treatment obligation specifies that imports shall 
be treated no worse than domestically produced goods, under internal 
taxation or regulatory measures. 
-------------------------
265 Jackson, Davey & Sykes, Jr., supra, 298. 
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Although the General Agreement is central to international trade regulation, 
it has never itself been applied. It is rather applied by the "Protocol of 
Provisional Application" (PPA), which was signed on October 30, 1947.266 
The birth of the World Trade Organization (WTO), during the eight-year 
Uruguay Round was, therefore, a welcome development in international 
trade267. More important, the WTO was charged with the administration of 
three treaties, namely; the GATT treaty on trade in products, the treaty on 
trade in services (GATS), and the treaty for the protection of intellectual 
property (TRIPS). It is equally pertinent to clarify that although the WTO 
was charged with the administration of the GATT treaty, it is not a creation ,. 
of the Bretton Woods system. First, the WTO was created from the Uruguay 
Round of Talks and was endowed with the legal authority to administer not 
only the GATT treaty, but the other two treaties on trade in services and the 
protection of intellectual property. 
• 
------------------------~666 ;rotocol of Provisional Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,1947,61 Stat. Pts. 
267 iAS No. 1700,55 UNTS 308. See also Jackson, etc, supra. 
he Uruguay Round of Talks spanned from 1986 to 1994, and culminated in the formation of the WTO. 
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V WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF WTO 
Unlike the GATT Charter, the WTO Charter clearly established an 
international organization. The WTO Charter endows the WTO with legal 
personality, supports it with the traditional treaty organizational clauses 
regarding "privileges and immunities," secretariat, director-general, 
budgetary measures, and explicit authority to develop relations with other 
inter-government organizations and non-government organizations. The 
Charter prohibits staff of the Secretariat from seeking or accepting 
instructions from any government "or any other authority external to the 
WTO."268 
As we indicated earlier, the WTO was formed as an effort to remedy most, if 
not all of the "birth defects" of the GATT, since inception. Thus, the WTO 
eXpressly provided for the continuity of the GATT. The WTO Charter 
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provided, among others, that except as otherwise provided, the WTO and the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements shall "be guided by the decisions, procedures 
and customary practices followed by (GATT 1947)." Also, the Charter 
provided that the secretariat of the GATT 1947 would become the WTO 
secretariat. The legal framework of the WTO is very similar to that of GATT 
1947, with some major changes. At the apex of the authority is the 
"Ministerial Conference." The Conference is followed iIi hierarchy by the 
"General Council," which has overall supervisory authority, including 
responsibility for carrying out many of the functions of the Ministerial 
Conference between the conference sessions. Other Councils include the 
Council for Trade in Goods, the Council for Trade in Services, and the 
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights . 
. Also established by the Charter was a "Dispute Settlement Body" (DSB). The 
DSB is charged with the responsibility of supervising and implementing the 
dispute settlement rules in Annex 2. The General Council performs these 
functions. Further, the Charter created a "Trade Policy Review Mechanism". 
------------------------------------------------------------




We have so far traced the origin of the Bretton Woods System as well as the 
off-shoot institutions. The sole goal of establishing these institutions, from 
the perspective of the founders, was to collaborate to ameliorate and prevent 
the re-occurrence of the economic and financial conditions before W orId War 
II. The difficult economic and financial conditions that existed then, 
contributed immensely to the outbreak of that war. The Bretton Woods 
System269, as well as the off-shoot institutions270, were conceived as and 
remain the premiere institutions that greatly impact the economic, monetary, 
and financial forces of the twentieth and twenty-first century. Their 
. 
llnportance and pre-eminence, therefore, can not be over-emphasized. 
~---------------------
:. A~ We have explained earlier, the Bretton Woods system created the bulk of the international financial 
:. titutlons (IFIs) which includes the IMF, the World Bank, and later the WTO. 
These include all the complementary institutions to the IFIs like the other international organizations formed 
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However, these institutions were not created, we believe, to serve equally the 
economic, monetary, and financial needs of all the countries271. Certainly, 
the founders were the political leaders of the Allied Forces during the Second 
World War. Their goal, apparently, was to create the institutions that will in 
the general scheme of things, provide the tools to forestall a re-occurrence of 
pre-war economic and financial environment. But, particularly, they intended 
to establish institutions that will serve as catalysts and managers in the 
speedy reconstruction and rehabilitation of the devastated parts of the 
countries where the Allied Forces were drawn from, particularly, in 
Europe272. 
To buttress this point, General George Marshall,273 then U.S. Secretary of 
State, and chief architect of the famous Marshall Plan, while delivering a 
speech at Harvard University, said: 
un~er the auspices of the United Nations as well as the regional organizations like the African Union, the European • 
Drnon, the ASEAN etc 
~ It appears that 'this ·anomaly was taken into consideration in the formation of the Wodd Trade Organization 
. TO). The second preamble to the WTO Agreement provides as follows: "RecognizingJurther that there is need 
for Positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, 
~ecure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs oJtheir economic development," 
2;rnphasis added), see The Uruguay Round Agreement Act (1994), ibid. . 
M 2 A good case in point is the careful and elaborate plans that went into the formulation and implementation of the 
arshall Plan, otherwise known officially as the European Recovery Plan (ERP). 
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"It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed 
much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the 
European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement 
among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the 
part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to 
whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither 
fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up . 
unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. 
This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from 
Europe. The role of this country should consist offriendly aid in the drafting 
of a European program and of later support of such program so far as it may 
be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by 
a number, ifnot all, European nations." (emphasis added) 274 
. The consequence, we shall later see, was that the founders created these 
Institutions from their political, economic, and financial prisms. In the 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~"S<'~ the speech delivered by General George Marshall at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, at 




process, they allotted to themselves all the controlling powers and positions, 
and established goals and objectives that were so carefully tailored to serve 
their own interests. And the consequences are becoming more and more 
apparent as the world in the latter part of the twentieth century and the 
twenty-first century is completely different from the world in the early and 
mid-twentieth century when the IFIs were established. In view of the fact that 
the original purpose of the founding fathers of the BWS, was to ameliorate 
the harsh economic conditions that resulted in World War II, one would 
expect that in developing the legal framework for the operation of the BWS, 
that the poor economic conditions of the developing countries would be 
taken into consideration and accorded some measure of priority. 
In order to better appreciate how much power the founders of the IFIs 
allocated to themselves as well as the goals and objectives established for the 
IFIs, we shall undertake a review of the organizational structures of the IFIs 
in the next chapter. Hopefully, the review will expose the discriminatory 
allocation of powers and privileges to the founders which has greatly 
inflUenced the goals and objectives of the IFIs and the allocation of the 
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resources of these institutions. In the exercise of their powers, particularly, in 
the allocation of the resources of the IFIs, the founders have over the years 




LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OFTHE BRETTON 
WOODS INSTITUTIONS 
I INTRODUCTION 
In order to understand the current roles of the IFIs in the de'~loping 
countries, it is pertinent, indeed essential, that we begin with a review of the 
"original"275 roles that these institutions set out to accomplish. I use the 
term, "original," to distinguish what was intended in the beginning, and what 
IS currently the case in light of the challenges internally confronting these 
institutions as well as those spanning from the twentieth century into the 
twenty-first century. Consequently, our effort cannot be exhaustive until and 
-------------------------------
~5 ~he "original" roles for the purposes of this work are those roles aimed at satisfying the primary objectives of 
. eSe tnstitutions which include a better regulated international monetary system, the expansion of foreign trade and 




unless we look at these "original" roles, as well as the "current"276 roles as 
spelt out in the constitutive instruments of the respective institution as well as 
the interpretative authorities on those provisions. This inquiry will attempt to 
cover the two major prongs of this research, beginning with the law 236 
governing the Bretton Woods System whichforms the core of the group of 
IFIs, as well as the practice 277 of these institutions since creation. In this 
chapter, we shall focus primarily on the law governing these institutions, 
while saving their practice for the next chapter. 
In order to determine the "original" roles established for these IFIs, we must 
begin the search from the constituent documents278 that established these 
institutions as well as their analysis by learned scholars and publicists. The 
approach I will undertake in this chapter, therefore, will be to critically 
review and analyze the constituent documents that gave rise to these 
------------------------------------
~6 The "current" roles, on the contrary, are those that these institutions have developed and created in response to 
£ e ever-changing challenges of the 20th and 21 5t century, such as the three main strategies employed by the Fund as 
2~l1ows: Surveillance strategy, Technical assistance strategy, and the Lending strategy. 
7 Such practice includes those exhibited by the institutions over the years and which have become widely 
~Cepted by member states. 
w~ By constituent documents, we mean the multilateral treaties that the founding member states signed and ratified 
ch gave birth to these IFls. 
133 
• 
institutions279 in light of the authoritative interpretation of the learned 
scholars and publicists. Such a review will, hopefully, highlight my 
contention that these constituent documents were originally framed to reflect 
a Euro-American centric approach, contrary to a universal approach. By so 
doing, we can re-visit what the organizers intended to accomplish, as wen as 
how the roles that these institutions were created to serve have been greatly 
impacted by the changes within the institutions280 as well as in the 
world.281 In the concluding chapters, we shall draw from some of our 
observations in this chapter to proffer some suggestions on how to tinker 
with the roles with a view to enhancing the performance of these institutions 
in the international community in general and the developing countries in 
particular. 
279 The constituent document of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), otherwise 
known as the World Bank is the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. (http://web.worldbank.orgIWBSITE/EXTERNALlEXTABOUTUS/O) last visited August 17,2005. 
The constituent document of the IMF is the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund 
~:II~.imf.org/external/pubs/ftlaa/index.htm) last visited August 15,2005; the constituent document of the 
A ATT is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (http://www.ciesin.orgiTGIPI/TRADE/gatt.htrnl) last visited 
;gus~ 17.' 2005, while the constituent document of the WTO is the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
28 garuzatlOn (http://www.wto.org) last visited June 9, 2006. 
~ The expansion of the membership of these institutions from the few original member nations to almost all the U:0ns, as well as the increased demand for fairness and equality from the developing countries have continued to 
~ llenge the viability of the institutional and, legal framework of these institutions. Notable in this regard was the 
.o~tion of such regional organizations like the OAU, the Non-aligned movement, UNCTAD, etc, and their 
~:stent ~emands for fairness and equality in these institutions policies and practices. 
e The impact of globalization, diseases, terrorism, etc., has immensely changed the landscape of the world 






It is trite knowledge that the world after World War II is completely different 
in all shapes and forms from the world we currently live in. The 
consequences of the war on the economies of the international community 
were far-reaching and devastating.282 The need for the creation of the IF Is 
was apparent and urgent, not just to facilitate recovery, but to ensure that the 
pre-war discriminatory trade practices do not re-occur. The impact of 
globalization283 - economic, political, scientific, and technological- and the 
consequential development of a truly global village cannot be over-
emphasized. All these factors justify the creation of the international financial 
institutions (IFIs). And since the IFIs were created to serve the international 
community, they must, in order to remain relevant, be subject to such 
changes as are necessary in the accomplishment of their goals and objectives. 
---------------------
282 See the toll of the war on both the Allied and Axis Powers, supra. Footnotes 165 and 166. 
283 Globalization has been used to imply economic, political, scientific, and technical liberalization of trade. Whilst 
the goals of all the Multilateral Financial Institutions are to "open" all the economies that were hitherto "closed", the 
:sulting implications are becoming overwhelming for these institutions to contain. A closed economy encourages u: flow of investments and trade, while a closed economy discourages or regulates the inflow of investments and 
e. The argument in favor of open economy is that it is more conducive to the efficient allocation and use of 
:s~urces: which in tum contributes to "an increase in production and incomes." See Stefan P. Schleicher, "Borders 
(P ~ade III a Borderless World", in OECD Proceedings, Globalization and Environment: Preliminary Perspectives 




II INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) 
The IMF was created at the Bretton Woods Conference284 as an integral part 
of the reconstruction efforts after World War II285. Specifically, the Fund 
was created as a system that will facilitate the speedy repair of the 
international monetary system after the war. Most of the damage arising from 
the war occurred in Europe and certain parts of the world that actively 
participated in the war.286 Since most of the world's presently grouped 
developing countries did not play active roles in the prosecution of the war, a 
literal interpretation of the goal of the Fund appears to exclude them. In other 
words, the original goal of creating the IMF ad the sister institutions was far 
from the idea of facilitating the speedy repair of the economies of the 
developing countries287. Such roles, as will be discussed later; have evolved 
2~4 The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund was adopted at the United Nations Monetary and 
Fmancial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 22, 1944. Entered into force December 27, 1945. 
Amended effective July 28, 1969, by the modifications approved by the Board of Governors in Resolution No. 23-5, 
~dopted May 31, 1968; amended effective April 1, 1978, by the modifications approved by the Board of Governors 
mResolution No. 31-4, adopted April 30, 1976; and amended effective November 11,1992, by the modifications 
;pproved by the Board of Governors in Resolution No. 45-3, adopted June 28, 1990. 
85 The War was waged between the Axis Powers led by Nazi Germany and the Allied Powers led by Great Britain, 
~ndspanned from 1939 to 1945. 
2~6 Supra, footnotes 165 and 166. 
7 The "original" roles/purposes of the IMF can be seen from Article 1 of the Articles of Agreement which states 
~ fOllows: promoting international monetary cooperation; facilitating the expansion and balanced growth of 
mternational trade; promoting exchange stability; assisting in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments; 
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I/lii, .. ~:1 
over the years during the existence of the IMF. Although the roles established 
for the IMF can be glossed from Article 1 of its Articles of Agreement288, it 
is a different ball-game when those roles are subjected to authoritative 
interpretation by the staff and legal department of the institution, or indeed 
any other commentator.289 
It is comforting to note that the Articles of the IMF "justify, indeed direct, 
observance of a teleological technique"290 to its interpretation when it stated 
thus: 
"The Fund shall be guided in all its policies and decisions by the purposes 
set forth in this Article. "291 
The dilemma arises when those seemingly apparent purposes set forth in the 
Fund's Articles are subjected to varying interPretations and nuances that are 
and making its resources available (under adequate safeguards) to members experiencing balance of payments 
difficulties. See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.htm. last visited August 15,2005. 
288 Ibid 
289 There is a persuasive opinion that the organs of the IMF and the W orId Bank are better fitted to apply the 
teleological technique than external entities. See Gold, Joseph, Interpretation: The IMF and International Law, 1996, 
P·18 & 19. According to Mr. Gold, the organs are better fitted to apply the technique given their "effectiveness and 
expert knowledge, and in the analogy of U.S. administrative agencies." Sir Joseph Gold is an internationally 
~Ognized authority on the IMF and the development of international monetary law. He served as a member of the 
1 gal Department of the IMF from 1946 to 1960, as General Counsel and Director of the Legal Department from 
2~60 to 1979, and as Senior Consultant to the Fund. 
o See Gold, Joseph, ibid. :1 The original Articles of the Fund referred only to the "decisions" of the Fund, however; the First Amendment of 
e ft,-rticles inserted "policies" to Article I. The First Amendment became effective on July 28, 1969, after the 
~Odlfications were approved by the Board of Governors in Resolution No. 23-5, adopted May 31, 1968. See 







aimed at justifying the prevalent policies and decisions of the Fund. 
According to Sir Joseph Gold292, the dilemma is understandable, because "a 
teleological approach to interpretation in the adoption of policies and 
decisions calls for an expert knowledge of the history and development of the 
organization's purposes as expressed in its Articles and its subordinate law 
and as capable of response to changing circumstances. " 
Unfortunately, the organs of the organizations that should be better fitted to 
apply the teleological interpretative technique to the Articles lack the 
requisite knowledge and expertise for a number of reasons. First, the 
Executive Directors and staff may lack the historical knowledge about the 
organization after sometime because most of the EDs serve for a limited time 
in the organization. Also, the rate of turnover in the staff pool may 
significantly affect the ability to retain the "institutional memory" of the 
organization.293 Consequently, the technique will imply "that sometimes 
one and sometimes another purpose must be given ascendancy over other 
purposes without establishing a legal fixed hierarchy among them. "294 It is 
----------------------





interesting to note that the main inspiration for the original Articles of IMF, 
B.D. White, forewarned this development in his memorandum for a 
stabilization fund dated July 10, 1943, when he stated as follows: 
"The various purposes enumerated in the outline are to a considerable extent 
interdependent and overlapping and in some instances may even represent 
apparently conflicting tendencies. Yet, progress in the attainment of almost 
anyone of them facilitates progress toward the attainment of many of the 
others. Each of them represents a different phase of international monetary 
arrangements and calls in the main for different procedure, different powers, 
and in some cases, different kinds of resources. The fact that some of the 
.~ .. :-< 
~ .. :~ :., 
objectives may be at times harmonious and at other times conflicting, 
indicates that the management of an international stabilization fund cannot 
be reduced to a matter of simple rules. The successful operation of the Fund 
calls for constant examination of a large variety of pertinent factors and the 
Continual evaluation of various effects which might be expected to follow any 
• 
particular action or failure to act. "295 
139 
It may be in reaction to the above constraints in strictly applying the 
teleological approach to interpretation that the IMF has creatively interpreted 
its Articles based on the different stages of its development.296 
The earliest stages focused on the Fund's regulatory authority.297 Two main 
motives reinforced this approach. First, was the reinforcement of the 
international monetary system that had been created.298 Second, was the 
desire to protect the Fund's resources against misuse at a time when the 
major tasks were focused upon reconstruction and development after the 
devastation of war.299 
The next stage was immediately after the Second Amendment which 
abrogated the par value system of the Fund. Consequently, the Fund's 
interpretation focused more on justifying growth and less on balance of 
payments. 3 00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
;95 Horsefield, History 1945 -1965, Vol. 3, p. 46, cited in Gold, supra. 
/6 Gold, Joseph, supra, p. 564 & 565 
97 ibid, p. 564 
298 ibid 
299 ibid 
300 Ibid, p. 565 
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The interpretation and application of the law of the IMF falls squarely upon 
the IMF team consisting of the Board of Governors, the Executive Board, the 
Managing Director and the Staff. This team is also conveniently referred to 
as the organs of the Fund. 
GOVERNING STRUCTURE 
In order of priority, the Articles of Agreement30 1 provide for the following 
organs: 
1) The Board of Governors 
The Board of Governors 3 02 is the highest authority of the IMF. It consists 
of one Governor and one alternate Governor appointed by each of the 
IMF's member countries303. The Governors are usually Ministers of 
-------------------------
~~~ Art~cle XII, section 1, of the IMF Articles of Agreement deals with the Organization and Management issues. 
303 ArtIcle XII, section 2 
htt.../~urren~ly there are 184 member countries; consequently, there are 184 members ofthe Board of Governors. See 
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Finance or Heads of Central Banks in their own countries.304 
The Articles also provide that each Governor and each Alternate shall 
serve until a new appointment is made. Further, that no Alternate may vote 
except in the absence of his principal. The Chairman of the Board shall be 
selected from one of the Governors.305 
The Articles also empower the Board of Governors to delegate to the 
Executive Board authority to exercise any powers of the Board of 
Governors, except those powers conferred directly by this Agreement on 
the Board of Governors.306 Although all members have equal 
representation on the Board of Governors, yet, their respective votes vary 
according to the number of votes allotted to each member country. 
Consequently, the Articles make it explicitly clear that, "Each Governor 
shall be entitled to cast the number of votes allotted under Section 5 of 
---------------------------------
304 As of March 2007, the current Nigerian Minister of Finance, Mrs Nenadi Esther Usman serves as a member of 
~e Board of Governors, while the current Central Bank Governor, Prof Charles Soludo, serves as the alternate 
Governor. The current representatives of Ghana on the Board of Governors are Paul Acquah as Governor, and 
~ge Gyan-Baffuor as alternate Governor. The Brazilian representatives are Guido Mantega as Governor, and 
s· que de Campos Meirelles as alternate. The representatives of Korea are Duck-Soo Han as Governor, and 
eoutae Lee as alternate. 
305 Art· 30 ~cle XII, section 2 (a), supra. 





I ;~i '. 
• 
this Article to the member appointing him" (emphasis mine )307. In this 
caveat lies the fundamental difference in the powers of the developed 
countries and those of the developing countries. Although each member 
country enj oys equal numerical representation on the Board of Governors, 
yet each member country's representative enjoy differential voting powers 
within the same Board. The obvious result, no doubt, is that by their 
superior voting powers, the developed countries dictate and enforce 
policies and practices within the Fund that ultimately serve their best 
interests. 
The Articles provide that the Governors and Alternates shall serve on the 
Board without compensation from the Fund, but they are entitled to 
reasonable expenses incurred in attending meetings.308 The Articles also 
empower both the Board of Governors and the Executive Board to appoint 
such committees as they deem advisable for the more efficient 
administration of the Fund. Such committee membership should not be 
-------------------------
307 Article XII, section 2 (e), supra. Section 5 (a) states as follows: "Each member shall have two hundred fifty 
~~~es Pl~s one additional vote for each part of its quota equivalent to one hundred thousand special drawing rights." 
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limited to Governors or Executive Directors or their Alternates. 309 In 
line with the foregoing provision, the Board of Governors on July 26, 
1972, adopted a resolution establishing a Committee on Reform of the 
International Monetary System,31 0 known as the Committee of 20. 
Further, an Interim Committee was established at the 1974 Annual 
Meetings.311 The Interim Committee is composed of 24 IMF Governors. 
The Committee meets twice a year to fashion out how best to provide 
ministerial guidance to the Executive Board. It reports to the IMF's Board 
of Governors on the management and functioning of the international 
monetary system and on proposals to amend the Articles of 
Agreement.312 
In 1974, there was also established a Joint Ministerial Committee of the ' 
Boards of Governors of the Bank and the IMF on the Transfer of Real 
Resources to Developing Countries (the Development Committee). The 
---------------------------------
;09 Article XII, section 2, 0), supra 
3
10 The Committee of 20, as it was popularly called concluded their work on June 12-13, 1974. 
11 Ibid 
312 On June 12-13, 1974, the Conunittee of 20 concluded their work and reconunended that there was need to 
establish an inunediate program to help monetary system evolve. On January 7-8, 1976, the Interim Conunittee also 
reconunended that there was need to embark upon "interim reform" of the monetary system, including the 
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Development Committee, which has 24 members, also advises and reports 
to the two Boards of Governors on development issues. 
The Board of Governors normally meets once a year, but it may meet or 
vote by mail. Over the years, however, the Board has delegated many of 
its powers to the Executive Board and the Managing Director of the 
Fund.313 
2) The Executive Board 
Although the Board of Governors is the highest authority of the IMF, in 
practical terms, the Executive Board314 is the permanent decision-making 
organ of the Fund. The Executive Board consists of Executive Directors, 
who are appointed or elected by the member countries. The five members 
having the largest quotas are entitled to appoint five members of the 
Executive Board, while the remaining fifteen members of the Board shall 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~endment of Article IV and other issues. 
313 See IMF By-laws, section 15 which is similar to the World Bank's By-laws, section 15. 






be elected by the rest of the membership (emphasis mine )315. Here again, 
one can see how the composition of the EB is so arranged to be dominated 
by the five members with the largest quotas. In this case, the five members 
are entitled to appoint five members of the EB, while the rest of the 
membership of the Fund votes to elect the remaining fifteen members. 
Unlike the Board of Governors, the Articles empower the Executive 
Directors to appoint their Alternates. Such Alternate enjoys the full power 
to act for the Executive Director when the Executive Director is absent. 
But when the Executive Director is present, Alternates are entitled to 
attend meetings, but may not vote. 316 An Executive Director shall " ":, 
continue in office until the successor is appointed or elected.317 Similar to 
the provision on the voting privileges of the Board of Governors, each 
appointed Executive Director shall be entitled to cast the number of votes 
allotted under Section 5 to the member appointing him (emphasis mine) 
• 
-----------------------
315 Article XII, section 3 (b) (i) (ii), supra. 
316 Article XII, section 3 ( e), supra. 
317 Article XII, section 3 (f), supra. 
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318. On the contrary, each elected Executive Director shall be entitled to 
cast the number of votes which counted towards his election (emphasis 
mine) 319. The disparity within the EB becomes more apparent in the 
voting structure of the EB. Whilst the five members appointed can 
individually cast the number of votes allotted under Section 5 to the 
member appointing him/her, the remaining fifteen members are limited to 
cast the number of votes which aggregated to his/her election on the 
EB.320 By this arrangement, the votes of the fifteen members are 
marginalized into the number of votes that elected each of them, whilst the 
votes of the five mernbers depend on the huge allocation of votes and 
quotas under Section 5. 
The Executive Board deals with a wide variety of policy, operational, and 
administrative matters. These matters include surveillance of members' 
exchange rate policies, provision of IMF financial assistance to member 
• 
countries, consultations with members, and comprehensive studies on 
------------------------
318 Article XII, section 3 (i) (i), supra. 
319 Article XII section 3 (i) (iii), supra. 
320 Ibid ' 
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issues of importance to the membership. 
3) The Managing Director 
The Managing Director of the IMF is selected by the Executive Board.32.l 
However, such selection shall be made of a person who is not a Governor 
or an Executive Director of the Fund322. The Managing Director, when 
selected323, serves as the Chairman of the Executive Board and as the 
head of the IMF' s staff. In that capacity also, the Managing Director 
conducts the day-to-day business of the IMF.324 
-------------------------
~~1 Given the dominance of the five members with the highest number of quotas and votes in the Executive Board, 
. It 18 of no surprise that the appointment of the Managing Director of the Fund has been dictated by those powerful 
Article XII, section 4 (a). . 
The first person to be appointed the Managing Director of the IMF was Camille Gutt, from Belgium, who 




4) The Staff 
The IMF staff typically comprises of international civil servants325. The 
pool is drawn from the member countries with a view to having 
widespread representation in the staff. The staff works under the direction 
and supervision of the Managing Director, who has the power (subject to 
the control of the Executive Board), for the organization, appointment, 
and dismissal of the staff of the Fund326. They implement the day-to-day 
decisions and policy directives of the Fund. The fact that most of them are 
international civil servants provides the Fund with a rich variety of 
expertise to harness within the system.327 
• 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------s . 
3~~U1, whose five year tenn began on June 7, 2004. 
325 Footnote 114 and 115, supra; IMF SURVEY, September, 1995, supra. 
As of2005, the IMF staff is comprised of approximately 2,700 members drawn from 141 countries. 
149 
Q!LOTA SYSTEM 
Central in the organizational structure of the Fund is the quota system. 328 
Article III, section 1, of the IMF Articles of Agreement provides as follows: 
"Each member shall be assigned a quota expressed in special 
drawing rights. The quotas of the members represented at the 
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference which accept 
membership before December 31, 1945, shall be those set forth in 
Schedule A. The quotas of other members shall be determined by 
the Board of Governors. The subscription of each member shall 
be equal to its quota and shall be paid in full to the Fund at the 
appropriate depository." 
Under the system, each member of the IMF is assigned a quota, expressed 
in SDRs, which is equal to its subscription in the IMF. The quota is 
• 
intended to reflect the size of the member's economy relative to the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~;6 Art~cle XII, section 4 (b). 
3/ ArtlCle XII, section 4, © and (d). 
8 On December 27, 1945, the Articles of Agreement of the Fund entered into force upon signature by 29 
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economy of other members. The quota is a good reflection of a member's 
maximum financial commitment to the Fund329, its voting power330, as 
well as its access to the Fund's resources.331 The voting strength is 
calculated based upon I vote for each SDR 100, 000 of its quota, plus the 
250 basic votes to which each member is entitled. Further, the quota also 
determines a member's maximum access to the financial resources of the 
IMF, as well as its share in allocations ofSDRs by the IMF. A member is 
generally required to pay up to 25 percent of its quota in SDRs or in 
currencies of other members specified by the IMF, with the concurrence 
of the issuers; it pays the remainder in its own currency. 
Until the early 1960s, the initial quotas of the original members of the IMF 
were based upon what was generally termed the Bretton Woods formula.332 
This formula was a combination of some basic variables as an average of 
governments, representing 80 percent of original quotas. • 
329 As of June, 2006, Nigeria had a total quota of 1,753.2(Millions) SDRs corresponding to a total number of votes 
of~7,782; Brazil had a total quota of3,036.1(Millions) SDRs corresponding to a total number of votes of30,6l1; 
while Korea had a total quota of 1,633.6(Millions) SDRs corresponding to a total number of votes of 16,586. For 
~o~e details on the quotas and voting powers, see http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/memdir/members.htm. last 
VIsIted June 12,2006. 
330 ibid 
~~1 By the end of March 2006, the total quotas of the IMF were SDR 213 billion, which translates to about u.s. 
08 billion. 
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annual import and export flows, gold holdings and dollar balances, and 
national income. In 1963, the Bretton Woods formula was revised and a 
number of other quota formulas wereintroduced.333 These formulas 
employed the economic data of the Bretton Woods formula, but included 
parallel calculations that employed current account transactions and the 
variability of current receipts in place of data on exports and imports. 
In 1980, the quota formulas were further revised with hopes of simplifying 
the procedure for calculating quotas and improving the quality of the 
economic data used in the formulas. Consequently, GDP replaced national 
income; a broader measure of official reserves was employed; and 
calculations used data on current account transactions, rather than trade data 
on imports and exports.334 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~32 Article III, section 1 of the IMF Articles of Agreement. 




Today, when a country applies for IMF membership,335 the IMF staff 
calculates a quota for the new member and compares it with the quotas of 
existing members of similar economic size and characteristics. The staff then 
suggests an initial quota or quota range in a paper prepared for the 
consideration of a committee of the Executive Board. If the country agrees to 
the terms and conditions of membership - including the amount of the initial 
quota - proposed by the committee, the full Executive Board considers the 
committee's recommendations. If the Board approves the recommendations, 
the Board forwards a proposed membership resolution to the IMF's Board of 
Governors. After the membership resolution is approved by the Board of 
Governors, and appropriate domestic legal and procedural steps are 
completed, a representative of the country signs the Articles of Agreement, at 
which time the country becomes a member. 
From the foregoing, we can appreciate the vital role that the quota system 
plays in the Fund as both a determinant of the power structure as well as in 
---------------------------------
335 Article II of the Articles of Agreement covers membership status. While section 1 deals with the "original 
members", i.e. those members represented at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference and who 
accepted membership before December 31, 1945, section 2, deals with "other members." See also Article III, section 
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the accessibility to the resources of the Fund. The voting structure of the 
Fund is weighted by the quota system, and consequently, the voting power of 
the members, particularly, the developing countries, rests on their quota 
system in the Fund. Furthermore, the amount of resources a member can 
draw from the Fund is predicated upon the size of the member's quota. 
Consequently, the voting power as well as the amount of resources available 
to the members, particularly, the developing countries, are determined by 
their limited share of the quota system. Yet, the formula that the Fund applies 
in the creation and management of the quota system takes little recognition of 
theexport instability, structural imbalance or dependence on imported inputs 
which is the bane of many developing countries. 
In light of the foregoing policies and practices, it is no wonder that the 
developing countries tend to blame the Fund, to a large extent, for 
aggravating their adjustment problems.336 In addition to the point earlier 
made that the Fund has treated the balance of payments objective as 
overriding and thus has shown insensitivity to other government objectives, 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
;' Whic~ empowers the Board of Governors to allocate the quotas of other inembers in line with Article II, section 2. 
b36 Thls may explain the unpopularity ofthe Fund and the World Bank in the developing countries where they are 
oth perceived as agents of oppression rather than partners in development. 
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thethrust of the Fund's adju stment programs has been to focus more on 
reducing demand than on stimulating supply.337 
Developing countries, we have shown, lack the voting powers under the 
Fund's quota system. They also lack the accessibility to the resources of the 
. Fund commensurate to their pressing economic and financial needs. In order 
to access additional financial resources within the Fund, they must agree to 
very burdensome terms and conditions which are imposed by the Executive 
Board. In light of the fact that developing countries have little or no 
alternatives in the face of pressing financial and economic difficulties, they 
reluctantly accept such burdensome terms and conditions. According to one 
commentator, in so doing, developing countries do not just borrow money 
from the Fund (and other IFIs); they effectively mortgage the future of their 
. citizens. 3 3 8 
• 
---------------------------
337 This practice, no doubt, contravenes one of the principal objectives of the Fund which is the facilitation of the 




On August 1, 1995, membership of the Fund comprised of 179 countries, 
with a total quota of SDR 144.9 billion. Currently,339 the Fund's 
membership stands at 184 countries, with total quotas of SDR 213 billion. 
Why the demand for a continuous review of the quota formula? 
The importance of a continuous review of the quota formula is very critical 
for the following reasons: 
1. A general quota review provides the opportunity for the Fund to 
assess the adequacy of the total quota package with regard to the 
members' balance of payments financing needs, as well as the 
Fund's ability to meet those needs. 
2. A general review provides the Fund the opportunity to reflect any 
changes in a member's new position in the world economy. 340 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
:~8 See Susan George, A Fate Worse than Debt (New York: Grove Press, 1988), at 155, where she posited that, 
3~ebted countries h~ve not just borrowed money - they have mort~~ged the future. Nature puts up the collateral." 
. See h!!p://www.lmf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm. last vIsIted June 12,2006 
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Although the Board of Governors approves the recommendations of the 
Executive Board on a quota review, such approval must receive the final 
approval of 85 percent majority of the membership. In the approval of a 
quota review by the Board of Governors, such approval must pass two litmus 
tests: the size of an overall increase and the distribution of the increase 
among the members.341 The Board has authorized thus far, Thirteen General 
Review of the quota formula.342 Such review exercise is carried out in 
regular intervals of five years, except the review that was carried out between 
1958 and 1959. Not all the reviews have resulted in quota increases.343 
The size of a member's quota within the Fund is very critical for a number of 
reasons. According to Sir Gold,344 "both the absolute and the relative size of 
a quota are of central importance in a member's relations with the IMF. For 
example, a member's subscription to the IMF's general resources is equal to 
its quota; voting power is based largely on quota; the rate of allocations of 
3~O Outside a general review, the Fund can embark upon ad-hoc quota review. In 2001, the Fund granted China a 
~gher qu?ta after it resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong. 
41 The Importance of these two criteria is ostensibly to first ensure that the increase meets the present financial 
~eeds of the members, and secondly, to ensure equitable distribution in line with pre-existing formula. 
042 After the conclusion of the Twelfth General Review on January 30,2003, the Board authorized the Thirteenth 
3;neral Review which is expected to be completed by January 30, 2008. 
3 Apart from the exceptional review of 1958/59, of all Twelve reviews already concluded, increases have been 
~~proved on seven occasions. Those increases occurred during the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and 
eventh General Reviews. 
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SDRs is proportionate to quotas; and access to the general resources is 
usually defined in terms of quota." 
SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS (SDRs) 
The Fund created the Special Drawing Right (SDR), to serve as an 
international reserve asset, as well as to supplement the existing official 
reserves of member countries.345 At the time of SDR creation, the two key 
reserve assets for international transactions were gold and theU.S. dollar. 
However, those two proved inadequate to meet the increasing needs arising 
from the expansion of world trade and financial developments. Consequently, 
the IMF intended to fulfill the need by creating another international reserve 
asset in the SDR. Upon creation, the Fund allocated SDRs to member 
countries in proportion to their already established IMF quotas. Each 
member's SDR corresponded to the member's quota ratio. Another important 
feature of the SDR was that it became the unit of account of the IMF and 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~~ See Gold, supra, note 289, p. xxviii 
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some other international organizations. From the creation of the SDR in 1967 
until the early 1970s, the Fund applied the SDRs as its unit for calculating 
transactions. 
Sometime in the early 1970s, the Bretton Woods system collapsed346, 
occasioning the ineffectiveness of the SDR. Although the Fund has been 
working hard to restore the viability of the SDR as a credible reserve asset, 
presently, the SDR maintains limited use as a reserve asset. What is left intact 
of the SDR is the use as the unit of account of the IMF and some other 
international organizations. 
Under the IMF system, however, a member may be allocated SDRs in 
proportion to their IMF quotas. There are two kinds of-allocations: 
1. The General Allocations, which are based on a long-term global need to 
Supplement existing reserve assets. Generally, such allocations are considered 
-------------------------i46 As a result of the collapse, on August 15, 1971, the United States government informed the IMF that it will no 
Onger freely buy and sell gold to settle international transactions, thus signaling the beginning of the floating 
ex.change regime. For further reading see, Wilson E Schmidt, "The Night We Floated," International Institute for 
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every five years, but not automatically approved every five years. 
2. The Special One-time Allocation, which is based on the need to correct or 
remedy an anomalous situation or emergency.347 
III CURRENT TELEOLOGICAL APPLICATION OF THE FUND'S 
ARTICLES 
The Articles of the Fund, like other constitutive instruments, are products of 
constitutive treaties.348 Such treaties deserve special interpretative approach 
quite dissimilar to the constitutional interpretation applied to national 
constitutions.349 This position, which has gained currency, was articulated 
by Judge Spencer in his separate opinion in the advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice in Certain expenses of the United Nations, 
1962. According to Judge Spencer,350 
"In the interpretation of a multilateral treaty such as the Charter which 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~onOmic Research, Original Paper 9, October 1977 . 
. ;7 The IMF's Board of Govemors approved a special one-time allocation ofSDRs in September 1997 to correct 
34e fact that countries that joined the IMF subsequent to 1981, have not received an SDR allocation. 
34
8 GOld, Supra, note 337, p. 407 
9 Ibid 
See Certain expenses o/the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, o/the Charter), Advisory Opinion 0/20 
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establishes a permanent international mechanism or organization to 
accomplish certain stated purposes there are particular considerations to 
which regard should, I think, be had. Its provisions were of necessity 
expressed in broad and general terms. It attempts to provide against the 
unknown, the unforeseen and, indeed, the unforeseeable. Its text reveals that 
it was intended - subject to such amendments as might from time to time be 
made to it - to endure, at least it was hoped it would endure, for all time. It 
was intended to apply to varying conditions in a changing and evolving 
world community and to a multiplicity of unpredictable situations and events. 
Its provisions were intended to adjust themselves to the ever changing pattern 
of international existence. It established international machinery to 
accomplish its stated purposes. 
It may with confidence be asserted that its particular provisions should 
receive a broad and liberal interpretation unless the context of any particular 
provision requires, or there is to be found elsewhere in the Charter, 
• 
something to compel a narrower and restricted interpretation. The stated 
PUrposes of the Charter should be the prime considerations in interpreting its 
----------------------------------------------
jUly 1962, Ie] Reports 1962, p. 151, at p. 185 
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text." 
From the above statement, the learned Judge encourages the interpreters of 
any constitutive treaties to be solely guided in the process by the stated 
purposes of the Charter while applying "a broad' and liberal interpretation" 
unless mandated to apply "a narrower and restricted interpretation."3 51 
. Earlier in this chapter,352 we noted that the Fund appears to be guided in the 
interpretation of its Articles according to its different stages of 
dvdopment. 353 Pursuant to that objective, the Fund employs three main 
strategies that serve it well both in terms of creativity as well as flexibility. 
The strategies are commonly characterized as follows:354 
1. Regulatory IS urveillance 
According to Sir Gold, regulatory powers are those exercised by the Fund to 
approve or disapprove certain measures applied or contemplated by member 
-------------------------------------
351 Ibid 
;52 SUpra, footnote 253. 
3;3 Supra, footnotes 254 - 257. 
~ The ~lassification of the modus operandi of the Fund as strategies is my own creation and does not reflect the 
ternunology. Neither are these strategies listed in the order of importance. The Fund may apply one of the 
S:tegies at a time or a combination of the three pursuant to their goal. Infact, Sir Joseph Gold classified these 
S tegies as the three main areas that the Fund exercises its jurisdiction. See Gold, supra 
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countries.355Under the regulatory/surveillance strategy, the Fund provides 
member-countries regular policy advice. In the same process, the Fund 
conducts, once a year, a comprehensive assessment of each country's 
economic situation.356 From these assessments, the Fund publishes twice a 
year the comprehensive report in the W orId Economic Outlook and the 
Global Financial Stability Report. 
2. Technical! Advisory Assistance 
Under the technical or advisory assistance and training strategy, the Fund 
offers these services to member countries free of charge. Such assistance and 
training are offered in a variety of fields like fiscal policy, monetary and 
exchange rate policies, banking and financial system supervision and 
regulation, statistics, etc.357 
3. Financial/Lending 
Under the lending or financial strategy, the Fund offers member-countries the 
financial lifeline to facilitate their recovery from adverse economic and 
" 
financial situations. In the same process, the Fund imposes the terms and 
------------------------
355 Gold, supra. 
356 Ibid. 
357 IMF Articles, Article V section 2 (b), see also Gold, supra, pp 422-423. 
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conditions for such use.358A pre-condition for the Fund's loan is that the 
affected country will obligate itself to a specified policy program designed 
and monitored by the Fund.359 The IMF lending activities are generally 
conducted under two principal programs: (1) the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF) program, (2) and the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative (HIP e) program.360 
Although a literal reading of the Fund's Articles of Agreement will indicate 
an emphasis on the promotion of international monetary cooperation, 
facilitation of the expansion of international trade, promotion of exchange 
stability, etc., through such operational strategies as surveillance, technical 
assistance, and lending; however, from the Fund's current teleological 
approach to the interpretation of its Articles, it would seem that the Fund is 
relegating these listed objectives to the background in preference to the 
restoration of payments equilibrium objective. In the opinion of one 
---------------------------------
358 The popular term in the context of the Fund's activities is the conditionalities. 
359 Such policy programs may take a variety offorms including the austerity measures, structural adjustment 
~rograms, devaluation of currencies, severe compression of real wages, privatization, higher interest rates, etc. 
60 There are currently 18 countries in this category of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), owing 
approximately US 50 billion dollars. Most of those countries are in Africa. 
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commentator,36l "the Fund would appear to have treated these objectives as 
secondary to the restoration of payments equilibrium and has tended to 
neglect the potentially negative impact of its programs on the "primary 
objective" set out in the Articles of Agreement." But given the current stage 
of the Fund's development as an institution, coupled with the increased and 
more demanding roles on its limited human and material resources, the Fund 
may be reacting to the more pressing global challenge of payments 
disequilibrium. And in so doing, the Fund may have unwittingly relegated the 
"original primary objectives" to the background and replaced them with the 
current and more pressing objective of restoration of payments equilibrium. 
In the same vein, the Fund has also relegated to the background another 
primary objective, which is, the provision of balance-of-payments finance for 
members experiencing temporary financial and budgetary constraints. Such 
finance was anticipated to reduce the risk that imports would be cut in 
circumstances where they need not and should not be cut, and would thus 
• 
Contribute to the maintenance of both domestic and global employment and 
Income. However, the conditions stipulated by the Fund before members can 
--------------------------
361 Sanusi, 1.0., "African Economic Disequilibria and the International Monetary System, "papers presented at a 
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access the financing facility have negated the interventionist role that the 
Fund was intended to serve. Again, the Fund has attempted to justify its new 
attitude by pointing out that its financing resources are limited while the 
droand for them is in the increase. 
IV INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT (WORLD BANK) 
The World Bank, we stated earlier, was one of the tripartite creations of the 
Bretton Woods Conference362. Article I of the Articles of Agreement, 
363specifically states that the primary purpose for the creation of the Bank 
was to assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members 
by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes as well as the 
restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war. 364(italics mine) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
;YmPOsiumheld in Nairobi, Kenya, May l3-15, 1985. 
6~ See the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, 1945, supra. Also, see Article II, section l(a) 
;hiCh st~tes as follows: "The original members ofthe Bank. shall be those members of the International Monetary 
3 und WhICh accept membership in the Bank. before the date specified in Article XI, section 2(e)." 
U63 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank. for Reconstruction and Development, December 27, 1945,2 
.N.T.S. 134, hereinafter referred to as IBRD Articles of Agreement. It is noteworthy that of all 45 original member 
~ountries signatories to the Articles, only 4 were from Africa, namely, Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and then Union of 
Outh Africa 
364 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article I (i). 
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Contrary to the position of Sir Joseph Gold that "the original Articles were 
drafted without express differentiation between developed and developing 
,countries, and without acceptance of the idea that the promotion of 
development was a purpose of the IMF,"365 a careful reading of Article I of 
the Bank's Articles would suggest that the Article charges the Bank with the 
responsibility of accomplishing two major objectives. The first component of 
the responsibility consists of the 'facilitation of investment of capital for 
productive purposes" in the territories of members. The second component, 
however, limits the Bank to the narrower pool of "restoration of the 
economies destroyed or disrupted by war. " Thus, a literal interpretation of 
the mandate of the Article would imply that while the Bank is charged with 
the responsibility of serving the entire members under the first component of 
Article 1, the second component limits the Bank to the service of only 
member countries "destroyed or disrupted by war." Thus, from a literal 
Interpretation and application of Article 1, one can argue that developing 
Countries were included in the first component of the Article, while the 
-------------------------------------
~s ,Se,e Gold, supra, Although Sir Gold was writing specifically about the Articles of the Fund in this context, given 
Fe SlllUlarity of both the Articles of the Fund and the Bank, one can safely apply that comment in this context. 
Urther, the similarity extends to membership, whereby a condition for membership in the World Bank is 
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second component excluded most of the developing countries. The 
justification for this assertion may be anchored on the fact that many 
developing countries were not principal actors in World War II, and 
consequently, were minimally impacted by the war.366 Since the second 
component of Article 1 specifically covers only member countries "destroyed 
or disrupted by war", it could be argued that developing countries lack any 
legal basis to claim for assistance under this component of the Article.367 
Because they were not in the consideration of the framers of thatsecond 
component of the provision, they were thus excluded from the benefits of that 
purpose.368 But such a narrow interpretation will deprive, as it has been 
depriving developing countries, the opportunity to jump start their 
development with the active support and encouragement of the IFIs, 
particularly, the World Bank. Moreso, since the Bank and indeed the West 
created extra-ordinary interventionist policies and measures369 to jump start 
membership in the IMF. (IBRD Article II, section 1). • 
366 See footnotes 165, 166 and 241, supra. 
367 Ibid. 
~68 A good example of the extra efforts to boost private investment to the war-devastated Europe after World War 
11, the U.S. government included in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, ch.169, paragraph 111 (b) (3), 62 Stat. 
th44 (1948),. a system for guaranteeing U.S. private investments in Western European countries against restrictions on 
3 e conversIOn of currencies. See Shihata Ibrahim, MIGA and Foreign Investment, 1988, p.SS. 
69 Ibid, refer also to the Marshall Plan and other extra-ordinary policies geared towards accelerating the economic 
reCOvery of Europe after the war. 
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the economies of the European countries destroyed by war, one would expect 
such treatment for the developing countries in light of their present situation 
which is as bad as any war situation.370 
Furthermore, central to the Bank's mandate was for the Bank to stimulate and 
support foreign investment, which had declined significantly prior to and 
after W orId War II371. The idea of foreign investment from the narrow 
perspective of the founders of the W orId Bank covers primarily investment 
flowing from developed countries to developing countries for the sole 
purpose of profit maximization by the investing developed country firms. It 
may also include investment from the economies of former colonial masters 
to that of the former colonies. 
On the contrary, the anticipated flow of investment did not envisage flow of 
investment from the developing country firms to the developed country 
firms. Neither did it envisage flow of investment from the economies of the 
former colonies to that of the former colonial masters. Indeed, the proposed 
------------------------------------
370 Unfortunately, the West has not responded enthusiastically to the calls for a formulation of an African Marshall 
Plan or developing countries recovery plan. Other related calls for total and unconditional debt relief or forgiveness 
have not yielded tangible results. 
371 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article I (ii). 
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flow of investment, based on the classical theory372 on foreign investment, 
reflects the Euro-American centric view of foreign direct investment. The 
opposing view, however, based on the dependency theory373, highlights the 
concerns of this author as well as most developing countries that the central 
idea behind foreign direct investment is a system that creates permanent 
dependency on the part of the host country in a foreign direct investment 
relationship, notably, the developing countries.374 These objectives, no 
doubt, lend credence to my contention that the Bank was created, ipso facto, 
to serve the limited interests of the founding states, which were Euro-
372 The classical economic theory on foreign investment is premised on the assumption that it mostly benefits the 
host state, typically, the developing country. This assumption is based on the following factors: (a) the foreign capital 
brought into the host state guarantees that domestic capital that could otherwise be applied for that use is applied to 
other public use (b) foreign investment brings technology into the host state (c) employment is also created by the 
foreign investor (d) skills employed by the foreign investor will be transferred to the nationals employed in the 
enterprise (e) infrastructural facilities built either by the foreign investor or the host government benefits the general 
public. See Sornarajah, M, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 1994, pp 38 & 39. 
373 The dependency theory, on the contrary, is totally opposed to the classical theory and asserts that foreign 
investni~nt does not ensure sustained economic development in the host state. The argument is based on the 
contention that most foreign investments are driven by multinational corporations based in the developed countries. 
The multinationals, therefore, embark upon foreign investments driven by a global policy intended to primarily 
benefit the parent company and its shareholders in the home country. Consequently, the home countries become the 
central economies of the world, while the host states (developing countries) become subservient or peripheral 
e~onornies serving the interests of the central economies of the home states of the multinationals. Under the 
CIrcumstances, the host countries can not develop unless they break the link with the home countries that design the 
foreign investment agenda. For further reading, see Sornarajah, M, supra, p. 43. See also R. Peet, Global Capitalism: 
Theories of Social Development (1991) pp. 43-51; B. Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds (1988) pp. 
12-14; P. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil (1979); 
TJ. Biersteker, Multinationals, the State and the Control of the Nigerian Economy (1987). See also Samir Amin, 
Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formation of Peripheral Capitalism (1976) as well as D. Bennett 
andK, Sharpe, Transnational Corporations versus the State (1985). For a contrasting view on how communist states 
~ff~ctivelY control the activities of the multinationals, see M.M. Pearson, Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of 
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American states. The Bank ,has over the years insisted that it serves equally 
both the developed and the developing member states by a strict application 
ofthe teleological approach to the interpretation of its Articles. 
The Articles of the W orId Bank, just like that of the Fund, encourage a 
teleological technique in its interpretation.375 Accordingly, Article 1 of the 
Bank's charter376 provides as follows: 
"The Bank shall be guided in all its decisions by the purposes set forth 
b " a ave. 
However, the same dilemma faced by the interpreters of the Articles of the 
Fund confronts the interpreters of the Articles of the Bank. 3 77 The reason 
lies in the major components of a teleological technique which includes the 
demand for expert knowledge of the history and development of the 
organization's purposes, its subordinate law, as well as the capability to 
respond to changing circumstances.378 We shall coverthese challenges in 
• 
Olore details later; however, in the meantime let us review the 
-------------~---------
375 See footnotes 246 & 248, supra. 
376 See footnote 298, supra. 
377 Footnote 301, supra 
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organizational/institutional framework of the World Bank. 
GOVERNING STRUCTURE -
The institutional framework of the Bank is contained in Article V of the 
Bank's constitution, which is otherwise called the "Organization and 
Management Article." 379This Article V is similar to the Fund's Articles XII 
and XIII. 380 
In order of priority, the Articles provide for the following organs: 
1) The Board of Governors 
The Board of Governors,3 81 like that of the Fund, consists of one 
Governor and one alternate Governor appointed by each member country. 
The two Boards meet in joint session once a year. 
-------------------------------------------------
378 ibid 
379 lBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 1. 
380 IMF Articles of Agreement, supra. 
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The Board of Governors is the highest authority of the Bank.382 Its 
powers include the admission of new members, increase or decrease of the 
capital stock of the Bank, suspension of a member, determination of the 
remuneration of directors, and other reserved functions.383 
2) The Executive Directors 
Like the Fund, the Board of Governors delegates the daily operatiol). of the 
Bank to the Executive Directors. 384 However, the Board may not 
delegate to the Executive Directors the powers specifically enumerated in 
Article V Section 2 (b) (i) - (vii). 385The Articles of the Bank provided 
for twelve Executive Directors in the following categories: 
381 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 2 (a). 
382 Ibid. 
383 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 2(b). 
384 Supra, footnotes 154 and 155. 
38~ Such reserved powers of the Board include the power to admit new members and determine the conditions of 
!herr admission; increase or decrease the capital stock; suspend a member; decide appeals from interpretations of the 
Agreement given by the Executive Directors; arrangements to cooperate with other international organizations; 
~~~ne~t suspension of the operation of the Bank and the distribution of its assets; and determination of the 
stributlOn of the net income of the Bank. 
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i) five shall be appointed, one by each of the five members 
having the largest number of shares; 
ii) seven shall be elected ........... by all the Governors other than 
those appointed by the five members ........ 386 
The Board of Governors may, by a four-fifths majority of the total voting 
power, increase the total number of directors by increasing the number of 
directors to be elected. 387The Executive Directors and their alternates are 
appointed or elected for two-year terms. Further, they shall function in 
continuous session at the principal office of the Bank and shall meet as often 
as the business of the Bank may require.388 They are also empowered to 
appoint such committees as they deem advisable. Such committee 
membership need not be limited to governors, directors or their 
altemates.389 
---------------------------------
386 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 4(b). 
387 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, Section 4, (b) (i) and (ii), see particularly the interpretation paragraph 
at the end of sub section (b) (ii). 
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3) The President 
The President of the Bank shall be the chief executive officer, 
"responsible for the organization, appointment and dismissal of the 
officers and staff, subject to the general control of the Executive 
Directors."390 In the recruitment of staff, the President must be 
influenced chiefly by the "paramount importance of securing the highest 
standards of efficiency and of technical competence" and also, "pay due 
regard to the importance of recruiting personnel on as wide a 
geographical basis as possible. "391 
4) The Staff 
The President is the "chief of the operating staff of the Bank and shall 
conduct, under the direction of the Executive Directors, the ordinary 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
388 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 4(e). 
389 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 4 (i). 
390 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 5(b) .. 
391 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 5(d). 
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business of the Bank." 392This power extends to the organization, 
appointment and dismissal of the officers and staff of the Bank, subject to 
the general control of the Executive Directors. 393 In staff selection and 
recruitment, thePresident's goal is to "secure the highest standards of 
efficiency and of technical competence," while at the same time aiming to 
hire from a pool that covers "as wide a geographical basis as 
possible."394 
Further, the President and the staff enjoy international duty status in the 
discharge of their official duties to the Bank. While they are expected to 
owe their duty entirely to the Bank and to no other authority, each member 
of the Bank is expected to "refrain from all attempts to influence any of 
them in the discharge of their duties."395 . 
The World Bank Group is comprised of five organizations as follows: the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the 
------------------------
~~2 Currently, the World Bank staff strength is around 9,300 working out ofW~~hington and other country offices. 
3 e lmp:/ /web. worldbank.org/WB SITE/EXTERNAL/EXT ABOUTUS/O, last VIsIted August 17, 2005. 
93 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article Y, section 5 (b), supra 
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International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), 
and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
The World Bank Group can be further classified into the implementation 
. group and the service group. The implementation group consists of the IBRD 
and the IDA, while the service group consists of the IFC, the MIGA, and the 
ICSID. While the IBRD focuses on middle income and creditworthy poor 
countries, the IDA focuses primarily on the poorest countries in the world. 
Both organizations, however, are serviced by the combined efforts of the 
IFC, the MIGA, and the ICSID.396 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
394 IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 5 (d). i95 IBRD, Articles of Agreement, Article V, section 5(c). 
96 For further reading on the World Bank Group and the relationship of each organization to one another, refer to 
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V CURRENT TELEOLOGICAL APPLICATION OF THE BANK'S 
ARTICLES -
Under the section covering the IMF above, we enumerated the generally 
accepted approach to a teleological interpretation of the Articles of any 
organization. Such approach, we stated, "calls for an expert knowledge of the 
history and development of the organization's purposes as expressed in its 
Articles and its subordinate law and as capable of response to changing 
circumstances."397 Indeed, the Articles of the Bank, just like that of the 
Fund, not only justify but direct observance of a teleological approach to the 
interpretation of the Articles.398 
Consequently, Article I of the Bank's charter399 provides that: 
"The Bank shall be guided in all its decisions by the purposes set forth 
above." 
However, as in the analysis under the Fund above, the application of the 
teleological approach to interpretation within the Bank is hampered by such 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
~~: II web.worldbank.orgIWBSITE/EXTERNALlEXTABOUTUS/O, last visited July 3,2006. 




challenges as the lack of expert knowledge in the history and development of 
the Bank. The high turnover rate of the staff and the Executive Directors 
hinder the accumulation and preservation of institutional memory for easy 
access and application by other employees who may be relatively new in the 
Bank. Compounding this situation is the conflicting provisions of the Bank's 
Articles of Agreement400 in some respects. For instance, the Articles created 
an ambiguous situation by assigning to the Board the responsibility for "the 
general operations" of the BankAO 1 In the same vein, the Articles mandate 
the President to conduct its "ordinary business" under the "general control" 
of the BoardA02 The Bank has, however, attempted to clarify these roles in 
the First Annual Report of the Bank which was issued in September 1946. In 
that report, the Bank clarified the roles as follows: 
"Matters of policy determination are the responsibility of the Executive 
Directors, while operational, administrative and organizational questions are 
399 Footnote 311, supra. The Articles of the World Bank or IBRD is also referred to as the Bank's charter or 
Constituent instrument. 
400 See IBRD Articles of Agreement at arts. V (4) (a) and 5(b). See also IFC Articles of Agreement, May 25,1955, 
264 U.N.T.S. 117, at arts IV(4)(a) and 5(b); IDA Articles of Agreement, January 26,1960,439 U.N.T.S. 249, at 
arts. IV (4) (a) and 5(b). 
401 Ibid 
402. Ibid. Although Article V(5)(b) of the IBRD Articles of Agreement mandates the President to conduct the 
~rdlUary business of the Bank "under the general direction of the Executive Directors", it is important to note that 
oth "direction" and "control" were used interchangeably in the section. 
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the responsibility of the President, subject to the general direction and control 
of the Executive Directors."403 
According to Dr. Shihata, notwithstanding the effort of the Bank to clarify 
the ambiguity in roles, the Bank's first President resigned in December 1946 
after six months in office.404 In another attempt to further clarify the roles, 
the Bank's Board in 1947 adopted a "Memorandum with Regard to 
Organization and Loan Procedure"405. By the time the Memorandum was 
last revised in 1956, the Board was specifically charged as being "responsible 
for the decision of all matters of policy" which is inclusive of loan 
approvals.406 On the contrary, the management was charged as being 
"responsible for developing recommendations on all matters of policy 
requiring decisions by the Executive Directors."407 
From the foregoing, one can appreciate the difficulty within the Bank in its 
attempt to teleologically interpret the Articles of Agreement with respect to 
the roles designed for each office within the Bank. As a result, roles have 
------------------------------------
403 IBRD, First Annual Report by the Executive Directors (1946) 
404 See Mason and Asher, The World Bank since Bretton Woods, p. 41-42, 46-48 (1973). 
405 IBRD Doc. R-106, June 4,1947. 
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clashed or overlapped as a result of mis-interpretation by the officers 
involved. This challenge becomes more apparent in the on-going efforts of 
the Bank to apply a teleological approach to the interpretation of the various 
provisions of its Articles. Notwithstanding these challenges, the Bank must 
continue to strive to interpret its Articles teleologically whether in respect to 
the different roles of the various offices or in respect to the various policies 
and practices that it embarks upon pursuant to its responsibilities. 
VI GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARRIFS AND TRADE (GATT) 
GATT is not a single agreement, but is comprised of over two hundred 
agreements, protocols, process-verbaux, etcA08 The protocols are products 
of amendments to the text of the general articles, as well as corrections or 
revisions of the tariff schedules. In addition, special "side agreements" were 
completed, dealing with obligations on certain subjects, but applicable only 





06 lBRD Doc. R-106!8, September 14,1956. 
7 Ibid 
408 Jackson, J.H., Jean-Victor Louis & Mitsuo Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo Round: National Constitutions 
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The basic trade policy commitments of the contracting parties of GATT are 
contained in the "General Articles" of the General Agreement. 409And the 
General Agreement, which includes the detailed commitments on tariffs that 
comprise the "Tariff Schedules," fills many volumes of treaty text. The 
General Articles, which is thirty-eight in number, also covers seventy pages 
of text. They contain a number of detailed rules and obligations, which 
admonish nations not to pursue "beggar-thy-neighbor", trade policies, which 
will be counter-productive if practiced by all the contracting nations. 
From the previous chapters, we have shown that GATT was a product of 
badly compromised diplomacy. Consequently, GATT suffered what has been 
rightly characterized as "birth defects."41 0 The result was a cumbersome 
system that lacked the organizational structure to be efficient in the arena of 
international trade and commerce. 411 As a matter of fact, intemationallaw 
did not recognize GATT as an organization. The implication is reflected in 
the fact that signatories to GATT are not identified as "members" as is the 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
and Intemational Economic Rules 1-2, (1984). 109 See the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1947. The Agreement was signed on 30 October 
,,947 by 23 contracting parties. The tariff concessions, however, came into effect on 30 June 1948 through a 
4Protocol of Provisional Application". 
10 Footnote 179, supra. 
411 As we noted earlier, the ITO was designed to serve as the organizational structure that will implement the 
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, case in other international organizations, but are called "contracting 
parties" 412 
GOVERNING STRUCTURE 
As a consequence of the demise of the ITO, 413 the GATT lacked the 
complementary institution for implernentation. Further, since the GATT was 
never intended to serve as an organization, it also lacked the requisite 
institutional framework for its self implementation. But the GATT had made 
a provision for the convening of its first meeting. Under this provision, the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations is mandated to convene the first 
meeting of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, no later than March 1, 1948.414 
Apart from the convening of the first meeting by the UN Secretary General, 
the GATT apparently created the office of an Executive Secretary. The 
GATT obligations. However, when in 1950 the United States government announced that it would not seek 
Congressional ratification of the Havana Charter (which created the ITO); it signaled the demise of the ITO. 
412 See http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/whatis-e/whatis-e.htm. last visited June 19,2006. For comparison, see 
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994 at 
lltmJL~.wto.org/englishidocs e/legal e/ursum e.htm, last visited June 20, 2006. 
413 Footnote 170 
:14 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XXV (2). See also 
~WWw.wto.org/englishidocse/legale/gatt4701e.htm. last visited June 20, 2006. 
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Executive Secretary was to serve as the head of the GATT secretariat. 415 
Under Article XXVI, 416 each contracting party accepting the Agreement 
was expected to deposit an instrument of acceptance with the Executive 
Secretary. The Executive Secretary will, thereafter, inform all the parties of 
the date of deposit and of the day on which the Agreement enters into force 
under paragraph 6 of this Article. 417 
GATT OBLIGATIONS 
At the heart of the GATT obligations is the Article II, dealing with tariff 
schedules. The Article comprises detailed commitments by each country to 
limit tariffs418 on particular items by the amount negotiated and specified in 
its tariff schedule. The other GATT obligations, however, are designed to act 
415 FOllowing the tradition of continuity from GATT to WTO, the secretariat still remains in Geneva, Switzerland. 
416 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XXVI, (4). See also, 
http:www.wto.org/Eng1ishidocs_e/1egate/gatt47_02_e.htm. last visited June 20, 2006. 
417 It is important to note that by the decision of the 23 Contracting Parties on March 1965, the title of the head of 
the GATT secretariat was changed from "Executive Secretary" to "Director-General". The first GATT Director-
General was Eric Wyndham-White (1948-1968) from UK, while the current Director-General is Pascal Lamy (2005-
present), from France. . 
:18 Tariffs are taxes on imported goods. The logic is that by the imposition of such taxes, the imported goods will 
e~ome more expensive than the locally manufactured goods; c0l!sequently, it will serve as a deterrent to importers 
. while protecting domestic producers. Such taxes can be applied ad valorem, specific, or by compound formula. Ad 
valorem duty is levied as a percentage of the invoice value of imported goods. Specific duty is levied as a fixed sum 
On a physical unit of an imported good, while Compound duty is levied as a combination of specific and ad valorem 
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as a counter-balance to the basic tariff obligation by ensuring that nations do 
not evade tariff obligations by the use of other non-tariff barriers419 that 
would negatively affect imports. These obligations, nevertheless, provide an 
exception in Article I, which comprise the "Most Favored Nation" clause 
(MFN). The MFN clause is the principal clause, and it provides in part as 
follows: "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like 
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting 
parties)l20 
Another important GATT obligation is the national treatment obligation, 
which is contained in Article III. Sub paragraph 2 of that Article states as 
follows: "The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into 
the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
duties. See also Ball, McCulloch, Jr, Frantz, Geringer & Minor, International Business: The Challenge of Global 
Competition, 10th ed, 96. 
419 Other non-tariff barriers may not involve monetary measures, but may include other bureaucratic bottlenecks 
that are classified as quantitative and nonquantitative barriers. Such quantitative barriers include quotas, voluntary 
eXpOrt restraints (VERS), and orderly marketing arrangements. Nonquantitative barriers include direct government 
partiCipation in trade, customs and other administrative procedures and standards. Again, the logic is that such 
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indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of 
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products."421 
It is worthy of note that in addition to the obligations, the General Agreement 
contains several exceptions. 
GATT EXCEPTIONS 
Some of GATT exceptions include the following: 
1. Article XII, which provides for Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance 
of Payments, creates an exception when a contracting party intends to 
safeguard its external financial position and balance of payments.422 
2. XIII, which provides for Non-discriminatory Administration of 
Quantitative Restrictions, creates an exception in the application of 
prohibition or restriction on imports.423 
3. XIV, which provides for Exceptions to the Rule of Non-discrimination, 
---------------------------------------------
bottlenecks will discourage imports without imposing any monetary fines. 
:20 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article I (1). 
/1 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article III (2). 
22 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XII (1, 2, (a)). 
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creates many exceptions to the non-discrimination rule.424 
4. Article XIX, which provides for Emergency Action on Imports of 
Particular Products, creates an exception where imports are causing or 
threatening serious injury to domestic producers.425 
5. Article XX, which provides for General Exceptions, creates many 
exceptions ranging from the protection of the public morals to the 
acquisition or distribution of products in local supply.426 
6. XXI, which provides for Security Exceptions, create exceptions for the 
protection of a contracting party's "essential security interests", as well 
as "its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the 
maintenance ofintemational peace and security."427 
7. Article XXIV, which provides for Territorial Application - Frontier 
Traffic - Customs Unions and Free-trade Areas, creates exceptions to 
the strict interpretation of the Article.428 
8. Article XXV, which provides for Joint Action by the Contracting 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
423 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XIII (1). 
424 The General Agreement on Tariffs ad Trade (GATT 1947), Article XIV (1 - 5). 
425 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XIX (1, a & b). 
:26 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XX (a - j). 
427 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XXI (a - c). 
28 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XXIV (3 a & b). 
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Parties, creates an exception in exceptional circumstances.429 
Ironically, the General Agreement, which is central to international trade 
regulation, has never itself been applied. It is, however, applied by the 
"Protocol of Provisional Application" (PP A), which was signed October 
30, 1947.430 
From the foregoing shortcomings of the GATT, it became imperative that 
a properly constituted organization must be formed in order to fully 
complement the functions of the Fund and the World Bank as originally 
envisioned at the Bretton Woods conference. Thus, when the World Trade 
Organization was formed, it completed the dreams of the founding fathers 
of the Bretton Woods conference. 
-------------------------------------
:29 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), Article XXV (5). The sub-paragraph 5 reads as 
ollows: "In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement, the CONTRACTING 
:~~IES may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party by this Agreement; Provided that any such 
~clslon shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more than 
If of the contracting parties." 
430 Protocol of Provisional Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 
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VII WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) 
As we stated earlier, the formation of the WTO was a result of mere 
happenstance.431 Although GATT suffered from many birth defects432 which 
inhibited its maximum performance, there was no indication that the Uruguay 
Round433 would produce an organization that will take over from GATT known as 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO, however, differs substantially 
from the ITO (the 1948 International Trade Organization). While the ITO Charter 
included five sizeable chapters filled with substantive rules regulating international 
economic behavior, plus a chapter with an elaborate set of institutional clauses, the 
WIO on the contrary is a "mini-charter," with no substantive rules or institutional 
measures. The WTO is a very flexible institution, which allows for texts to be 
added or subtracted with time and for the evolution of institutions necessary for 
implementation of the rules.434 
-
Stat.pts.5, 6, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS 308. • 
431 Chapter 1, supra. 
432 Footnote 179, supra 
433 Uruguay Round negotiations, spanned from 1986-94. It was signed at the Marrakesh ministerial meeting in 
April 1994. 
~34 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization in Final Act Embodyi~g the Results of the Uruguay 
Eoun~ of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1994) 33 I.L.M. 1125. For further readmg, see the Agreement 
J stabhshing the World Trade Organization at http://www.wto.org/englishldocse/legale/legale.htm. last visited 
line 26, 2006. 
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The WTO Charter explicitly established an international organization. The 
Charter endowed the organization with legal personality, clauses on 
"privileges and immunities," secretariat, director general, budgetary 
measures, and explicit authority to develop relations with other inter-
government organizations, as well as non-government organizations. Further, 
the Charter prohibits staff of the Secretariat from seeking or accepting 
instructions from any government "or any other authority external to the 
WTO."435 The World Trade Organization is essentially comprised of six 
major parts. The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
serves as the umbrella agreement, with other five major parts, identified as 
Annexes. The other five parts are the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (1994), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU), and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. 
436 
---------------------------------
435 See Footnote 192. 
4i6. In addition to the big six components of the WTO family, it is worthy to note that other components like the 
P IInlateral agreements, schedules of commitments, etc, also form part of the WTO family. 
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Annex 1 is broken into sub paragraphs covering different subject matters.437 
The Annex 1 texts include the following: 
Annex lA consists of the Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods. The 
principal document in this Annex is the GATT 1994, which must be read 
with GATT 1947. 
There are a number of "side agreements," some originating from the Tokyo 
Round results. 438 These include the following: Agriculture, Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, Textiles and Clothing, Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), Anti-dumping (Article VI of 
GATT 1994), Customs valuation (Article VII of GATT 1994), Preshipment 
Inspection, Rules of Origin, Import Licensing, Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, and Safeguards. 
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Annex lB consists of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
which was aimed at specifically providing the rules for trade in services. This 
was in cognizance of the tremendous growth in trade in services since the end 
of World War II.439 
The GATS aims to regulate a very wide spectrum of service sectors, 
including legal, medical, banking, insurance, transportation, tourism, 
communications, etc. The drafters' intention was apparently motivated by the 
recognition of the vital role that trade in services had acquired, as well as the 
desire to checkmate governments that may attempt to limit competition with 
restrictions and protectionist measures. Similar to GATT, there are exception 
clauses, as well as transparency clauses that obligate members to disclose 
trade information. 
Annex 1 C consists of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS).440 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
437 The WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 1 (lA). 
438 The Tokyo Round spanned from 1973 - 1979. 
439 The WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 1 (lB). 
440 The WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 1 (l C). 
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The TRIPS comprises some of the major intellectual property treaties.441 
The primary goal of TRIPS was to further trade by providing some measure 
of protection for those intangible, yet critical, components of trade identified 
as intellectual property rights. These rights include, but not limited to, 
copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, patents, business secrets, etc. 
Similar to the GATT, the TRIPS also contains exception clauses. 
Annex 2 consists of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, whichobligates 
all members to explore the dispute settlement options provided under the 
Agreement. 442 
Annex 3 consists of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), which 
empowers the WTO to conduct a periodic review of the overall trade policies 
of each member to ensure compliance with the spirit and letter of the 
------------------------------------
~l The Berne Convention on Copyrights 1886 is formally known as the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works. It was revised in Paris in 1896 and in Berlin in 1908, completed in Berne in 1914, 
revised in Rome in 1928, in Brussels in 1948, in Stockholm in 1967 and in Paris in 1971, and was amended in 1979. 
The Paris Convention on Patents 1883 was the fore-runner to the Berne Convention. Both the Berne and Paris 
~onVe~tions set up separate bureaux to handle the administrative tasks. In 1893, both bureaux merged and became 
the Ullited International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI). In 1967 BIRPI became WIPO, 
h e World Intellectual Property Organization, currently a separate organization within the United Nations. See 





Annex 4 consists of the Plurilateral Trade Agreements. These Agreements are 
four and include the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft,444 the Agreement 
on Government Procurement,445 the International Dairy Agreement,446 and 
the International Bovine Meat Agreement. 44 7 
There is a very conscious effort to harmonize the operations of WTO and 
GATT. The WTO Charter stipulated that the secretariat of GATT 1947 shall 
become the WTO secretariat. Further, the Charter stated that the WTO and 
the Multilateral Trade Agreements shall "be guided by the decisions, 
procedures and customary practices followed by (GATT 1947)."448 
Having reviewed the general provisions of the WTO as well as its historical 
442 The WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 2. 
443 The WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 3. 
444 The WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 4 (a). 
445 The WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 4 (b). 
446 The WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 4 ©. This Agreement was terminated in 1997. For further reading, visit 
.l!ttIwwww.wto.org/englishidocse/legale/legale.htm. last visited June 27, 2006. 
447 The WTO Agreement 1994, Annex 4 (d). This Agreement was also terminated in 1997. For further reading 
refer to footnote 203. 
448 The WTO Agreement 1994, supra. 
194 
• 
background, let us now tum our attention to the governing or institutional 
strUcture of the WTO. 
GOVERNING STRUCTURE 
(1) The Ministerial Conference 
The highest hierarchy in the WTO is the "Ministerial Conference," which 
meets every two years. The Ministerial Conference is comprised of Ministers 
from member nations. In their capacity as the supreme body of the WTO, 
they make decisions regarding any of the multilateral trade agreements. In 
addition to the General Council, the Ministerial Conference enjoys exclusive 
authority in the interpretation of GATT 1994 by the approval of three-
quarters majority of the members.449 Unlike theother Bretton Woods 
Institutions (the IMF and the World Bank), the ultimate decision-making 
• 
power is not delegated to a board of directors or the institution's head, but 
------------------------
449 See Article IX: 2 and Article 19:2 of the WTO Agreement. See also Articles 3(2) of the DSU. 
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lies with the Ministerial Conference.450 
Although the powers of the Ministerial Conference are not expressly 
delegated to the General Council, the latter meets more regularly and in the 
process acts in three capacities. According to one commentator, as the 
General Council strives to act in these different capacities, they adopt 
different sets of rules in each meeting all in an effort to make decisions by 
consensus.451 The process of decision-making in the WTO is generally by 
consensus.452 However, in situations where members can not reach 
consensus, voting is permitted. In voting, each member commands one vote 
and the outcome are determined by simple majority of the total votes cast.453 
(2) The General Council 
The next in hierarchy is the General Council which is charged with the 
450 Ibid 
~51 Baldwin, Robert E., "Pragmatism Versus Principle in GATT Decision-Making: A Brief Historical Perspective" 
~ WTO Secretariat, From GATT to the WTO: The Multilateral Trading System in the New Millennium, Kluwer Law 
ternational, 2000 at p. 38. 
452 This is one of the major inheritances of the WTO from GATT. Decision making by consensus also drives the 
:ro's claim that it is 'member-driven'. Notwithstanding that practice, the WTO Agreement does recognize that 
ere are occasions where consensus may not be practicable and voting may be applied, e.g. in the interpretation of 
any of the multilateral trade agreements, in a decision to amend the provisions of any of the multilateral trade 





responsibility for carrying out the day-to-day work in between Ministerial 
Conference sessions. It is comprised of ambassador level representatives 
from all member governments. In addition to the Ministerial Conference, the 
Council enjoys exclusive authority in interpreting GATT 1994 which is the 
constituent authority of the WT0.454 The General Council also functions as 
the Dispute Settlement Body455 and the Trade Policy Review Body.456 
Although the composition of the General Council is the same while 
functioning as the DSB and the TPRB, nonetheless, their terms of reference 
differ while functioning in their different capacities. 
453 Footnote 207 
454 Footnote 393, supra 
455 The WTO General Council is governed by different rules while acting as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
The current chairperson is H.E. Mr. Muhamad Noor Yacob from Malaysia. For further reading, see 
!umJLWWw.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispue.htm. last visited June 28, 2006. 
456 The WTO General Council functions under different rules while acting as the Trade Policy Review Body. As 
the TPRB, they conduct periodic reviews of trade policy of members in order to ensure compliance with the WTO 
~greement. A Chairperson for the year is elected at the first meeting of the year. Currently, the chairperson is H.E. 
s. Claudia Uribe from Colombia. See http://www.wto.org/english/tratopeltpre/tprbdye.htm. last visited June 28, 
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(3) The Councils 
The next hierarchy is the Councils. These are the Councils set up pursuant to 
the three annexes under the GATT Annex 1. The Councils are as follows: 
Council for Trade in Goods, Council for Trade in Services; and Council for 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. These Councils are 
comprised of all member nations. 
(4) The Subsidiary Groups 
The fourth hierarchy is the Subsidiary Groups. These groups are created from 
the Councils to handle very specific areas of the general coverage of the 
Councils. There are many such subsidiary groups. For instance, the Goods 
Council has 11 committees dealing with specific subjects like agriculture, 
market access, subsidies, anti-dumping measures, etc. 
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(5) The Secretariat 
Finally, the WTO is run by a secretariat located in Geneva. The head of the 
secretariat is the Director-Genera1.457 The DG is assisted by four Deputy 
Director-Generals, in charge of specific areas of operation and management. 
VIII CURRENT TELEOLOGICAL APPLICATION OF THE WTO'S 
CHARTER 
The World Trade Organization was the most recently created458 of the three 
organizations that were intended under the Bretton Woods conference. 
459Although it was created at a different forum, yet the forum was a creation 
of one of the products of the Bretton Woods conference.460 
Under the WTO, the GATT 1994 expressly confers the exclusive authority of 
Interpretation of the charter on the Ministerial Conference and the General 
-
457 The current Director-General is Pascal Lamy, assisted by the following Deputy Director-Generals: Alejandro 
Jara, Valentine Rugwabiza, Harsha Varhana Singh, and Rufus Yerxa. For further reading, visit 
!mn.iLWWw.wto.org/englishJthewtoe/whatise/tife/org4e.htm. last visited June 30,2006. 
458 The WTO came into force in 1995. 
459 See the Bretton Woods conference of 1945, supra. 
460 The Uruguay Round of Talks under the GATT 1947 was a creation of GATT which emerged from the Bretton 
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Counci1.461 Thus, only the Ministerial Conference and the General Council 
can adopt interpretations of the GATT 1994, after securing the majority 
decisions of three-quarters of the members. 
Again, any attempt to apply the teleological approach to the interpretation of 
the charter of the WTO must take into cognizance the requirements of such 
an approach. Such considerations call "for an expert knowledge of the history 
and development of the organization's purposes as expressed in its Articles 
and its subordinate law and as capable of response to changing 
circumstances."462 Unfortunately, the WTO has only been in existence for 
twelve years463 and by comparison to both the IMF and the W orId Bank, 
lacks the lengthy history that the other two can draw upon.464 Further, due to 
its limited number of years, the WTO lacks the experience of organizational 
development with respect to its purposes as well as enough experience in 
responding to changing circumstances.465 Yet, the WTO, as a bona fide 
member of the Bretton Woods family, and indeed the international financial 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WOods conference. 
461 Supra, footnotes 393 and 398. 
462 See Gold, supra. 
463 See the WTO, supra. It was created in 1995 after the Uruguay Round of Talks finalized the arrangements for its 
establishment 4 . 
64 Both the IMF and the World Bank were established at the Bretton Woods conference of 1945. 
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institutions must ensure that it applies the teleological approach in its 
interpretation of its charter with a view to achieving uniformity in the long 
run. 
IX CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we have focused primarily on the law govemingJhe Bretton --=------_. ---
Woods institutions as well as the off-shoots like the GATT and the WTO, 
which form the core of the IFIs. In order to better understand the laws 
governing mostIf~s-,-_~ good appreciation of the laws governing the Bretton \ Woods institutions will serve as a good appetizer. Whilst our search is to 
---~ -------~ -._-- --~---~--~----
appraise the roles of the IFIs in the context of some select developing 
c---- I 
countries, such a search, in order to become meaningful, must begin from the 
constituent documents that established these institutions. However, a mere 
literal analysis of the constituent documents will not suffice. More is needed 
• 
III order to comprehensively carry out the search. Consequently, we have not 




the authoritative interpretation of the learned commentators, scholars and 
publicists. 
Our thesis has been that the roles that the Bretton Woods System play, and 
indeed, all the c01nplementary_~fonoIllic--,_!!l0E~taty, and fina®~Jj!1:~!!tujj~s, 
were roles that were carefully scripted for them by the founding powers. 
Such roles were the roles that the founding powers articulated in the 
-------------, 
aftermath of World War II. Thus, the roles were framed to reJle<;L~Euro-
.....oL..-_________ • ____ ._~_________ ' ~-----~ 
American centric approach, contrary to a universal approach. 
The roles were limited to the political, economic and financial exigencies of 
the post-war era from the prism of the founding fathers. The area of service 
was also limited to the geographical map covering the key members of the 
Allied Forces during the war. With the benefit of hindsight, these institutions 
Were able to serve those interests fairly successfully. A case in point was the 
Marshall Plan of 1947.466 
"' 
-------------------------------------
466 The Marshall Plan was named after United States Secretary of State George Marshall. It is officially known as 
the EUropean Recovery Program (ERP), a plan by the United States for rebuilding the allied countries of Europe 
a~r World War II. The plan was in operation for four fiscal years beginning in July 1947. During that period, an 
~st~ated $13 billion of economic and technical assistance, equivalent to around $130 billion in 2006, when adjusted 
;rmfla~ion, was given to help the recovery of the European countries which had joined in the Organization for 
cononuc Co-operation and Development. For more details, visit http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilMarshall Plan (last 
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But when we look at the tremendous changes taking place in the international 
community as well as the ever-expanding roles expected of these institutions 
as a result of their internal expansion, there will be little doubt that these 
international financial institutions are not pulling their weight in the scheme 
of things. Admittedly, some of the challenges of the latter part of the 
twentieth century as well as the twenty-first century were not foreseeable in 
the twentieth century. But most of the economic and financial challenges 
were foreseeable and preventable. As a matter of fact, with regard to Africa 
and other developing parts of the world that were victims of colonialism, the 
economic and financial challenges were foreseen, but intentionally 
ignored.467 
Consequently, with all the efforts of these institutions in those parts of the 
World called developing, the situation still looks bleak and hopeless. Why? 
visited June 6, 2006.) 
467 It is reasonable to expect that during the period of colonialism, these developing countries presented first hand 
experiences to their colonial powers of the enormous challenges faced by these economies. Further, as the colonial 
rulers of these colonies, the former can not claim to be oblivious to the enormous challenges that they were daily • 
confronted with during the period of their colonial rule. Thus, it is justifiable to assert, as I have done, that these 
challenges were known (or should have been anticipated), but were ignored for obvious reasons. This position was 
re-inforced by Dr. Kingsley Moghalu when he stated: 'Colonialism, of course, was a cardinal means of the expansion 
?fWestem-dominated international society for thoroughly self-interested reasons, mainly economic. And it was not 
lIlfrequently accompanied by mass atrocities against the colonized peoples. The Belgian King Leopold, who ruled 
Belgian Congo (today's Democratic Republic of Congo) in the late 19th century as his private rubber plantation, 
ordered the massacres of nearly 10 million Congolese to quell resistance to forced labor in the colony .... .' See Is 
there an international community? by Kingsley Moghalu in the Nigerian Guardian Newspapers, August 15,2005. 
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Because, we venture to state, the problems have been left unattended for such 
a long period of time that "band- aid therapy" now appears ineffective. 
Take for instance the IMF, despite the amendment of the Articles, neither the 
structure nor the operational philosophy havtbeen impacted to reflect and 
incorporate the contemporary realities of the situation in the developing 
world.468 In all the institutions that we reviewed under this chapter, there is 
a remarkable imbalance in the composition of the membership of the highest 
authorities. Same applies in the voting structures and arrangements, such that 
developing countries lack adequate voting powers to impact the policies and 
practices of these institutions. Flowing from these inequities is the inability 
of the developing countries to impact the terms and conditions for accessing 
the resources of these institutions. Developing countries thu~ beat'Jhe full 
weight of!l1_~_pol!cy_de~isionB_orthese institutions through the various ways 
that these institutions_exexcise their jurisdiction. Yet, the developing 
~- -_.-- - ----- - - -- - - ~--..., 





468 Footnote 210, supra. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ROLES OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
NIGERIA, SOUTH KOREA AND BRAZIL 
I INTRODUCTION 
THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
The lack of concrete evidence to prove that the IFIs have had any positive 
impact on the economies of developing countries is troubling, to say the 
least. Among the group classified as developing countries, it appears that 
Africa's fate is worse. As one commentator vividly stated, "Africa's 
~ ----.--~-
economic situation, already seri~ll~x isg~teriQrating. Ip fa.ct, unless effective 
measures are taken now, the already fragile fabric of the economic, social, 
and political systems in many parts of Africa will break down."469 
--------------------------------
~69 Ndegwa, P., The Economic Crisis in Africa, published by the IMF from papers presented at a symposium held 
l!lNairobi, Kenya, May 13-15,1985, edited by Helleiner, O.K., in 1986. 
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II THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
It is pertinent at this juncture, to analyze the economic climate or 
macroeconomic environment in which this debate on the impact, if any, of 
the IFIs on the African economies is conducted. The statistics is alarming. 
According to the World Bank's "Berg Report," only few African states had 
fairly good rates of economic growth until 1979. Since then, there has not 
been any report of economic growth in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Further, the available data indicates that 15 of the 45 sub-Saharan African 
7:~-··-------___ . ___ -
countries experienced declining per capita income between 1970 and 1979. 
The other 19 countries experienced per capita income growth of less than 1 
per cent per year during this period. According to the World Bank, per capita 
income in Africa declined by 0.4 per cen.! p~year in the 1970s. Agricultural 
exports, which were then the major source of foreign exchange earnings, 
declined over the decade by 20 per cent. The situation was exacerbated by a 
.---------,-- • 
combination of factors, which included governmental inefficiency, pervasive 
mismanagement, unstable political structures and wanton corrupt practices in 
both the public and private sectors. The resultant shock on the fragile 
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economies was so severe that most African economies could not and has not 
been able to recover economically. The second oil price shock (1979-80), no 
doubt dealt the "last straw" on the economies~f African sta~. 
In addition, the terms-of-trade shock, which has continued unabatedly in sub-
Saharan Africa, has been aptly described by the IMF itself as "brutal." This 
deficit in terms-of-trade has been attributed mainly to the decline in prices of 
primary commodities which over a long period of time constituted the main 
source of foreign exchange earnings in sub-Saharan Africa. The cumulative 
impact was a continuous decline in the terms of trade of African countries 
exporting primary products. It has been canvassed that the decline is so 
unprecedented that it was even worse than it has ever been since 
independence, or since the Second W orId War, or even since the Great 
Depression."470 
Unfortunately, African countries are already burdened by heavy surcharges 
unposed upon them for failure to pay back on capital borrowed from foreign 
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banks and suppliers, including the IMF and the W orId Bank. African 
countries also suffer from surcharges imposed on goods sold to them by 
foreign suppliers on credit. During the period in review, organizational 
development assistance was cut by the maj or donors. For instance in 1981 
alone, development assistance to Africa fell by 4 per cent in real terms 
overall. The International Development Association, which directs about 30 5 per cent of its credit to Africa, was been forced by the United States cutbacks 
in contributions to reduce its activities significantly. /D,4 
The cumulative effects of the scarcity, consequently, resulted in a massive 
cutback in the volume of imports by African countries. According to the 
IMF, import values over this period fell on average by 7 per gentin Afri§. In 
r-
Madagascar, for instance, they ~ll by 40 per cent, in Sierra Leone they fell 
----------~-------
by 36 per cent, in Ghana by 29 per cent, in Zambia by 20 per cent, and in 
(: -----~-------------~--~-,-----




470 Helleiner, G.K., Essays in International Finance, No. 152, July, 1983. 
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Unfortunately, the governments were unable to cut expenditure as quickly as 
their revenues have fallen, leading inevitably, to unplanned and excessive 
monetary expansion. Monetary expansion in combination with scarcities, 
inevitably breeds, inflation. In an effort to curb inflation, African 
governments have adopted a number of economic and political measures. 
Among these measures, is an effort to deal with price increases by means of 
price controls, which is typically reinforced by severe consequences. The 
result is a spread of black markets and corruption, a retreat from legal 
activities, a concomitant depressing effect on morale. Further, the delays in 
required adjustments of exchange rates have led to further tightening of 
import and foreign exchange controls and to the growth of smuggling. 
According to the IMF report, real (inflation-adjusted) exchange rates in 
Africa have appreciated enormously in the past three years which amounted 
to the opposite of what was probably required for adjustment over the longer 
run.472 
• 
The longer the necessary exchange-rate changes are delayed, the greater the 
"shocks" eventually required to bring them back in line. 
---------
471 IMF, 1982a, p.97. 
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In 1974, the IMF reported only 3 countries in arrears on external payments. 
However, by the end of 1981, the number had increased to 32, of which 20 
were AfricanA 73 As more and more African countries fell behind in their 
debt repayment plans, the need to seek external credit became imperative. 
Unfortunately, when suppliers are forced to extend credit, they charge high 
interest rates. And the next time, they demand payment in cash. 
In a desperate effort to keep afloat the ship of state, African countries 
resorted to debt rescheduling. Consequently, in the past few years, African 
countries have taken over as the most numerous customers of the "Paris 
Club" of official creditors. By 1979, African countries accounted for 3 out of 
4 official reschedulings (Togo, Sudan, Zaire); in 1980, 2 out of 3 (Sierra 
Leone and Liberia); and in 1981,6 out of7 (Madagascar, Togo, Zaire, 
Uganda, Senegal, Liberia). Subsequently, there have been 6 more African 
meetings of the Club, rescheduling the official debts of Senegal, Uganda, 
Malawi, Sudan, Togo, and Zambia. The report further indicates that foreign-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------







exchange reserves in Africa fell in 1982 to unprecedented levels, averaging 
7.4 per cent of annual imports, or twenty-seven days worth of imports. 
Reserves were less than half their 1973 -7 4 levels and less than half the 
estimated 1982 average for all oil-importing developing countries.474 
III THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA'S EXPERIENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
Modem day Nigeria has been an amalgamation of different peoples and 
culture that had been under the dominance of the British government, 
through their Royal Niger Company. In 1885, the British received 
international recognition for their formal claim of influence over Nigeria. In 
-~---."------, 
1914, the separate areas were formally united as the "Colony and Protectorate 
of Nigeria." Under this unification, the area was still administered separately 
• 
under the Northern province, the Southern province, and Lagos colony. After 
World War II, in response to increasing nationalism and demands for 
----~~-----
473 IMF, 1982c, p. 28. 
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independence, the British gran~ed Nigeria imicpendence on October 1, 1 
1960.475. ----_.----
Under independence, the country was designed to be governed as a 
Parliamentary government with three regions forming the federation states. 
The three regions were the northern region476, the western region477 and 
the eastern region478. Each region was endowed with' substantial powers for 
self-governance, while the federal government had exclusive powers over 
defense and security, foreign relations, commercial and fiscal policies. Three 
years later on October 1963, the government changed its political structure 
and became a federal republic with a new constitution. At the same period, a 
new and the fourth regional government were created as the Midwestern 
regIOn. 
The newly established nation did not last long. On January 15, 1966, the 
military embarked upon a coup which ended the First republic under Prime 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
474 IMF, 1982a, p.169 
475 Upon independence, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa became the first Prime Minister of Nigeria. 
476 The capital city of the Northern region was located in Kaduna. 
477 The capital city ofthe Western region was located in Ibadan. 
478 The capital city of Eastern region was located in Enugu. 
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Minister Tafawa Balewa.4 79 In July of the same year, a segment of the 
military staged a counter-coup.480 The fall-out of the two coups and the total 
breakdown of law and order, as well as the massive killings of civilians, 
resulted in the civil war that lasted from 1967 to 1970.481 
Since then, the country has been ruled by one military government or another 
until 1979, when another civilian government was elected under Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari. President Shagari's government lasted fronh979 to 1983, 
when the military overthrew the government. The military continued to rule 
the country from 1983 until 1999, when former military general Olusegun 
Obasanjo was elected civilian president for four years, and re-elected in 2003 
for another four year term. 
479 It is worthy of note that the Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, the Premiers of Northern region and 
Western region, as well as other high ranking officials were killed in the bloody coup. 
480 It is also worthy of note that the counter-coup culminated in the death of the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Military Government that succeeded the Tafawa Balewa region, General lTY Aguiyi Ironsi. Although Ironsi was not 
directly involved in the plot to overthrow the Balewa government, he assumed the position of C-in-C as the highest 
tanking military officer during the coup. 
481 The Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) was fought between the Nigerian military and the Biafran military. Then 
GOvernor of Eastern region, Colonel Odumegwu Emeka Ojukwu, declared the State of Biafra, in reaction to the 
genocide that was been perpetrated against the Ibos in the Northern region of the country. The war, essentially, was 
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Although generally known as Nigeria, the country is officially addressed as 
the federal republic of Nigeria. With an estimated population of 137 million 
people, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, and also accounts for 
20 percent of the entire population of West African countries. A country with 
. a rich diversity, there are approximately 250 ethnic groups that constitute the 
population segments. The dominant ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani in the 
, ;~, 
north which are predominantly Muslims, the Y orubas in the west which are " 
~q 
evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, and the Igbos in the east 
which are predominantly Christians. 
The country enjoys a land area estimated at 923, 768 square kilometers or 
<--_ .. _ .. - -
356,700 square miles. The capital city is Abuja with an estimated population 
0[100,000. Other popular cities include Lagos with estimated population of 
12 million, Ibadan with estimated population of 5 million, Kano with ,------_ .. _. . . _.-.-. 
estimated population of 1 million, and Enugu with estimated population of 
• 
,; 500,000 people. 
~--------------------------------------~-----------------------------------------
an attempt by the Nigerian government to prevent the secession of Biafra (with its rich oil reserves) from Nigeria. 
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Nigeria currently runs a democratic government under a federal system of 
representation. The operational constitution is the 1999 constitution, which is 
based largely on the 1979 constitution that had been suspended by the 
military after the overthrow of the civilian government in 1983.482 
Currently, the country is administered as a federation with 36 states and a 
Federal Capital Territory (FCT), called Abuja. The federal government 
currently led by President Olusegun Obasanjo and his Cabinet constitute the 
Executive branch. The Legislative branch is comprised of the bicameral 
legislature. The National Assembly consists of the Senate (Upper House) 
with its 109 members. Each state is represented by three senators, while the 
FCT is represented by one senator. Also, the National Assembly consists of 
the House of Representatives (Lower House) with its 360 members. The 
tripartite component of the federal government is the Judicial branch, headed 
by the Chief Justice of the Federation. The states are governed by the 
Governors and their cabinet. The states are further sub-divided into a total of 
• 
774 local governments, headed by Local Council Chairpersons. 
--------------------------
482 The 1999 constitution which was based largely on the 1979 constitution was promulgated by decree on May 5, 
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With an estimated Gross Domestic Product of $90.9 billion and per capita 
Gross Domestic Product of $694, Nigeria has been a classical case study of 
missed opportunities and under-utilization of human and natural resources. 
The country is blessed with abundant natural resources like petroleum, 
natural gas, tin, columbite, iron ore, coal, limestone, lead, zinc. It has been a 
world leader in the production of agricultural products like cocoa, palm oil, 
, 
~:j yams, cassava, sorghum, millet, com, rice, livestock, groundnuts, cotton, etc. 
~ l, 
The industrial products that are produced in the country include textiles, 
cement, food products, footwear, metal products, lumber, beer, detergents, 
car assembly, etc. Total export receipts in 2005 are estimated at $52.16 
billion, while petroleum products aloneaccounts for 950/0 of the total 
revenue. 
The discovery of oil in Nigeria and the sudden oil boom in the 1970s caused .j,. 
the government to focus all economic attention on the oil sector to the total 
• 
neglect of the other sectors of the economy. The consequence is evident in 
the fact that in 2002, for instance, oil and gas exports accounted for more 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999. It came into force on May 29, 1999. 
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than 98% of export earnings and about 83% of the government revenue.483 
The neglect of other areas of economic activities like agriculture has been 
most devastating. Nigeria used to be Africa's biggest poultry producer with 
an estimated 40 million birds annually. Currently, the number of birds 
~----- •.. ,- --
produced annually is al1®t 18 millionJ2i~s. Same consequence applies to the 
cocoa production, groundnuts (peanuts), rubber, and palm oil, which all used 
to be major sources of revenue for the country pre- and post-independence. 
Cognizant of the dangers inherent in a 'one-product economy', the 
government of President Obasanjo has embarked upon a number of policy 
initiatives aimed at diversifying the economy and providing incentives for 
investment in other areas of the economy. 
With the aggressive efforts directed at privatization of the government owned 
banks, cement plants, fuel distribution companies, the government is geared 
• 
towards a more market-oriented economy. A huge success story in this effort 
Was the introduction of the GSM telecommunications system, which has 
--------------------------------
483 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, July 2006. See http://www.state.gov/r/paieilbgn/2836.htm. 
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greatly increased private investment in the industry, as well as created new 
employment opportunities. Further, with the creation of the much dreaded 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the government has 
shown that it is committed to curbing the embarrassing stigma of public and 
private corruption in the system. But more needs to be done in order to 
reverse the downward trend in economic development under the many years 
of poor military rulership. The country's infrastructure is in urgent need of 
attention and repairs after many years of neglect and non-maintenance under 
the mi Ii tary. 
Nigeria currently has oil reserves that are estimated to be 25 billion barrels. It 
c----___ . __ ... __ ----.., ~ 
also has gas reserves that are estimated to be 100 trillion cubic feet. It is also 
becoming a more respected member of the international community by the 
leadership roles it has been playing in West Africa, Africa, and as a member 
of the United Nations. Its national economic profile is equally on the rise 
• 
Which was evident in the IMF's approval of its first ever Policy Support 
~----
Instrument for Nigeria in October 2005. Further, the Paris Club recently 
-_.-----------
-------------------------------------------------------------
last visited August 16, 2006. 
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signed debt reduction agreements with Nigeria under which the country was 
given an $18 billion debt reduction in exchange for the payment of the 
remaining $12 billion. The country did not only meet the Paris Club deadline, 
but is currently working to also exit the London Club as a debtor. 
NIGERIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
, 
" 
First, I must concede that the scope of this work can not accommodate a most 
comprehensive review of the totality of the relationship between Nigeria and 
the major international financial institutions (IFIs). The underlying reason 
includes the fact that this exercise is not principally aimed at dissecting the 
entire relationship between Nigeria and the IFIs. Rather, the effort here is to 
highlight the major aspects of the relationship with a view to using it as a 
mirror of what constitutes the relationship. Consequently, although Nigeria 
has, from inception, been involved with the IFIs, I will locate the critical 
• 
aspect of its relationship with the IFIs within the limited period from 1983-
1993. This ten-year period is very illustrative because it covers the 
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administration of one civilian government and two military governments.484 
I. THE SHAGARI GOVERNMENT (1979-1983) 
After thirteen years of military rule,485 Nigeria conducted another general 
election aimed at enshrining a multi-party democracy. The National Party 
of Nigeria (NPN) won the Presidency and a slim majority in the National 
Assembly. On October 1, 1979, Alhaji Shehu Shagari ofNPN was sworn 
in as the President and C-in-C. The out-going military government had 
fashioned a new constitution modeled after the US Presidential system of 
government, otherwise known as the 1979 constitution. President Shagari 
also inherited a relatively stable economy from the out-going military 
government headed by General Olusegun Obasanjo. Although the country 
had some external debt, it was easily manageable at 1.5 percent debt 
service ratio.486 The oil revenue from crude oil was also significant since 
------------------------------------
484 The Shagari government was elected in 1979 and won re-election in 1983. Shortly thereafter, the government 
Was overthrown by the military. In the wake of the coup d'etat, General Muhammadu Buhari became the C-in-C and 
lfead of the Military government. Two years later, General Ibrahim Babangida, his Army Chief, overthrew the 
government in a palace coup. 
485 Footnote 248, supra 
486 See Yusufu Bangura, "The Politics of Nigeria's Debt Crisis" in Okello Oculi, ed. Nigerian Alternatives, Zaria, 
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a barrel sold for $44.4 in 1980/81.487 The out-going Obasanjo 
government had pursued what a commentator called "low profile" 
deflationary policies which were aimed at tackling the 1977178 balance of 
payments challenges.488 
However, in the first budget announced by the new civilian government in 
March 1980, the government reversed the out-going government's "low-
profile" economic policy. Rather, the government adopted what I consider 
to be a "lavish and extravagant" economic policy. For instance, the 
government expanded the allocation for public expenditure from N13.291 
billion in 1979 to N23.695 billion in 1980, resulting in almost 200 percent 
increase in its first year.489 Simultaneously, both the federal and state 
governments borrowed unrestrictedly in the international capital markets 
-
Nigeria, Dept. of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University, p.99-100. Cited in M.O. Okome, "A Sapped • 
Democracy", University Press of America, 1998. 
487 See Adebayo 01ukoshi, "The Management of Nigeria's External Debt: Issues & Problems" in Olukoshi, ed. 
lkNigerian External Debt Crisis: Its Management, Lagos, Nigeria, Malthouse, 1990, p.28. Also cited in M.O. 
~kome, supra. 
488 M.O. Okome, supra, p. 88; see also Olukoshi, supra, pp 25-26. 
~9 .Yu~ufu Bangura, RaufMustapha and Saidu Adamu, "The Deepening Economic Crisis and its Political 
~hcatlOns." In Siddique Mohammed and Tony Edoh, Nigeria: A Republic in Ruins, Ahmadu Bello University, 
~"partment of Political Science, 1983, p.59. 
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thereby draining the external reserve of the country.490 The import 
license scheme which was in place before the new government took power 
was used as a vehicle for party patronage, and consequently contributed to 
the huge drain on the foreign exchange. Cumulatively, by allowing 
massive capital flight in a short period of time, the over-invoicing of 
imports, under-invoicing of exports, and fraudulent accounting practices, 
the Shagari government caused a sudden economic crisis.491 By 1981, the 
country's foreign exchange reserves were depleted from over $10 billion 
in 1980 to $4.2 billion. 
By early 1982, the international price for crude oil fell drastically, thus 
compounding Nigeria's economic problems. As a result, Nigeria's oil 
revenue fell from $10 billion in 1979 to $5.161 billion in 1982.492 At the 
same time, Nigeria's gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 2 percent and 
4.4 percent in 1982 and 1983, respectively. Nigeria's current account 
----------------------------------
490 Olukoshi & Herbst, "Nigeria: Economic and Political Reforms at Cross Purposes" in Stephen Haggard & 
Steven B. Webb, eds. Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1994. (Published for the World Bank). 
491 See Olukoshi, supra, footnote 256. 
~2 Olukoshi, "The Role of the IMF and World Bank in Nigeria's ...... " in The Nigerian External Debt Crisis: Its 
~, supra, footnote 256 
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deficit grew to N4.9 billion in 1982 and was N2.9 billion in 1983.493 By 
the end of the administration's first term in office in 1983, the budget 
deficit ofN6.231 billion was more than 50 percent of the total 
expenditure.494 
By adopting the "lavish and extravagant" economic policy, the Shagari 
government effectively plunged the country into a serious economic crisis 
within the four-year period that it was in office. The consequences for 
both the country and the citizens were dire. The economy began to 
experience massive retrenchment, unemployment increase~ irregular 
payment of salaries became popular, while most employers froze 
employment. Basic food became scarce and expensive, while public 
services became more expensive. Crime and violence immediately 





495 See Yusufu Bala Usman, Nigeria Against the IMF: The Home Market Strategy, Kaduna, Nigeria, Vanguard, 
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In realization of the collateral consequences of its economic policy, the 
Shagari government began to introduce an austerity package in 1981. The 
goal of the package was for the government to cut public expenditure by 
$1.6 billion. The 1982 budget also targeted a further cut of $3 billion. But, 
apparently the damage had been irredeemably done. As we can see, the 
efforts by the government to stem the tide of economic erosion were too 
late and too little. In fact, the situation had become so critical that while 
the government was implementing the austerity package, it was compelled 
to draw upon the country's reserves with the IMF.496 
Dr. Okome succinctly summarized the three strategies that were applied 
by the Shagari government as follows: 1) Stabilization of the economy 
strategy; 2) The appointment of a committee of experts to make 
recommendations on policy reforms strategyand 3) The solicitation of 
external assistance strategy.497 
~--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1986. 
496 Thomas Biersteker, "Reaching Agreement with the IMF: The Nigerian Negotiations, 1983-86." Pew Program in 
~eaching and Writing in International Affairs, Case #205. University of Southern California Press, 1988, pp. 
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A. The Economic Stabilization Strategy: 
In recognition of the dire economic situation facing the administration, the 
Shagari government introduced the Economic Stabilization Act, 1982,498 
while pledging to cut government expenditure by 40 percent.499 The 
provisions of the Act were aimed at increasing customs and excise duties, as 
well as comprehensive import regulation. Consequently, the government 
recalled all import licenses that were unused; suspended the issuance of 
import licenses for motor vehicle importation; suspended all capital projects 
not yet started; reducecbasic travel allowances 500 from N800 to N500 and 
from N3,000 to N2,000 for individuals and businesses, respectively; advance 
deposits were imposed on all imports while interest rates were increased by 2 
percent. Further, the government imposed more stringent monetary and credit 




497 M.O. Okome, supra, p.88 
498 The Economic Stabilization Act was enacted on April 19, 1982, as an act of the legislature of Nigeria. 
499 See Olukoshi, "Role of the IMF & World Bank in Nigeria's Foreign Debt", supra, footnotes 256 & 261. 
500 These were amounts of money that the government authorized individuals and businesses to have while 
travelng overseas. 
501 See Okome, "A Sapped Democracy", supra, p. 90. See also Yusufu Bangura et al 'The Deepening Economic 
Crisis ... " supra, and Olukoshi, "The Nigerian External Debt Crisis. Further, see Tom Forrest, Politics and Economic 
~opment in Nigeria, Boulder, Westview, 1993, p.183. 
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As I indicated earlier, by the time the Shagari government introduced the 
Economic Stabilization Act, the proverbial horse had bolted out. The Act, 
unfortunately, failed to remedy the economic situation of the government. 
Compounded by the steady decline in crude oil export, the chief source of 
foreign exchange revenue, the Act could not control imports; regulate the 
monetary system and curtail government expenditure to a commensurate 
level with declining income. By the end of 1982, Nigeria's debt service ratio 
had skyrocketed to 19.2 percent, while the government's trade debt to foreign 
creditors was three months overdue.502 The government reacted by seeking 
the assistance of a team of economic and financial experts, thus the 
appointment of the Odama Committee. 
B. The Committee Appointment Strategy: 
The economic situation continued unabated into 1983. Thus, in January 1983, 
In order to curtail the drain on the scarce national resources, the government 
embarked upon a massive deportation exercise of over one million "illegal" 
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aliens resident in the country at the time.503 In the same January 1983, the 
government through its National Economic Council appointed a committee 
of experts under the chairmanship of Dr. J.S. Odama.504 Other members of 
the committee include the special advisers on economic affairs to the 
respective state governors, as well as a representative of the Central Bank of 
Nigeria. 
To underscore the urgency of the situation, the committee submitted its report 
one month after its inauguration.505 The report, among other 
recommendations, called for "radical departures ...... in a number of crucial 
sectors and policies if the economy is to survive the onslaught, particularly 
from exogenous outside factors."506 Further, the committee proposed a long-
term solution that calls for "fundamental structural adjustments in all sectors 
of the economy."507 
;02 For a fuller account of the economic situation of Nigeria under the Shagari government, see Biersteker, 
'Reaching Agreement .... " supra. 
50~ Unregistered aliens are commonly referred to as illegal aliens. These aliens comprisd mainly citizens of 
neIghboring countries who had sought political and economic refuge in Nigeria. 
504 At the time of his appointment, Dr. Odama was a special adviser to the President on economic affairs. 
~05 S~e the Report of the Odama Committee on the State of the Nigerian Economy by the National Economic 
~l.(NEC) Experts Committee, (The Odama Report) Lagos, Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Planning, February, 
5983. CIted in Okome, supra, p.91. The Odama Report was submitted on February, 1983. 
06 The Odama Report, supra, footnote 274. 
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Again, the report was another effort by the government that fell short of the 
expected reaction to the increasingly worsening economic situation facing the 
country. I will like to argue that while the Odama report was aimed at long-
term recommendations, the government was looking for short-term measures 
that will allow them to plan for the long-term. Thus, the goal of the experts in 
making the recommendations was divergent to the goal of the recipients and 
became impracticable. Evidence of this position was that in the same month 
that the report was submitted, the government negotiated and received a $1 
billion Eurocredit loan for the payment of the country's debt arrears. 
Although the National Economic Council made recommendations to the 
government from the Odama report,508 based upon which the government 
issued a white paper, the prevailing mood within the government circle was 
that external help must be sought. Without devoting further thought to the 
Odama report, the Shagari government sought a formal help from the 
International financial institutions, particularly, the IMF. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
507 The Odama Report, supra, footnotes 274 & 275. 
iO~ See "The Green Paper on the State of the Nigerian Economy," Africa Development, Vol., 9, #3,1984, p.136. 
his was a critique of the Odama report. 
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C. The External Assistance Strategy: 
As I indicated earlier, after receiving the Odama report and without further 
thought on it, the government began formal negotiations with the IMF in 
April, 1983. Nigeria sought from the IMF a $2-3 billion loan in under to 
support its balance of payments deficits and an additional $500 million in 
order to support the deficit from oil sales. Both loans were made under the 
IMF's Extended Fund Facility (EFT) and the Compensatory Financing 
Facility (CFF) programs, respectively. Additionally, the government sought 
more help from the World Bank in the amount of $300 million under the 
Bank's Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) program. 
In order to approve the loan, the IMF demanded that Nigeria meet the 
following conditionalities: 509 




2. introduction of greater budgetary discipline; 
3. reduction of grants, subventions and loans to parastatals; 
4. cessation of non-statutory transfers to state governments; 
5. simplification and rationalization of the Customs Tariff Structure; 
6. review of industrial incentives and policies; 
7. strengthening of the operational efficiency of revenue collection 
agenCIes; 
8. upward review of interest rates and a reduction in the sectoral 
allocation of credit; 
9. strict external debt management; 
10. export promotion to broaden the export base; 
11. adjustment of producer prices of agricultural commodities; 
12. review of on-going projects with a view to determining their priorities; 
13. classification of parastatals into social and economic activities for the 
purpose of restructuring them to achieve cost effectiveness, accountability 
• 
and, for economic parastatals, profitability; 
14. phased removal of subsidies on fertilizer; 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
509 These conditionalities were adapted from Okome, A Sapped Democracy, supra, pp.93 & 94. 
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15. trade liberalization; 
16. removal of the subsidy on petroleum; 
17. the devaluation of the Naira51 0 
Notwithstanding the government's willingness to comply with most of the 
IMF imposed conditionalities, the government had great reservations 
regarding the implementation of those relating to devaluation of the 
Naira511, the removal subsidy and the liberalization oftrade.512 
The government believed that the three conditions were irrelevant to the 
context of the Nigerian economic situation and should be excluded from the 
negotiations. Some scholars, however, attribute the government's reluctance 
to comply to be based on the lack of administrative and political capacity.513 
Some other scholars believe that while the government possessed sufficient 
administrative capacity, it lacked at the time, the political capacity to 
Comply.514 Why? The reason was that the government was facing general 
elections and felt that the maintenance of the economic status quo will be 
--------------------------------
510 See the Nigerian NEWSWATCH magazine of October 14, 1985, p.14. 
511 The Nigerian currency is denominated by Naira (paper denominations) and Kobo (coin denominations). 
512 Footnote 279. supra 
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, more beneficial to their prospects in the election. One major implication of 
the maintenance of the economic status quo was the continuation of the 
import license scheme which had been abused by the party officials, but 
which had served the ruling party well in oiling their patronage scheme. 
The government was faced with a fundamental decision: comply with all the 
IMF conditionalities and risk losing the 1983 general elections, or refuse to 
comply and hopefully win the general elections.515 The decision of the 
government was facilitated by the mounting resistance to the IMF package 
coming from the organized labor unions, civil servants, students, professional 
organizations, etc. The Shagari government predictably chose to refuse to 
comply with the IMF conditionalities, particularly; those relating to 
513 See Olukoshi, supra 
514 See Okome, supra p.96 . 
515 An interesting development during the government's negotiations with the IMF was the dispute regarding the 
accurate amount of Nigeria's external indebtedness. According to Okome, "Throughout the negotiations, the Shagari 
administration was never sure of the exact amount of Nigeria's indebtedness. Consequently, between 1982 and 1987, 
the amount of Nigeria's external debt was a matter for debate, discussion and conjecture. Acrimonious disputes 
ensued between Nigeria and its creditors on the amount of the debt and the extent of state responsibility for 
~epayment. The claim submitted by the London Club to the Nigerian government was $8.8 billion while Nigerian 
unporters submitted a counter claim of $6.4 billion. A conference was held on the matter and a "guesstimate" of $23 
billion was made. The Central Bank of Nigeria's estimate in 1983 was $17.758 billion. Further complications were 
caused by the discovery that many of the claims were fraudulent. Three financial advisers, S.G. Warburg and Co., 
Lehman Kuhn and Lazard Freres were hired to assist Nigeria in reconciling all the claims and in negotiating an 
agreement with Nigeria's private creditors to whom $2 billion was owed on unconfirmed letters of credit." See also 
;USUfBangura, "The Politics of Nigeria's Debt Crisis"; Olukoshi, The Management of Nigeria's External Debt, and 




devaluation, subsidy removal and trade liberalization. 
In the meantime, Nigeria sought and obtained an agreement from the London 
Club of creditors to roll over Nigeria's trade debts. The package demanded 
that the interest rolled over will be converted into a loan which will be repaid 
in three years, commencing from January 1984. Thereafter, the creditor banks 
insisted that Nigeria will not receive any new loans until they conclude an 
agreement with the IMF. Consequently, creditors like the US Eximbank and 
the U.K.'s Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) refused to insure 
the country's imports without an IMF agreement.516 
The Shagari party, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), won the majority of 
the votes in the 1983 general elections. The victory was short-lived because 
in December 1983, the newly elected government was overthrown by the 
military government led by General Muhammadu Buhari who claimed that 
the coup d'etat became necessary in order to save the ship of state from the 
recklessness of the Shagari government. 
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II. THE BUHARI GOVERNMENT (1983-1985) 
As earlier stated, the Buhari government justified their overthrow of the 
Shagari government based on the latter's recklessness and indiscipline in 
handling the affairs of the country.517 Thus, the new government 
championed discipline in both thepublic and private sectors of the 
country.518 The economic situation of the country was fast deteriorating 
upon the seizure of power by the Buhari government. The main source of 
foreign exchange for the country, the crude oil earnings, had plummeted from 
$25 billion in 1980 to $11 billion in 1984. At the same time, the country's 
debt service ratio had skyrocketed to 28.3 percent of the GDP. Consequently, 
while the country was generating less than half of its 1980 earnings, its debt 
obligation had more than doubled. Compounding the situation was the high 
rate of domestic inflation, the low rate of industrial production, and the 
overall impact on the standard of life of the average citizen.519 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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The Buhari government immediately introduced what they termed a War 
Against Indiscipline (WAI).520 The campaign was aimed at encouraging the 
citizens to live an orderly and discipline life in private and public 
relationships. It was also aimed at curbing the wanton recklessness in the 
public sector which had fueled the prevalent rate of corruption in the public 
sector. The campaign was carried out in the local and national print and 
broadcast media. A combined team of the newly established and recruited 
W AI Brigade officers and the military were empowered to strictly enforce 
any act of indiscipline.521 
The Nigerian public welcomed the Buhari government as a relief from the 
corrupt and scandalous Shagari government. At the same time, they looked 
forward to a faster containment of the economic crisis. The Buhari 
government responded to the worsening economic crisis by adopting some 
aUstere fiscal and monetary policies. These included drastic reduction in 
public expenditure, increased interest rates and stricter tax laws enforcement. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





Although the new government did not immediately abolish the corrupt 
import license scheme of its predecessor, they, however, imposed stricter 
guidelines in its operation. Predictably, these measures worsened the 
economic conditions of the citizens and the industrial sector. 
The high rate of unemployment implied the unavailability of jobs for the 
citizens, both skilled and unskilled. For the employed, there was a higher 
sense of job insecurity resulting from the daily retrenchments and layoffs 
prevalent in the country. Concomitant to job insecurity was the state of 
under-employment and irregular wage payments. Social services also became 
increasingly expensive for both the employed and unemployed.522 
The production sector of the economy fared worse. The full weight of the 
austere fiscal and monetary policies, although necessary to combat the 
economic situation, fell upon the industrial sector.523 Consequently, many 
could not afford to continue producing on full capacity and had to layoff 
their non-essential workers. Cost of procuring raw materials and replacement 
equipment parts became exorbitant.524 
------------------------------------





Buhari's Blue Book: -
After initially imposing stricter fiscal and economic policies,525 the Buhari 
government developed and released The Blue Book in 1984.526 The Blue 
Book was a comprehensivEfeport t hat included some of the provisions of the 
1982 Stabilization Act, some of the provisions of the Odama report, as well 
as those recommendations of the IMF and the W orId Bank which were 
acceptable to the government.527 
The Blue Book stated the justifications for the overthrow of the Shagari 
government as follows: 
1. the mismanagement of the Nigerian economy; 
2. lack of political accountability; 
3. causing the deterioration in the quality of life of the average citizen; 
4. insensitive political leadership; 
5. preemptive intervention to prevent the drift towards economic collapse and 
--------------------------------------
525 Okome, supra, classified these initial fiscal and economic responses by the Buhari government as domestic 
solutions. I concur, but must add that they were aimed to serve as very interim measures while searching for more 
effective measures. At the same time, the new government needed to buy time to undertake a more comprehensive 
study of the extent of the situation and proffer more effective solutions. This position became evident in the 
government's release of The Blue Book. 
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The Blue Book also analyzed the consequences of the country's over-
dependence on oil revenue and identified the following consequences: 
1. a shift in the pattern of investment to the construction and service 
sectors; 
2. an increase in the importation of goods; 
3. neglect of the agricultural sector resulting in the shortage of food 
supplies; 
4. loss of foreign exchange earnings from agricultural exports; and 
,.' 
5. the massive population shift from the rural to the urban areas.529 
Another critical aspect of The Blue Book report was the mismanagement and 
:i 
indiscipline of the Shagari government which they attributed to their policy 
failures. Some of the consequences of the Shagari government's 
mismanagement and indiscipline include the following: 
1. overspending on social programs; 
• 
2. inflation and non-execution of contracts; 




4. huge budget deficits; and 
5. increased internal and external debts at all levels of government.530 
Finally, The Blue Book made some recommendations for tackling the 
economic crisis as follows: 
1. the repayment of federal and state governments' external and domestic 
debts as a matter of priority; 
2. increased internal revenue through efficient collection of taxes and 
levies; 
3. reduction in government expenditure, particularly on social services to 
combat budget deficits; 
4. retrenchment of workers; 
5. freeze on salaries and wages and the elimination of allowances; 
6. freeze in hiring new government employees; 
7. closer regulation and taxing of traders and artisans; 
8. support of private capital in its industrial, agricultural and other 
• 
investments; 




10. local sourcing of raw materials; 
11. government spending to foster improvements in power and 
telecommunications; 
12. increased government involvement in distributing goods at many 
different levels; 
13. increased controls on expenditure and foreign exchange 
allocation.531 
In February 1984, the Buhari government re-activated the negotiations 
between the Nigerian government and the IMF.532 The Fund insisted that 
the new government must devalue the naira, increase the cut in government 
subsidies, increase the cut in government expenditure, freeze any new loans 
to state governments, and divide the government parastatals into social and 
economic categories. The Fund also demanded that domestic interest rates be 
further reviewed, more trade liberalization, including review of the import 




532 The talks had been stalemated due in part to the Shagari government's refusal to comply with all the 
conditionalities imposed by the Fund prior to their full engagement in the crisis management or solution. The 




Buhari government comply with all their demands before they can engage 
them in solving the increasing economic crisis. Like the Shagari government, 
the Buhari government through the Minister of Finance,533 countered that 
they were willing to implement the non-disputable conditionalities while 
engaging in further talks regarding the disputable conditionalities. 
In order to prove their willingness to cooperate with the Fund, the 
government cut the budget deficit from N6.2 billion in 1983 to N3.3 billion 
in 1984.534 The government imposed a general wage freeze on all 
government employees, while on the other hand, 250,000 government 
employees were fired. The subsidies that had been extended to the education 
sector and the social services sector were also withdrawn, and replaced with 
levies and fees.535 The government further reduced grants and subventions 
to parastatals and public enterprises. The parastatals were categorized into 
economic enterprises and social services enterprises, with a view to 
533 The Minister of Finance under the Buhari government was Dr. Onaolapo Soleye who led the team of Nigerian 
negotiators during the talks. 
534 See Thomas Callghy, "Lost between State and Market: The Politics of Econornic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia 
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commercializing the parastatals.536 The government resisted the demand to 
remove the petroleum subsidy, but rather intensified their efforts to curb 
crude oil bunkering and the smuggling of petroleum products.537 
While the Buhari government was doing their very best to meet the 
expectations of the Fund, it was also engaged in another battle of credibility 
domestically.538 As part of their War Against Indiscipline (WAI) campaign, 
the government commenced a series of military tribunal prosecutions to try 
those charged with us crimes during the ousted Shagari government. 
Concurrently, the vibrant Nigerian press was handicapped by draconian 
decrees like the Decree number 2, which empowered the government to arrest 
and detain any person without trial; and Decree number 4 (The Public 
Officers Protection Against False Accusation Decree) which imposed prison 
term for the publication of any information found to be false.539 At the same 
time, government banned all public demonstrations and processions, subject 
to government approval and authorization. The government refused to 
---------------------------------
536 See the Nigerian Newswatch magazine of October 14, 1985, p.14. 
537 Ibid 
307 For a good perspective on the Buhari government's policies, see, " Buhari Delivers Independence Day Speech," 
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engage the public in any discussions relating to a possible return to 
democratic rule.540 At this point, the government was beginning to feel 
threatened in both directions: one from the Fund and its uncompromising 
conditionalities, and the other from the citizens who were beginning to lose 
their patience with the draconian rule of the government and the slow pace of 
economIc recovery. 
The Buhari government refused to comply with all of the Fund's 
conditionalities on the same argument advanced by the Shagari government. 
The government was convinced that the devaluation of the naira, 
privatization of the parastatals and the removal of the petroleum subsidy 
., 
would have worse implications for the Nigerian economy. While the 
government reserved the right to agree to devalue the currency as a last 
resort, it advocated a gradual devaluation contrary to the wholesome 50 
percent devaluation advocated by the Fund. Again, the Buhari government 
• 
. responded that the currency devaluation conditionality was "irrelevant" 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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539 See "Idiagbon Cautions Press on Writings of Ex-Politicos", FBIS-MEA, 28 March, 1984 p. T4 
540 See the West Africa magazine, 7 April, 1984, p.968; Shehu Othman, "Nigeria: Power for Profit: Class, 
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because the country's petroleum exports were denominated in US dollars and 
the local industries were import dependent. Moreover, the government feared 
that such devaluation will cause sudden and unmanageable inflation in the 
economy.541 
While the negotiation with the Fund was in progress, the government 
engaged the Paris and London Clubs for shorter term financial assistance. In 
their negotiations with the Clubs, the issue of the exact amount of Nigeria's 
debt as well as the interest amount owed on uninsured trade debts became 
disputed. The government reacted by appointing the Chase Manhattan Bank 
of New York to represent the government with a view to resolving the issues. 
In the interim, the government succeeded in obtaining a loan of $1 billion 
from a syndicate headed by the Barclay's Bank of London to facilitate 
payment of trade debts owed to exporters insured by the British Export 
Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD).542 Thereafter, Nigeria was 
pressurized to reach complete agreement with the Fund before any further 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COrporatism and Factionalism in the Military" in Doanl Cruise O'Brien, ed. Contemporary West African States, 
New York, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p.137; cited in Okome, supra. 
541 See, Biersteker, "Reaching Agreement. ... ", supra 
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financial assistance will be approved.543 The World Ban~, for instance, 
refused to approve the government's pending application for a SAL unless it 
fully complies with the IMF's conditionalities. The country's lines of credit 
were blocked, while the foreign creditors mounted increasing pressure on the 
government to honor their debts.544 Some of the country's creditors agreed 
to reschedule the debts owed in the amount of $2.5 billion in uninsured trade 
arrears when the country's foreign exchange reserves fell to less than $1 
billion. The deal allowed the country a grace period of two and a half years 
and an interest rate of 1 percent above the London Inter-Bank Rate 
(LIBOR)545 
After the negotiation deadlock, the government and the Fund resumed a fresh 
round of negotiations in May 1984. However, this round of talks did not last. 
Although the Fund had lowered the bar on the naira devaluation from 50 
percent to 30-35 percent, the government refused to comply with the 
cnditionality, insisting on a gradual devaluation process. In frustration, the 
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Fund formally declined Nigeria's loan application in July 1984.546 The 
government reacted by designing its own indigenous stabilization program in 
1985. One of the goals of the program was to increase the debt service ratio 
from 30.3 percent in 1984 to 44 percent in 1985.547 Also, the program 
sought to increase the country's foreign exchange earnings by introducing 
counter-trade schemes with trading partners like Brazil, lobbying OPEC to 
increase production quota,548 cutting the price of Nigeria's crude oil and 
overproduction of crude oil. In the meantime, Nigeria sought a short term 
loan from Saudi Arabia in the amount ofN1.6 billion. The US government 
blocked the loan by advising the Saudi government to insist that Nigeria 
make a deal with IMF.549 
The Buhari government notwithstanding the deadlock in formal negotiations 
with the Fund, nevertheless, maintained informal negotiations with the Fund. 
In October 1984, there appeared to be a breakthrough when the government 
• 
announced that the Fund was willing to conclude negotiations without 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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insisting on two of the three disputed conditionalities.550 The Fund, through 
its representative, confirmed the possibility of a deal in November 1984, if 
the government will agree to a major devaluation of the naira. By January 
1985 the Fund proposed that the naira be devalued by 25 percent immediately 
and by another 25 percent later. Such a drastic devaluation was again rejected 
by the government which on its own had devalued the naira from Nl = $1.33 
in January 1984 to Nl = $1.12 in March 1985.551 The Fund insisted that the 
rate of devaluation was still insignificant and unacceptable. 
In the final analysis, the Buhari government continued to implement its 
independently designed and indigenous stabilization program without the 
Fund's approval and agreement.552 At the same time, it continued to wage 
its self-proclaimed war against indiscipline domestically. The combined 
effect of both "wars" on the government policies and the citizens contributed 
tmmensely in fertilizing the conducive environment for the palace coup of 
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548 See "Oil Seen as Way To Achieve Self-Sufficiency," FBIS-MEA, 23 October, 1984, p. T5. 
549 Biersteker, supra 
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August 27, 1985. 
III. THE BABANGIDA GOVERNMENT (1985-1993) 
On August 27, 1985, the Army Chief under the Buhari government, Major 
General Ibrahim B. Babangida, popularly known as "IBB", overthrew the 
government of Buhari in a palace coup. Immediately upon usurpation of 
power, Babangida promised that his government would "break the deadlock 
in the negotiations with a view to evaluating more objectively, both the 
negative and positive implications of reaching a mutual agreement with the 
IMF" (italics mine).553 At the same time, Nigerians, particularly; the 
organized labor unions, professional groups, as well as student groups were 
united in their opposition of IMF prescribed conditionalities.554 Cognizant 
of the strong public opposition to the IMF and its conditionalities, and yet 
Willing to appear to be conciliatory, the Babangida government appointed a 
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553 See West Africa, September 9, 1985 
554 See Financial Times of September 20, 1985, article captioned, "Nigerians reluctant to take IMF's bitter 
r~llledy." Compounding the economic situation of the country at the same time was the unprecedented drop in crude 
011 revenue from $28 per barrel to $1 ° per barrel. 
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panel to study the desirability or otherwise of accepting the IMF deal.555 
Some commentators argue that the establishment of the panel was primarily 
aimed at accomplishing two objectives:556 
1. to estimate the magnitude of anti-IMF sentiment, and 
2. to demonstrate the regime's commitment to human rights to the 
Nigerian public. 
Others argue, however, that it was ploy by the new government to buy time 
"until the regime had devised a strategy for taking a decision that it had 
intended all along."557 This author concurs with the latter analysis given the 
government's final position on the recommendations of the panel. 
The new government also announced a couple of policy decisions aimed at 
seeking public approval and cooperation.558 The notorious Decree number 4 
was repealed, however; the sister Decree number 2 was continued. Some 
journalists and politicians not yet charged and tried by the Buhari 
------------------------------------
555 The Nigerian Newswatch magazine article of October 14, 1985, entitled, "The Great IMF Debate: Nigerians 
argue the merits and demerits of an IMF loan." 
556 Olukoshi & Herbst, supra 
557 Okome, A Sapped Democracy, supra, p. 107 
558 See Callaghy "Lost between State and Market. ... " supra. See also, "Newspapers Assess Babangida's 
Performance, Regime," FBIS-MEA, December 6,1985, p. 13. 
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government were released. The National Security Organization which had 
carried out most of the arrest and prosecution under the previous government 
was disbanded and publicly ridiculed. The new government also signaled its 
intention to begin the process to return the country to multi-party 
democracy. 559 
The IMF Debate: Whether to accept or reject the IMF loan 
The nine-member panel that was set up by the Babangida government to 
conduct the IMF debate was chaired by Abubakar Abdulkadir.560 The 
committee was charged with the task of organizing the debate to determine 
whether the Nigerian government should accept or reject a loan of $2.5 
billion from the IMF. The debate was intended to be carried out by public 
speeches, pronouncements, street demonstrations, discussions, seminars and 
special reports and interviews in the mass media.561 
--------------------------------~--
SS9 Ibid, see also Olukoshi & Herbst, supra, p. 26 
S60 At the time, Mr. Abdulkadir was the Managing Director of the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB). 
Other members of the panel were drawn from the business community, the academia, bankers and civil service. 
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Although the debate was meant as an opportunity for the government to 
gather public opinion on the best policy choice to make, it was evident from 
the beginning of the exercise that the government desired the choice to accept 
the loan. Signaling the government's preference in the matter, Babangida had 
stated in his maiden speech to the nation that: "Austerity without structural 
adjustment is not the solution to our economic predicament. "(italics 
mine)562 Leading the government's team in support of the acceptance of the 
loan was the newly appointed Minister of Finance, Dr. Kalu Idika Kalu, who 
was a former W orId Bank economist. Also, in support of the team was the 
resident representative of the W orId Bank, Ishrat Hussain, as well as the 
,t 
commercial sector, some indigenous entrepreneurs, and representatives of 
:·;:·il 
foreign capita1.563 The supporters of the loan claimed that the loan and the 
concomitant conditionalities were precisely the best prescription for the 
ailing Nigerian economy. The position of this group could be summarized by 
the remarks of the then Minister of Finance, Dr. Kalu Idika Kalu, when he 
• 
said, "in fact, you are getting yourself a new lease of life with the 
----------------------~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
561 See Biersteker, "Reaching Agreement ...... " supra, p. 24. 
562 See Financial Times, Friday, September 20, 1985. 
563 See Newswatch, The Great Debate, supra. See also Remi Akano, ed., Nigeria and the IMF, supra. 
251 
loan. "(italics mine)564 Other supporters of taking the loan included the US 
deputy assistant secretary of commerce, David Diebold, who promised that 
the Reagan administration will greatly assist the new government if it reached 
an agreement with the Fund.565 
In opposition of the loan was a formidable coalition comprised of organized 
labor, bankers, intellectuals, local manufacturers, students, professionals, 
journalists, market women, etc.566 According to this group, the rejection of 
the IMF loan was critical in order to assert and maintain the economic 
independence of the country. Whilst the group appreciated the influx of 
additional capital from the loan, they nevertheless questioned the social and 
economic implications of the loan. They were, no doubt, afraid of accepting 
the loan which may tum out to be the proverbial "white elephant" gift. Some 
within the group questioned the difference between the IMF's loan and 
conditionalities and the Buhari's austerity policy hich was currently in 
--------------------------------------
564 Ibid 
565 See the Report of the Conference: Nigeria'S Economic Recovery, Lagos, Nigeria, September 24-25, 1985. This 
Conference was con-sponsored by the Nigerian-American Chamber of Commerce and the African American Institute. 




place.567 The opposition group also feared that the combined effects of the 
naira devaluation and subsidy removal will signal a huge increase in food 
prices and basic social amenities. 
While the debate progressed, the economic situation of the country worsened. 
Some of the Western banks refused to confirm the letters of credit emanating 
from Nigerian banks. Others went as far as withdrawing the lines of credit 
that they had opened for some Nigerian banks.568 Time was running out for 
the Babangida government and a choice had to be made. 
Babangida's Final Choice: 
We had concurred with the proposition that the Babangida government 
wanted to buy time in order to implement the economic policy that they had 
in mind. The establishment of the panel to conduct the IMF debate was 
simply a ploy to appear to be sensitive to the wishes of the Nigerian public. 
From inception, the government had maintained their neutrality in the whole 
--------------------------------------
567 See West Africa, "Nigeria and the IMF", 9 September, 1985 




process, but in practice, the government had canvassed for the acceptance of 
the loan. In his interview with the New Nigerian newspaper, Babangida 
maintained that: 
"I did emphasize that we wanted to break the deadlock as far as the 
negotiation on IMP was concerned because we went into it as far back as 
1983 ...... but in doing so, all our decisions must be governed by the yearnings 
and aspirations of the Nigerian people and we threw it out for debate .... 
It is the decision of the people that we will carry along to the negotiation 
table. "569 
Contrary to his assurances to abide "by the yearnings and aspirations of the 
Nigerian people" in the outcome of the debate, Babangida ultimately made a 
choice that was totally contrary to the yearnings and aspirations of the 
Nigerian people. In December 1985, the Abdulkadir-led panel submitted their 
report from the debate to the Babangida government. The panel, in 
consonance with the overwhelming wishes of the Nigerian public, 
recommended that the government reject the IMF loan and the concomitant 




accepting the recommendation to reject the Fund's loan but announced that it 
would design a "home-grown" adjustment program. 570 
The government immediately developed a structural adjustment program that 
was only "home-grown" in name, but essentially a prototype IMF /W orId 
Bank strq,ctural adjustment program. It has been stated on good authority 
that, indeed, the W orId Bank resident representative in Nigeria, Dr. Ishrat 
Husain, who was actively involved in the debate also collaborated with the 
government officials in designing the program.571 
One commentator described the program as follows: 
"A comprehensive reform program, one certainly unprecedented in the 
Nigerian context. It was, in effect, the equivalent of an IMF stabilization and 
.. structural change package. In fact, in some areas, it probably went further 
569 See the New Nigerian, September 27, 1985 
570 The term "home-grown" was used by Okome, supra. For greater details on the government's decision, see 
"Babangida Announces Rejection ofIMF Loan" FBIS-MEA, 13 December, 1985 pp. T3-T4. See also, "Babangida 
Discusses Economic Measures, Aims," FBIS-MEA, 27 December, 1985 p.T7. Also, West Africa, 13 January, 1986, 
p.51. 
571 See Paul Beckett, "Structural Adjustment and Democracy: Reflections on the Nigerian Experience" in Lual 
Deng, Markus Kostner & Crawford Young eds, Democratization and Structural Adjustment in Africa in the 1990s, 
Madison, Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 1991, p. 159. See also Callaghy, "Lost between State and 




than the IMF would have. "572 
On December 31, 1985, President Babangida573 presented the budget for the 
1996 fiscal year. The budget essentially unveiled all the details of the new 
economic reform program.574 It contained provisions regarding the 
devaluation of the naira, subsidy removal and privatization. It also proposed a 
cut of 3 percent and 19 percent for government spending and defense 
spending, respectively. The country's debt servicing was reduced from 44 
percent to 30 percent, while the government also re-iterated its commitment 
to return the country to civil rule timely.575 Babangida praised the budget 
provisions as "the beginning of a new path, and the inauguration of a new 
era; the era of economic reconstruction, social justice and self-reliance."576 
The budget practically ratified all the contentious aspects of the IMF 
conditionalities which had served as the bottleneck in reaching an agreement 
572 See Callaghy, "Lost between State and Market. .. " supra. See also, "Nigeria's Economy Under the Knife: The 
Depth of Nigeria's Crisis is Spelled Out in the Government's own Confidential Assessment which AB has obtained," 
an article that appeared in the African Business of August 1986, pp. 42-43 
573 Upon seizure of power, General Babangida adopted the title of "President," contrary to the practice offormer 
Il1ilitary rulers who were addressed as "Head of State." Thus, he became the first military president of the country. 
574 See "The Babangida Charter" in the West Africa of 13 January, 1986, p. 5l. See also the "Budget Speech" in 
FSIS-MEA. 




between the previous Nigerian governments and the IMF. The government 
acceded to the conditionality regarding subsidy removal in the oil sector by 
proposing an 80 percent increase in the price of petroleum products.577 The 
devaluation condition was met by the proposal to establish a two-tier foreign 
exchange market. The first tier will be used for debt servicing and will 
operate on the existing exchange rate of the naira. The second tier foreign 
exchange market (SFEM) will service all other commercial transactions. 
Under this latter tier, the value of the naira will be determined in a foreign 
exchange auction mechanism that will be conducted by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN).578 Privatization will be conducted with regard to the 
government's parastatals. The only contentious conditionality that the 
government refused to accede to was the demand for trade liberalization.579 
, Interestingly, although the Babangida's government had almost acceded to all 
the previously contentious conditionalities, the IMF did not immediately give 







World Bank had played a very critical role in the design and formulation of 
the program. It may be that the IMF felt that the government had, like its 
predecessors, cherry-picked the conditionalities to implement. It may also be 
that the Fund was displeased with the government for the clever way it 
manipulated the outcome of the debate. It is pertinent to note that the 
government had cleverly manipulated the outcome of the debate by taking the 
. following courses of action: 
1. It appealed to the popular yearnings of the Nigerian public by 
appearing to reject the IMF loan and conditionalities; yet 
2. It jettisoned the Fund and accepted the World Bank loan through the 
Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) of the Bank. As we stated earlier, 
Mr. Husain Ishrat, World Bank representative in Nigeria, was not only 
involved in the debate, but collaborated in fashioning the program. 
Apparently, the IMF wanted the government to implement the whole 
Contentious conditionalities even though the only one left out was the trade 
liberalization condition. In fact, it has been said that the World Bank refused 




In the meantime, the London Club of creditors granted Nigeria a 90 day 
moratorium on the outstanding debt of $7.5 billion. The Paris Club, under 
pressure from the Fund, refused to grant the country any moratorium. On 
October 16, 1986, the World Bank approved a loan of $452 million for the 
implementation of the SFEM. The London Club later extended the 
moratorium by an additional three months period.581 The IMF continued to 
withhold its blessing for the economic program until September 5, 1986, 
when the government and the Fund signed a letter of intent. That letter was 
subsequently ratified by the Executive Board of the Fund on December 12, 
1986. The agreement provided the country the long-awaited life-line in the 
form ofSDR 650 million from the Fund, effective January 30,1987.582 
Simultaneously, the London Club and the Paris Club agreed to re-schedule 
the country's debts of $3.8 million and $6.5 million, respectively.583 
At the same time that the government announced this economic reform 
program, the government was also aggressively embarking upon a political 
-----------------------------------
580 01ukoshi and Herbst, supra 
581 See "World Bank Approves $452 Million Loan,"FBIS-MEA, 20 October, 1986, p. T2. 
582 01ukoshi & Herbst, supra 
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reform program. Thus, the Babangida government set out to accomplish the 
unprecedented feat of embarking upon two major reforms at the same 
time.584 
IV THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S EXPERIENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
From 1910 to the end of World War II, Japan colonized what is currently 
known as North and South Korea. However, after the war, the Soviet and the 
United States embarked upon the division at the 38th Parallel, which created 
the trusteeship rights over the North and South Korea, respectively. 
~-------------------------------------------
583 Ibid 
584 Okome, supra. The author also credits the adoption of SAP by the Babangida government to the influence 
eXerted by the IMF, the W orid Bank and other external creditors, who insist that the fulfillment of conditionalities 
Was a prerequisite for access to debt relief. 
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Although the country is generally known as South Korea, it is officially 
addressed as the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.). A product of the end of World 
War II, with the surrender of Japan to the Allied Powers in 1945, the R.O.K. 
was established on August 15, 1948.585 The Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea (D.P.R.K.) or North Korea, on the contrary, was established on 
September 9, 1948.586 
Since the division of Korea into North and South, and establishment of the 
trusteeship arrangement, there has been no love lost between the sister-
nations. Less than a year after their establishments, 587North Korean forces 
invaded South Korea, sparking off another major international crisis which 
pitched the R.O.K and the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) on the 
one side and the D.P.R.K. and China on the other side. Eventually, the crisis 
was brought to an end when the Armistice Agreement was signed by the 
representatives of the Korean People's Army, the Chinese People's 
Volunteers, and the U.S. -led United Nations Command (UNC). The R.O.K. 
------------------------
585 The first President of the R.O.K. was Syngman Rhee. 
586 The first leader of the D.P.R.K. was Kim II Sung. 
587 North Korean forces invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. 
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refused to sign the Agreement.S88 
With a population of 48.42 million people inhabiting a total land area of 
98,477 square kilometers (38,022 square miles), the R.O.K has one of the 
world's highest population densities. Also, given the fact that almost all 
Koreans share the same cultural and linguistic heritage, the population is said 
to be one of the most ethnically and linguistically homogenous in the 
world.S89 
Although ethnically and linguistically homogenous, only fifty percent of the 
population actively practices religion. Amongst the religious group, 
Christians comprise 49 percent, while Buddhists comprise 47 percent. 
Confucianists comprise 3 percent, while the remaining 1 percent is comprised 
of a combination of Shamanism (traditional spirit worship) and Chondogyo 
(Heavenly Way). 
------------------------------------
588 By the end of the war, almost three million Koreans were estimated dead or wounded, while another estimated 
l11ilIions were left homeless and separated from their families. 
589 The exception to the population mix is the very insignificant 20,000 people that comprise the Chinese 
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The R.O.K. is governed by a republican form of government consisting of the 
Executive branch, the Legislative branch and the Judiciary. The Executive 
branch is comprised of the President, who acts as the head of state, and the 
Prime Minister, who acts as the head of government. The Legislative branch 
is comprised of a unicameral National Assembly, while the Judiciary is 
comprised of the Supreme Court, the Appellate Courts, and the 
Constitutional Court. The country is administratively divided into Nine 
provinces and sevencities.590 
Although the R.O.K has been governed mostly by the military, the economy 
has performed impressively. For instance, in 1963, the per capita Gross 
National Income (GNI) was estimated at $100. By 2004, the same GNI stood 
at over $14,000. At thesame time, the country's Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), stood at $680.1 billion. The country's gross exports in 2004 was 
estimated at $257.7 billion which was derived mainly from electronic 
• 
products, (semiconductors, cellular phones, computers), automobiles, 




these exports include China (and Hong Kong), which accounts for 19.6% of 
the total exports, the United States, which accounts for 16.9% of the total 
exports, the European Union which accounts for 12.8%, and Japan which 
accounts for 8.50/0. On the contrary, the country's gross imports in the same 
year was estimated at $219.6 billion, which comprised crude oil, food, 
machinery and transportation equipment, chemicals and chemical products, 
base metals and articles. These imports were supplied by Japan which 
accounts for 20.60/0, China which accounts for 13.1 %, the U.S. which 
accounts for 12.8%, and the European Union which accounts for 10.8%. 
The R.O.K's economy has performed tremendously well that in 2004, it 
ranked as the 11 th largest economy in the world. However, the economy has 
. been showing signs of slowing down in recent years, particularly, since the 
1997-98 economic crises.591 Some of the factors attributable for the weak 
economic performance include the rigid relationship between the employers 
and employees, the underdeveloped financial markets, the aging working 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
590 The seven cities are Seoul, Pusan, Incheon, Daegu, Gwangju, Daejeon, and Ulsan. 
591 The R.O.K survived the 1997-98 economic crises due to a combination of the huge IMP assistance and the 
extensive financial reforms that restored market stability and confidence. 
264 
• 
population, and the lack of efficient regulation of the sector. 
THE R.O.K AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
The scope of this research limits any attempt to cover all conceivable impacts 
of the IFIs on the R.O.K. However, I will use the single most devastating 
financial and economic crisis that beset the R.O.K. to illustrate the role of the 
IFIs before, during and after the crisis. By so doing, hopefully, we can fully 
appreciate the tremendous impact of the IFIs on the current shape, form and 
direction of the R.O.K's economy, politics, society, etc. 
The R.O.K. became a member of the IMF on August 26, 1955. But 
membership of the IMF, or indeed, any other IFIs did not contribute to the 
spectacular transformation of the one time poor country into what became the 
model for many developing countries. The transformation can be appreciated 
from the statistics that indicate that in 1965, for example, the country had a 
per capita GDP that was less than that of the Philippines. However, by 1995, 
the country's per capita income (GNP) was $13,269, compared with the 
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$2,475 of the Philippines. Statistically, this accounted for a 770% increase in 
30 years,592 while the economy grew averagely 7% per annum, making the 
economy the 11 th largest in the world at the time. As a beautiful bride, the 
R.O.K. was invited by many elite economic clubs, and consequently, joined 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on 
September 30, 1996.593 
Further, the R.O.K. was described in the 1996 report of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as the outstanding 
example of an "emerging donor". The report also described the R.O.K. as a 
"country that has successfully broken out of aid dependence"; having 
received aids totaling $4.8 billion since independence in 1945.594 
Less than a year later, the economic tide turned against the R.O.K. The 
economy took a tum for the worse. The R.O.K's balance of trade with Japan 
------------------------------------
592 Vinod Ahuja, et ai, Everyone's Miracle? Revisiting Poverty and Inequality in East Asia, Washington, World 
Bank, 1997, cited by Walden, et ai, TAMIN THE TIGERS: THE IMF AND THE ASIAN CRISIS, Third World 
Quarterly, 01436597, Sept 98, Vol. 19, Issue 3 
593 See' South Korea leaves developing world', Inter Press Service, 30 September 1997. In fact, the admission of 




and the USA was worsening. For instance, in 1987, the R.O.K enjoyed a 
trade surplus of$9.6 billion with the USA. But by 1996, the trade surplus had 
turned into a trade deficit of over $10 billion, while its total trade deficit was 
approximately $21 billion. 
By October 1997, the situation had become very critical. In fact, by that time, 
the total loan amount that was in default by the R.O.K's businesses was 
estimated at over $50 billion. In the light of this situation, the foreign banks 
which had provided the needed financial life-line froze all new loans to the 
R.O.K.595 Not only the businesses were in default of their loan obligations; 
the government also, was in financial dire straits faced with the repayment of 
$66 billion in foreign debt. The R.O.K. had no alternative than to join 
Thailand and Indonesia to apply for the IMF life-line. 
------------------------------------
595 The foreign banks at the time already had about $200 billion worth of investments and loans in the R.O.K. In 
reaction to the general economic and financial situation in the country, they apparently wanted to mitigate their 
potential losses by freezing the approval of new loans. Note 257, supra. 
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. THE IMF PACKAGE -
Given the extreme situation that the R.O.K. was facing, the IMF had to 
devise a means to circumvent its lending policy that no financial package 
shall exceed five times the recipient country's IMF quota. Consequently, the 
IMF invented a new kind of loan called the 'Supplemental Reserve Facility', 
that allowed it to contribute $21 billion of the total $57 billion package to the 
R.O.K.596 
The total loan package of $57 billion was contributed by the IMF ($21 
billion), the World Bank ($10 billion), the Asian Development Bank ($4 
billion), Japan ($10 billion), the USA ($5 billion), Australia and Brunei ($1 
billion each), while Canada, France, Germany, and the UK contributed ($1.25 
billion each). The conditions attached to the package included a long list of 
economic, institutional, labor and industrial reforms by the government. 
---------------------------------
596 It is noteworthy to point out that the $57 billion financial package extended to the R.O.K. exceeded the previous 
record loan of $17.8 billion to Mexico in 1995. It also represents more than 20 times the quota available to the 
a.O.K. in 1997. 
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The key fiscal and monetary conditions of the package included tightening 
monetary policy, raising interest rates from 12.50/0 to 21 % to curtail liquidity, 
controlling money supply to contain inflation at or below 5%, floating the 
exclmge rate, maintaining a balanced or slight surplus budget, increasing the 
value added tax (V A T) and expanding corporate and income tax bases. 
The key institutional conditions of the package included establishing an 
independent central bank, closing ailing financial institutions, imposing the 
debt-to-equity ratio of the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) on the 
local banks as well as opening the local market for foreign banks to establish 
their subsidiaries. Further, the package calls for more trade liberalization, 
capital account liberalization, corporate governance and structure review, and 
labor market reform. 
Some commentators have suggested that the IMF as well as other donors to 
the package used the opportunity to extract from the R.O.K. concessions that 
they had long sought but could not get. Others posit that some of the 
concessions or conditions of the package covered areas that were unrelated to 
269 
the economic crisis.597 For instance, an editorial in the Financial Times 
cautioned as follows598: 
. "both the government and the IMF must exercise care. Korea faces a private 
sector financial crisis, not the sort of government-inspired payments problem 
to which the IMF is traditionally used. Its current account deficit is low and 
falling, and there is a history of balanced budgets. Stringent fiscal restraint 
would compound the impact of private sector adjustment. The government 
can afford to borrow to finance its banks rescue. Insisting on tax increases 
and spending cuts to meet the cost would smack of overkill." 
Unfortunately, the IMF package caused a bad situation to become worse by 
their insistence on fiscal restraint, tax increases, spending cuts, monetary 
tightening and more financial liberalization. To buttress these contradictions, 
Professor Sachs stated: 
'The won has depreciated by about 80% in the past 12 months, from around 
840 to the dollar to a (then) record low of 1565 yesterday (10 December, 
------------------------------------
597 Jeffrey D. Sachs, the Harvard's Institute for International Development director, in the wake of the deal, 
aCcused the IMF of secrecy and attempting to compel all the country's presidential candidates to endorse the 
agreement which they had no part in drafting and no time to understand. For further reading, see, Jeffrey D. Sachs, 
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1997). This currency depreciation will force up the price of traded goods. 
Yet, despite that the IMF insists that Korea aim for essentially unchanged 
inflation rates .... to achieve unchanged low inflation in the face of huge 
currency depreciation Korea will need a monetary squeeze. And this is 
indeed what the Fund has ordered. Short term interest rates jumped from 
12.5. to 21 per cent on the signing of the agreement, and have since risen 
further.' 599 
The consequences of the IMF prescriptions were predictable: money is in 
short supply, credit is expensive, companies can't afford credit, companies 
collapse, and people lose their jobs, consumer demand declines, and so on. In 
order to meet the new BIS debt-to-equity standards, the local banks closed 
their lending services and refused to roll over existing loans. The situation 
immediately got so bad that it has been correctly attributed to an equivalent 
of 'fanning the flames'600, as well as 'overkill' .601 
'-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
'IMF is a power unto itself, Financial Times, 11 December, 1997. Cited in Note 257, supra. 
598 See the Financial Times of27 November, 1997. 
599 Note 263, supra 
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The general criticisms of the IMF in the handling of the R.O.K's crisis in 
1997 can be summarized as follows: 
1. Faulty advice 
The Fund failed to distinguish between private sector debt crisis as was 
faced by the R.O.K., and public sector crisis. Consequently, the measures 
imposed by the Fund in dealing with the R.O.K's crisis like budget cuts, 
hiking interest rates and taxes were in the domain of public sector debt 
crisis management, and not private sector situation as was faced by the 
R.O.K.602 
2. Moral hazard 
By bailing out countries in dire financial situations, the Fund has been 
accused of creating a morally hazardous situation which saves creditors 
and debtors who engage in unwise financial transactions. 
3. Inequitable distribution of adjustment pain 
The Fund has also been criticized for their inequitable distribution of the 
adjustment pain between 'domestic' and 'foreign' interests. According to 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
600 Note 257, supra 
601 Note 262, supra 
602 In another scathing piece on the same subject matter, Professor Sachs noted 'the currency crisis is not the result 
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the critics, domestic firms are expected to deal with the market forces, 
while foreign firms are protected in the reforms that form part of the 
rescue package. 
4. Extra-jurisdictional coverage 
The Fund has been accused, and rightly so, of exploiting the opportunity 
afforded it to intervene in distressed countries to act as the' global 
economic policeman. '603 Professor Martin Feldstein hit the point on the 
head when he cautioned as follows: "a nation's desperate need for short-
term financial help does not give the IMF the moral right to substitute its 
technical judgments for the outcomes of the nation's political 
process."604 
5. Same-size-fits-all approach 
The generic prescription that has become the hallmark of most IMF 
reform packages has been attributed to the intellectual arrogance of the 
Fund. The perception is that the policy makers in the Fund arrogantly 
~----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
of Asian government profligacy. This is a crisis mate mainly in the private, albeit under-regulated, financial markets'. 
"See Jeffrey D. Sachs, 'The wrong medicine for Asia', New York Times, 3 November; 1997. 
• 603 See Note 258, supra 
604 See Martin Feldstein, 'Refocusing the IMF', Foreign Affairs, MarchiApril1998, cited in Note 258. Professor 
Feldstein is of faculty at Harvard University and also the President of the National Bureau of Economic Research, as 
Well as a former adviser to US President Ronald Reagan. 
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believe that they have all the answers to the variety of financial problems 
that challenge different countries. Their prescription, therefore, of the 
same-size-fits-all reform package has been anything but the magical 
solution that is needed in the variety of the situations. 60S 
6. Agent ofneoliberalism 
Finally the Fund has been labeled an agent of neoliberalism and free 
market policies of its major shareholders, particularly, the United States. 
This point was highlighted by Charlene Barshefsky in her testimony 
before the US House Ways and Means Subcommittee, when she declared 
as follows: 'Many of the structural reform components of the IMF 
packages will contribute directly to improvements in the trade regimes in 
those countries. If effectively implemented, these programs will 
complement and reinforce our trade policy goals'. (Emphasis mine )606 
------------------------------------
605 This scenario was illustrated by Joseph Stiglitz, when he wondered how effective the Fund's solutions can be 
when those solutions were products of a system where 'economists would fly into a country, look at and attempt to 
verify these data, and make macroeconomic recommendations for policy reforms, all in the space of a couple of 
Weeks'. Cited in Note258. 
606 This formed part of the testimony of Charlene Barshefsky, then us Trade Representative, before the us House 
Ways and Means Trade Sub-committee in 1998. This was cited in Note 258. 
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V THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL'S EXPERIENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
Generally known as Brazil, the country is officially known as the Federative 
Republic of Brazil. The country of 186 million people came into existence in 
1500 when Pedro Alvares Cabral claimed the region called Brazil as a colony 
of Portugal. From 1500 to 1808, the colony was ruled from Lisbon, Portugal. 
When Napoleon's army invaded Lisbon, King Dom Joao VI and the entire 
royal family fled and settled in Rio de Janeiro, where they set up the new 
government. In 1821, however, King Dom Joao VI returned to Portugal. A 
year later, his son, Dom Pedro I, declared Brazil's independence on 
September 7, 1822, and became the first Emperor. After the reign of Dom 
Pedro I, his son, Dom Pedro II took over and ruled Brazil from 1831 to 1889. 
In 1889, Deodoro da Fonseca, Marshal of the Army, led a military coup and 
thereafter established afederal republic. Under the republic form of 
government, the presidency rotated between the dominant states of Sao Paulo 
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and Minas Gerais from 1889 to 1930. In 1930, there was another military 
coup which brought Getulio Vargas into the presidency. Vargas ruled Brazil 
as a dictator until 1945. From 1945 to 1961, Brazil was ruled by Jose 
Linhares, Gasper Dutra, Vargas (again), Cafe Filho, Carlos Luz, Nereu 
Ramos, Juscelino Kubitschek, and Janio Quadros who was forced to resign in 
1961. After the resignation of Quadros, his Vice President, Joao Goulart, 
continued the presidency until 1964, when the military staged a coup. 
Thereafter, the military began a long period of military rule that spanned 
from 1964 to 1985. 
By then, there had been established a transitional electoral college consisting 
of all members of congress and six delegates chosen from each state to 
choose the president. The electoral college, pursuant to its mandate, elected 
Tancredo Neves as President on January 1, 1985. Shortly after his election, 
President Neves took ill and died in April 1985 and was succeeded by his 
Vice President, Jose Samey. 
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In 1989, Brazil completed the electoral transition when Fernando Collor de 
Mello was elected president in the first direct presidential election in over 20 
years. Three years later, Mello's government was tarnished by a major 
corruption scandal which culminated in his impeachment and resignation. 
Consequently, Vice President Itamar Franco, succeeded him and completed 
their term in 1994, when Fernando Henrique Cardoso was elected President. 
President Cardoso was re-elected in 1998 for another four-year term due in 
part to his aggressive economic reforms. In 2002, Luiz Inacio da Silva, 
popularly known as Lula, was elected president for a four-year term. 
In 2005, the population of Brazil was estimated to have reached 186 million 
people, ranking the country the fifth in the world, as well as the most 
populated country in Latin America. The population is comprised of six 
major groups: the Portuguese, the Africans, other descents from Europe, 
Middle East, Asia, as well as indigenous peoples of Tupi and Guarani. 
However, it is worthy of note that Brazil remains the only Portuguese-
speaking nation in the Americas with three quarters belonging to the Roman 




The country has a geographical land area of 8,511, 965 square kilometer (or 
3,290,000 square miles). The major cities include the capital city, Brasilia, 
with a population of 2.3 million residents; Sao Paulo, with a population of 
10.8 million residents; Rio de Janeiro, with a population of 6.1 million 
residents; Belo Horizonte with a population of 2.4 million residents. The 
other cities include Salvador with a population of 2.6 million residents; 
Fortaleza, with a population of 2.3 million residents; Recife with a population 
of 1.5 million residents; Porto Alegre with a population of 1.4 million 
residents; and Curitiba with a population of 1.7 million residents. 
The federative republic of Brazil is comprised of 26 states and a federal 
district. The federal government is made up of the executive branch, the 
legislative branch, and the judicial branch. The 1988 constitution provides 
that the president is the chief of state and head of government. The president 
is elected to a four-year term of no more than two 4-year terms.607 The 
legislature consists of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The Senators 
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serve for eight years, however; two-thirds of the chamber undergoes election 
at the same time, while the remaining one-third is up for election four years 
later.608 On the contrary, the Chamber of Deputies serves for four years.609 
The Judiciary consists of the Supreme Federal Tribunal. The 11 lifetime 
members are appointed by the president. 
Recently, the economy of Brazil has recorded steady growth in a variety of 
the sectors. By 2005, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stood at $619.7 
billion by official exchange rate, which was equivalent to $1.579 trillion in 
purchasing power. The per capita Gross Domestic Product at the same period 
was $8,400, while the annual real economic growth was approximately 2.4%. 
Brazil's economic activities are based primarily on their huge natural 
resources which included iron ore, manganese, bauxite, nickel, uranium, 
gemstones, oil, wood, and aluminum. Given the fact that Brazil commands 
14% of the world's renewable fresh water, agriculture plays a vital role in the 
general economic activities of the country. Their agricultural products 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
607 President Luiz Inacio da Silva (Lula) was elected president in 2002 for a four year term. 
608 The 81 member Senate have three representations for each state and the Federal District. They serve for 8 years. 
609 The Chamber of Deputies has 513 members. They serve for 4 years. 
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include coffee, soybeans, sugarcane, cocoa, rice, livestock, corn, oranges, 
cotton, wheat, and tobacco. Another vital component of the economy are the 
industrial products which include steel, commercial aircraft, chemicals, 
petrochemicals, footwear, machinery, motors, vehicles, auto parts, consumer 
durables, cement, and lumber. The services sector, another huge component 
of the economy, includes mail, telecommunications, banking, energy, 
commerce, and computing. 
In 2005, Brazil recorded a $44 bi1lion trade balance surplus. The total export 
receipts amounted to $118 bi1lion, while the exports were shipped to the 
European Union which accounted for 25.00/0, United States which accounted 
for 21.1 %, and Mercosur which accounted for 20.4%. Total imports under 
the same period amounted to $62.8 bi1lion, and the major suppliers were 
European Union which accounted for 25.4%, United States which accounted 
for 2l.2%, Argentina which accounted for 7.6%, and China which accounted 
for 5.6. 0/0. 
Despite the modest growth recorded by the economy, there are sti1l some 




guarantee a more vibrant and steady economic growth. The Lula 
administration appears to be cognizant of these challenges and is poised to 
remedy them. For instance, the government has passed key tax and pension 
reforms to improve the fiscal accounts of the country. Part of the tax reform 
was aimed at creating incentives for long-term savings and investments. 
Also, judicial reform and the bankruptcy law reforms were embarked upon to 
improve the credit market system. In an effort to attract private investment, 
legislation has been passed aimed at promoting public private partnerships. 
BRAZIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Again, the scope of this research limits any attempt to fully review the impact 
of the international financial institutions (IF Is) on Brazil. Suffice it to say that 
OUf effort will be selective, yet covering the high points of the relationship 
between the country and the IFIs. It is also worthy of mention that unlike the 
R.O.K., Brazil has had a longer lasting interaction with the IFIs due to her 
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endemic financial and economic challenges.61 0 
Brazil joined the IMF on January 14, 1946. However, Brazil has become a 
regular patron of the Fund undergoing a variety of Fund-mandated economic 
and financial recovery programs.611 The genesis of the economic and 
financial crises of Brazil have been attributed to a number of factors, yet, no 
other set of factors is more dominant than the fiscal deficits incurred by the 
Brazilian government from the late 70s to the early 80s.612 This point can be 
highlighted by the fact that in four years613, Brazil, and indeed the other two 
largest economies in the region (Mexico and Argentina), "more than doubled 
the size of their nonfinancial public sector deficits, which rose from the 
already high levels of around 6 percent of GDP to well over 15 percent."614 
Fueling the increasing fiscal deficits were political pressures aimed at forcing 
the government to continue to spend regardless of the negative economic and 
610 See Brazil: Financial Position in the Fund As of July 31, 2006, at 
!mt2:llwww.imf.org/externallnp/tre/tad/exfin2.cfm?memberKeyl =90, last visited August 22, 2006 
611 id 
612 The same case is applicable to most countries in Latin America under the same period. This position is 
Supported and indeed advanced by Eduardo Wiesner in his paper, Latin American Debt: Lessons and Pending 
Issues, American Economic Review, May 1985, Vol. 75, Issue 2,191. Infact, the author acknowledged that 
although world recession and high real rates of interest in international markets aggravated the crisis, he doubts if 
they created the crisis as did the fiscal deficits. 
613 The four year period is from 1979 to 1982. 
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financial implications. Consequently, the external debt of Brazil, and indeed 
other key countries in the region, more than doubled between the four year 
periods. 
These countries accumulated the huge debts principally from the external 
financing facilities that were flowing from private international banks. The 
attraction for the private international banks to continue to make the funds 
available was the erroneous impression that these debts will be guaranteed by 
the government of the respective countries.615 On the contrary, some 
commentators attribute the attraction for the governments to continue to seek 
more funds to the illusionary belief that such funds were actually causing real 
appreciation of the exchange rate.616 The concomitant erroneous implication 
was that the economy was experiencing low inflation, high growth, and 
exchange rate stability.617 Unfortunately, after the initial appreciation of the 
exchange rate, the situation turned into a drastic depreciation of the real 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
614 id 
615 See Swoboda, A., "Debt and the Efficiency and Stability of the International Financial System," in 1.T. 
Cuddington and G.W. Smith, eds., International Debt and the Developing Countries, Washington: World Bank, 
1985. 
616 See Kavalsky, B. and Squire, L, et al., "Debt and Adjustment in Selected Developing Countries," unpublished 
paper, World Bank, July 1984. The authors acknowledge that in countries like Peru, Argentina, and Mexico, real 
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exchange rate. 6 1 8 The reality, however, was that these countries realized in 
the words of Rudiger Dornbusch and Stanley Fischer, that debt accumulation 
was not a "financing investment that was productive by the test of net dollar 
eamings."6l9 
It is important to underscore two fundamental developments that manifested 
in Brazil during the era of unregulated inflow of external financing. The first 
was the negative implication on domestic savings, which resulted in a 
derease in domestic savings as a proportion of GDP. In the same vein, gross 
domestic investment was on the decline as a percentage of the GDP. The 
reason had been that Brazil was amassing external resources primarily for 
consumption and not for increased investment.620 Consequently, the country 
was accumulating external debt faster than it was accumulating productive 
investment, which made a debt crisis very imminent. The second was the 
absence of oversight mechanism between the external finance and the 
exchange rates actually appreciated during that era. 
617 id 
618 See Harberger, A.c., "Lessons for Debtor Country Managers and Policymakers," in J.T. Cuddington, and G.W. 
Smith, eds., International Debt and the Developing Countries, Washington: World Bank, 1985. 
619 See Dornbusch, R. and Fischer, S., "The World Debt Problem," Report to the Group of Twenty-Four, 
DNDPIUNCTAD, September 1984. 
284 
• 
projects that the funds were intended to finance. This was a consequence of 
the character of the two principal parties involved: the private international 
banks and the public sectors of the Brazilian government. In the process, the 
private international banks ignored the fundamentals that should have been 
insisted upon in such financing, and in the words of a commentator, "the 
importance of the economic feasibility of investment proj ects was 
diluted."62l Again, as we stated earlier, the banks are willing to take this 
kind of blind risk if there is a guarantee, particularly, a sovereign 
guarantee. 622 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
620 Ffrench-Davis, R., "Que Paso con la Economia Chilena?" Estudios Publicos, Santiago, Chile, No 11, 1983. 
621 Note 277, supra 
622 Note 280, supra. The commentator, Alexander Swoboda, confirmed that banks are "willing to acquire assets at 
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THE CONTAGION EFFECT 
In addition to the fiscal deficits effect which we have covered thus far, 
another major effect on the Brazilian economic and financial crises is the 
contagion effect. By contagion effect, we imply the spill over effect on Brazil 
from the economic and financial turbulences from other countries that have 
fundamental economic and financial relationship with Brazil. As Professor 
Charles W. Calomiris stated623, contagion effect may arise under one or 
more of the following links:624 
1. Export and Import links, either through competition among exporters, 
as in the fallout for Indonesia and Malaysia after the Thai collapse, or 
import market linkages, as in the case of Uruguay's reaction to 
Argentina's crisis. 
2. Direct financial links, between the crisis country and other countries 
(which were of some importance for explaining the transmission of the 
rates of return lower than the riskiness of these assets" if there is a sovereign guarantee. 
623 Professor Charles W. Calomiris is the Henry Kaufman Professor in the Division of Finance and Economics at 
the Columbia University Graduate School of Business. He is also the codirector of the Project on Financial 
Deregulation at the American Enterprise Institute. 




Russian crisis to Brazil, the Argentine crisis to Uruguay, and the Asian 
crisis to Korea). 
3. Indirect, general-equilibrium financial links associated with global 
portfolio rebalancing, which explains the problems experienced by 
Brazil and Argentina in the wake of the Mexican crisis, and of Brazil in 
the wake of the Russian crisis. 
It must be cautioned, however, that contagion effect is not automatic, and is 
more likely selective in nature.625 The lesson, therefore, is that countries like 
Brazil can safeguard their economy from the contagion effects if the policy 
makers are willing to regulate the domestic banking sector, limit the 
expansion of government debt while pursuing programs aimed at export 
market growth and diversification. 
IRE IMF PACKAGE 
The IMF has been intervening in Brazil since the country became a regular 
of the Fund's 'rescue prescriptions.' The Fund, predictably, has been 
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offering Brazil its garden variety rescue prescriptions ranging from the 
reform of the banking sector to a whole array of other economic and political 
reforms aimed at stabilizing the economy and ensuring growth. 
Apparently, the Fund's reform packages are not very effective in Brazil, or 
they may be taking a rather longer period of time to translate into concrete 
results. And the question remains, "Is the Fund not doing a good job at 
diagnosing the Brazilian economic and financial crisis or alternatively, is the 
Fund failing to prescribe the correct reform pills for the country?" Some 
commentators have attempted to answer the question by placing the 
substantial portion of the blame on the Fund and its allies,626 while some 
others have suggestedhat the problem is twofold. 627 First, politicians do 
not have long-time horizons. Consequently, they lack the political patience to 
wait until after economic growth before increasing government expenditures. 
Second, local bureaucratic interests can be impervious to change even when 
politicians try to cut spending. This explains why huge spending policies are 
'--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
625 This point can be buttressed by the fact that Chile was not fundamentally affected by the Mexican crisis of 1994 
-95, neither was Singapore affected by the Asian crisis of 1997. 
626 See Lerrick, A., and Meltzer, A., "Beyond IMF Bailouts: Default without Disruption." Quarterly International 
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often decided at the local level but paid for at the national level. 
VI CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we selected one sample country from Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, respectively, to illustrate the roles played by the IFIs, particularly 
the IMF, in the developing countries. Our analysis of the experience of each 
of our selected country leads us to virtually the same conclusion: the Fund 
has become in the words of a critic a 'modern day Trojan horse' .628 In this 
ever-expanding role, the IFIs introduce a wide variety of trade, security and 
commercial interests under the cover of rescue mission. The case of the 
R.O.K. is very illustrative of how the IFIs used the opportunity of 
intervention to practically impact the totality of the composition of the 
country. As we indicated earlier, some of the reforms that formed part of the 
package were way beyond the economic and financial crisis that the country 
Economics Report, Carnegie Mellon Gailliot Center for Public Policy, May 2001. 
627 Note 289, supra. 
628 See Note 258. The authors contend that for more than 30 years, the R.O.K had creatively developed their 
economy by keeping the doors closed to outsiders like the US. Consequently, when the opportunity presented itself 




was confronted with. Yet, the IFIs insisted on those extraneous conditions as 
part of the rescue package presented to the R.O.K. And given the desperate 
situation that the R.O.K. government found itself in, it lacked the political or 
financial muscle to rej ect all or some of those extraneous components of the 
package, rather, they literally swallowed all hook, line, and sinker. 
Under the same cover of rescue mission, the IMF, and indeed the IFIs, has 
assumed the new and more powerful role of 'global economic policeman' 
under their surveillance jurisdiction or strategy.629 In this role, the IFIs have 
arrogated to themselves the role of monitoring directly and indirectly the 
performance of the economic performance of each country, particularly, the 
developing ones. However, experience has shown, and disappointelY so, 
that the IFIs' surveillance mechanism is faulty and ineffective since they fail 
to avert the crisis before maturation. Rather, they are apt to respond with their 




PROPOSALS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
I INTRODUCTION 
As we stated in the introductory part of this work, the fundamental goal of a 
doctoral dissertation must not be limited to the formulation of an academic 
thesis. It must ensure that the academic thesis is strongly supported by a 
variety of academic sources. Such sources must include among others, 
concrete, practical and reasonable proposals, recommendations, and 
suggestions on how best to deal with the enumerated challenges. 
Consequently, our goal in this concluding chapter will be to attempt to 
proffer some familiar as well as some unfamiliar recommendations. 
• 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
629 See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, 'The really new Bretton Woods', cited in Marc Uzan (ed) The Financial 
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II STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
Under this category, we propose a comprehensive review of the 
organizational structure of the key international financial institutions with a 
view to making them more representative of, and more responsive to the 
challenges of the twenty-first century. Granted that almost all of them were 
products of the post World War II era, and consequently, are of the twentieth 
century regime, it is imperative that they be re-organized to adequately meet 
the new and more complex challenges of the new century. 
Take for instance, the United Nations, which is the umbrella organization of 
all the international financial institutions (IFls), although it is made up of 192 
member states,630 it still retains its original structure which created among 
others the Security Council with the concomitant powers of the permanent 
System Under Stress: An Architecture for the New World Economy (New York: Routledge, 1996). 
630 Montenegro became the 192nd member of the United Nations when it was admitted on 28 June 2006 by the 
General Assembly upon the approval of the Security Council. The countries that form the basis of this work became 
members of the UN in this order: Brazil (24 October 1945), Nigeria (7 October 1960), and the Republic of Korea 
(17 September 1991). For further reading on the UN membership, visit 
!mp:llwww.un.orglNews/Press/docs/2006/orgl469.doc.htm. last visited on April 3, 2007. 
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five and their vet0631. One wonders how truly representative such a body 
can claim when all their deliberations and resolutions can be overridden by 
the veto of one of the five permanent members on the Security Council.632 
Unfortunately, this situation contradicts, in my humble opinion, the noble 
objectives enshrined in the preamble of the Charter which reads in part: 
"to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large 
and smal/"633 (italics mine). 
One wonders how the United Nations, the pre-eminent international 
organization, is living up to its ideals when only five members hold the 
ultimate veto power in the Security Council. Although the composition of the 
Security Council has been expanded to 15 members, yet, the other members 
with numerical majority on the Council lack the power to issue a resolution if 
one of the big fives decides otherwise. The same trend was replicated in the 
631 Although the amendment to Article 23 enlarges the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, 
it did not change the pre-eminence of the permanent five members. Amendment of Article 23 of the UN Charter was 
adopted (inclusive of Articles 27 and 61) by the General Assembly on 17 December 1963 and came into force on 31 
August 1965. In order to read the current membership of the Council as well as their term on the Council, visit 
htm;llwww.un.org!sc/presidency.htrnl, last visited April 3, 2007. 
632 The five permanent members are the United States of America, the Russian Federation, China, France and the 
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organizational structure and the power structure of the international financial 
institutions to the end that the poorer, weaker, member nations lack the 
ability to make meaningful contributions to the critical decisions that most 
affect them. 
A case in point is Africa, which is the beneficiary of almost fifty percent of 
combined IMF /W orId Bank loans to developing countries, yet, its combined 
votes in both institutions is less than three percent, respectively. The current 
imbalance in the power structures of both institutions has given rise to the 
natural clamor by the affected developing countries for an immediate review 
of the situation.634 
Ironically, the combined votes of African nations in the Bretton Woods 
institutions635, which are already low, have been targeted for further 
United Kingdom. 
633 Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
634 At a recent meeting held in Maputo, Mozambique, African Ministers of Finance resolved to push for more roles 
and representations in the organs of the IMF and World Bank. Their strategy includes enlisting the support of their 
Reads of State, through the African Union, to help them lobby their counterparts in the developed countries. One 
doUbts if the leaders of the developed countries will pay anything more than lip service to the request in light of the 
fact that they are currently enjoying the privileges that Africans want a piece of. See 
!um.;;/www,ngrguardiannews.comlnews/articleOI, last visited August 7, 2006. 
635 The Bretton Woods institutions are those institutions that were products of the Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 
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reduction in order to give the Asian developing countries more prominence in 
the institutions. According to the Special Assistant to the Nigerian President 
on NEPAD-ExtemaI636, Ambassador Aluko-Olokun, the Bretton Woods 
institutions plan to make the recommendations for a further reduction of the 
combined votes of African nations at their coming meeting in Singapore. In 
the words of the Ambassador, who also served as a former Nigerian Minister 
of National Planning, "Truly, we are not saying that the new Asian Tigers 
should not be given some leverage. But we are saying Africa should not lose 
its own relative position: 48 per cent of all the facilities given out by the 
Bretton Woods institutions come to Africa and that in itself is about an index 
that should show that we need to have a voice there. Weare losing our voice 
in the Bretton Woods institutions. This is not a good development for Africa. 
This is the essence ofNEP AD: to intervene in specific areas like this on 
behalf of Africa ..... "637 
USA, conferences, e.g. the IMF and the World Banle It is important to clarity that although the International Trade 
Organization (ITO) was conceived at the conferences, it failed to materialize. Consequently, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became the default organization. The GATT later gave birth to the WTO. 
636 NEP AD stands for the New Partnership for African Development. 
637 See, Why Africa should protest reduced power in IMF', World Bank, by Aluko-Olokun, THE NIGERIAN 
GUARDIAN NEWSPAPERS, at http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/news/article02. last visited August 14,2006. 
295 
• 
III DISTINCT APPROACH 
It would appear that two principal factors influence the international financial 
institutions' (IFIs) dsign of a one-size-fits-all policy in most developing 
countries. The first could be the lack of resources and manpower to develop 
country-specific programs, while the second could be the economics of 
applying a single policy across many countries as the case may be.638 
Experience, however, has proven that the one-size-fits-all approach that is 
currently been applied by the institutions, and indeed, the business world, is 
anything but effective. Interestingly, Coca-Cola, the world's exemplar of the 
success of standardization has realized the shortcomings of blind insistence 
on standardization in the face of tremendous changes going on in the new 
century. Douglas Daft, Coca-Cola's chair recently confessed as follows: 
"As the century was drawing to a close, the world had changed course, and 
we had not. The world was demanding greater flexibility, responsiveness and 
local sensitivity, while we were further consolidating decision-making and 
638 The business parlance for the application of a single marketing mix across different markets is called 
Standardization. The benefits inherent in the standardization of a marketing mix include (1) lower costs, (2) easier 
Control and coordination from headquarters, and (3) reduction of the time spent preparing the marketing plan ... 
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standardizing our practices ....... The next big evolutionary step of 'going 
global' now has to be 'going local.' "639 
It is common knowledge that differences exist between one nation and 
another within the same continent.640 It is equally common knowledge that 
differences abound from one part of a country to another.641 Consequently, 
the international financial institutions must resist the temptation of treating 
all African countries, for instance, as if they are comprised of the same 
human and environmental characteristics. Rather, great care must be taken to 
develop country-specific policies that may involve the adaptation of existing 
policies or the development of a completely new policy that will meet the 
peculiar needs of the recipient country.642 It will also be more productive if 
the developers of such programs are persons with sufficient knowledge of the 
639 Cited in Donald A. Ball ... , et aI, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: The Challenge of Global Competition, 9th 
ed., p. 525,2004. 
640 A classical example will be found in the extreme cultural, geographical and political characteristics of a country 
in the northern part of Africa, and another in the southern part. Many people in the US still confuse the fact that a 
country like Egypt lies in Africa, rather than in the Middle East. 
641 Take, for instance, Nigeria, with 36 states and three major ethnic groups, namely; lbo, Rausa, and Yoruba. The 
other components of the country include a wide variety of groups that have peculiarly different customs, traditions, 
languages, etc. 
642 Adaptation or the development of completely different policies is the two alternatives to the blind 
Unplementation of the standardized policies across board. Adaptation simply requires the tinkering of the existing 
policy in order to meet the present needs. Development of completely new policy, however, calls for the 
abandonment of the existing policy. It demands a completely new design taking into account the peculiar needs of 
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recipient nation. Such persons will, no doubt, ensure that the programs are 
consistent with the cultural, political, and economic peculiarities of the 
nation. 
IV GUARANTEEING HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNIVERSAL 
FREEDOM 
Following from the call for a distinct approach in program formulation, is the 
need for the international financial institutions (IFIs) to ensure that their 
programs and policies are aimed at guaranteeing human rights and the 
facilitation of universal freedom in the recipient nations. 
The current situation which tends to ignore the incalculable burden of 
sovereign debt on the citizenry, as well as the high corruption of the officials 
which results in the national funds siphoned overseas, is unjustifiable. Such a 
situation which denies the recipient nations and their citizens the right to 




contrary to the laudable goals of these institutions.643 It is common 
knowledge that most citizens of developing countries view international 
financial institutions (IFIs) suspiciously and have on occasions labeled them 
as agents of neocolonialists. This can be understood given their perception of 
the roles of the international financial institutions, and the harsh 
consequences of the IFIs'economic policies on their daily lives. As Africans 
poignantly put it: "People go to the doctor to get well. If, therefore, you visit 
the doctor and your conditions keep getting worse, it is either that the doctor 
lacks the knowledge to cure the sickness or the doctor is prescribing the 
wrong drugs for the cure. "644 A situation where many of the recipient 
nations are faring worse after many years of taking the IFIs' 'prescription 
drugs' is not helpful to the image of the IFIs. Such a situation has re-inforced 
the perception, particularly among developing countries, that many of the 
recipient nations have indeed found themselves in worse economic and social 
conditions than they were before they sought the intervention of the IFIs. 
643 The right of the citizens to enjoy and benefit from the wealth of their nation has been classified as their 
fundamental economic rights which must be protected and preserved. See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, International Law of 
Responsibility for Economic Crimes: Holding Heads of State and Other High Ranking State Officials Individually 
Liable for Acts of Fraudulent Enrichment, KIuwer Law Int'!, p.2, 1995. The latest edition of the work is titled, The 
International Law of Responsibility for Economic Crimes, 2nd ed, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006. 
644 This is a common way that Africans express their frustration when a problem defies all known solutions. 
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The diversion of public funds by government officials for private use has 
been likened to a violation of the people's fundamental human right.645 The 
contention is that when the government officials divert national funds for 
their private use, the consequence is the deprivation of the basic rights of the 
citizens.646 According to Professor Kofele-Kale: 
"The right of a people not to be disposed of their wealth and natural 
resources is not just any ordinary human right but thefundamental human 
right. This right transcends all the other rights and gives some semblance of 
form and shape to, and in a very real sense qualifies the other rights."647 
The validity of the learned professor's position can be further justified by the 
application of the needs theories like Maslow's648 and Adelfer's649. It is 
645 Id, Ndiva, Kofele-Kale, p. 359, supra. 
646 Jd., Ndiva Kofele-Kale, p. 359. Note 256, supra 
647 According to Professor Kofele-Kale, the act of depriving the citizens of the national funds and resources is the 
act of indigenous spoliation. The act of indigenous spoliation, according to Professor Kofele-Kale, is defined as the 
illegal act of depredation which is committed for private ends by constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials 
or private individuals. This view is contrary to the prevailing view in the intemationallegal community that the act is 
merely a property dispute. The human rights view is emerging and was amplified by Peter Weiss as one of the 
lawyers who represented the Philippines Government in the Marcos cases, cited in the 81 sl ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
648 The two major need theories include Maslow's hierarchy of needs and Alderfer's existence-relatedness-growth 
(ERG) theory. These two theories assume all people share a common set of basic needs. Maslow posited that people 
are motivated to satisfy five basic needs as follows: physiological needs, security needs, and belonging needs, esteem 
needs, self-actualization needs. The five basic needs are organized hierarchically, beginning from the physiological 
level and graduating at the self-actualization level. Thus, they are called the hierarchy of needs. Accordingly, lower 
level needs must be satisfied before the next higher level need would motivate further action on the part of a person. 
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trite, and indeed, noticeable that citizens typically assert their rights to "finer 
aspirations"650 (speech, association, and pursuit of higher goals), after 
satisfying the basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter.651 The assertion of 
any right or the degree of the assertion, nevertheless, depends largely on the 
motivation of the people.652 
Further, such "violation of a human right anywhere is also a violation against 
the state as well as against the conscience of mankind as represented by the 
international community, both as an integral whole and in its regional 
fragmentations."653 (italics mine) In the same vein, Professor Sucharitkul 
asserts that, "human rights, ................. are legal rights." He goes further to 
See Maslow, A.H., Motivation and Personality, New York, Harper & Row, 1954. 
649 Aderfer's existence-relatedness-growth (ERG) theory resembles Maslow's needs theory. For instance, the 
existence needs correspond to Maslow's physiological and security needs; the relatedness needs correspond to the 
social and esteem needs; while the growth needs correspond to the self-actualization need. Apart from those 
similarities, Aderfer makes two fundamental distinctions in the ERG theory. First, is that people sometimes attempt 
to satisfy more than one need at the same time. Second, is that the frustration in attempting to satisfy a higher-level 
need can lead to the satisfaction of a lower-level need. See Aderfer, c.P., "An Empirical Test of a New Theory of 
Human Needs," Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 4 (1969), pp. 142-75 
650 Id footnote 645 
651 Id footnote 646 with reference to the physiological needs. 
652 Kanfer, R., "Motivation Theory in Industrial and Organizational Psychology" cited in Handbook of Industrial 
and Organizational Psychology, ed. M.D. Dunnette and L.M. Hough, Vol. 1, Palo Alto, California, Consulting 
Psychologists Press, 1990, pp. 75-170. In Kanfer's opinion, motivation is anything that provides direction, intensity, • 
and persistence to behavior. See also Campbell, J.P., and R.D. Pritchard, "Motivation Theory in Industrial and 
Organizational Psychology," in Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, ed. M.D. Dunnette, 
Chicago, Rand McNally, 1976, pp.60-130. On the same subject of motivation, the authors as a manifestation of 
choosing an activity or task to engage in, establishing the level of effort to put forth on it, and determining the degree 
of persistence in it over time. Thus, motivation is not directly observable, rather it must be inferred from the behavior 
of the person involved. 
653 Sucharitkul, Sompong, A Multi-Dimensional Concept of Human Rights in International Law, Notre Dame Law 
Review, Vol. 62:305, 1987, p. 312 
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contend as follows:654 
"They are legal as opposed to moral or ethical rights, and as such a given 
legal system should enforce them and give them full effect, at any level or in 
any dimension. Legal rights are meaningful only if they can be correlated to 
the corresponding legal duties." 
Professor Sucharitkul goes further to place the obligation to protect human 
rights or to prevent the violations of them upon three identifiable and 
separate levels of enforcement or dimensions. The primary or first systemic 
dimension falls upon the state (including its administrative and police 
authorities). The intermediate dimension covers the regional agencies or 
commissions, while the ultimate dimension falls upon the international 
community (italics mine).655 
Given the apparent inability of the first and second dimensions of 
enforcement to prevent the violations of human rights with regard to 
654 Ibid, footnote 640, p. 311. See also the reference made to the work of Professor Hohfeld in Hohfeld, W, 
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (1923) wherein the 
distinguished professor provided a practical test to measure the effectiveness and scope of a human right in relation 
to its "correlative," i.e. the duty or obligation and the duty bearers. See also J. Stone, THE PROVINCE AND 
FUNCTION OF LAW 115-34 (1950), as well as Radin, A Restatement ofHohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141 (1938). 
655 Sucharitkul, ibid, footnote 641, p. 312 
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economic spoliation, the last vestige of hope lies in the international 
community, represented by the IFIs. In light of the clout that the IFIs 
currently enjoy in developing countries where they have expanded their 
traditional role as lending institutions to the new role of law-making 
institutions, they can contribute immensely t> the guarantee of the human 
rights and universal freedom of the citizens. The World Bank, particularly, in 
its new law-making role can do more by leveraging its financial resources in 
developing countries.656 
V FUNDS REPATRIATION/SURRENDER 
A common characteristic of the governments of developing nations is the 
high level of corruption of the officials.657 It is, unfortunately, these same 
corrupt government officials that seek and receive the funds meant to develop 
656 Paul Mosley, et aI, AID AND POWER: THE WORLD BANK AND POLICY-BASED LENDING: 
ANALYSIS AND POLICY PROPOSALS 66-77 (1979). The new law-making role of the World Bank evolved from 
the shifting perspective of conditionality from the probability of repayment of the loan to the removal of fundamental 
obstacles to economic growth. 
657 Classical examples abound in Nigeria under Generals Babangida and Abacha, in Zaire under Mobutu Sese 




their respective countries.658 Again, it is common knowledge that most of 
these funds do not make it to the country's treasury, neither are they applied 
to the benefit of the citizens.659 In the few cases where the funds actually 
make it to the government's treasury, the same officials find creative ways to 
siphon the funds into their private bank accounts located mostly in developed 
countries.660 Consequently, the same developed nation party to the creditor 
bank will eventually get to keep the funds in their country for more economic 
and social development. On the contrary, the poor recipient country is 
deprived of the benefits of the loan, but at the same time is burdened by the 
overwhelming weight of the debt. In fact, this practice of massively looting 
the national wealth and resources have been attributed, and correctly so, as 
658 Most governments designate the officials that can seek and obtain financial and other technical assistance on 
behalf of the country. Either as the Head of the central government or head of the component units, like states, or the 
Ministers of Finance, etc., these officials have the responsibility to negotiate and obtain sovereign loans and other 
assistance packages on behalf of the government. It becomes understandable, therefore, to imagine what these 
officials can do in their positions if they decide, (as many are wont to do), to line their own pockets from such 
transactions. 
659 A good example can be found in the case of Sierra Leone's former diplomat and government minister, Aiah 
M'bayo, who received on behalf of his government, $4 million, 500 tons of fuel and a ship load of provisions from 
Algeria as assistance to Sierra Leone in their hosting of the OAU summit. For negotiating the aid package, Mr. 
M'bayo received $25,000 from the proceeds, while the rest of the package was distributed among some of the 
Country's ambassadors. A similar example can be found in the case of a former Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone, 
Alhaji Abdul Karim Koroma, who sold food aid from Italy that was meant for starving Sierra Leone citizens and 
converted the proceeds into his personal account. These were some ofthe revelations that emerged from the three 
Commissions of Inquiry set up by the military government after the overthrow of the Momoh government in Sierra 
Leone. The Commissions were the Beccles-Davis Commission ofInquiry, the Lynton Nylander Commission and the 
Marcus-Jones Commission. 
660 Some of the creative ways that the government funds are siphoned include fake contracts, upfront kickbacks of 
designated contract amount percentage, outright conversion of public funds, the demand of huge monetary payments 
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the single most important obstacle to economic development.661 
Unfortunately, in the light of the massive looting of the treasury, the local 
law enforcement apparatus as well as the national judiciary, lack the 
resources and political will to prosecute the culprits who are high ranking 
public officials.662 
Another dimension to the issue of indigenous spoliation is the attempt by the 
sympathizers of the practice of indigenous spoliation to apportion greater 
blame for economic exploitation on multinational corporations. The tendency 
has been to focus primarily on the exploitative practices of the multinational 
corporations and consequently place all the blames on them. Granted that the 
multinational corporations have been less than ethical in their business 
practices in developing countries, the consequences of indigenous spoliation 
for the exercise of their official duties, etc. 
661 Id, Note 256, supra. See also Joseph Nye, Corruption and Political Development: a cost-benefit analysis, in 
POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A HANDBOOK 966 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnson & Victor T. Levine 
eds. 1989); Robert Williams, POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN AFRICA (1987). 
662 It is heart-warming to note that some developing countries are creating specialized anti-corruption agencies that 
will solely focus on the investigation and prosecution of corrupt government and non-government officials. A good 
example is the establishment by the Nigerian government ofthe much dreaded Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC). In the same light of fighting corruption, a former Attorney General of the Nigerian 
government, Prince Bola Ajibola, advocated the expansion of the fight against corruption by empowering the 
government to issue a writ of restitution against public officials who are alleged to have looted the public treasury. 
Such a writ, the Attorney General asserted, carries a lower burden of proof as the government needs prove their case 
by a preponderance of evidence. See Ajibola seeks law on restitution to recover ill-gotten wealth, THE 
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can not be minimized either. This position was amplified by Michael 
Reisman when he argued that the "ritual of condemnation of foreign 
corporations" and their exploitative practices in developing countries as well 
as the elevation of the issue internationally has obscured the equally 
important and damaging consequences of indigenous spoliation by 
government officials. He asserted that it was time to apply all necessary tools 
in international law to "restrain and recapture" looted national wealth from 
wherever they are hidden.663 
The international financial institutions (IFIs) should lead efforts to correct 
this ugly situation for two main reasons - it minimizes their efforts in 
assisting the developing countries and it will help launder their current image 
of willing benefactors of this crime. When the corrupt government officials 
are faced with a situation where they can no longer find a safe haven for their 
ill-gotten wealth, they will be somewhat discouraged from looting their 
government's treasury. But so long as they know that one of the developed 
VANGUARD NEWSPAPERS, http://odili.net/news/source/2006/aug/l0/322.html, last visited August 10,2006. 
663 W. Michael Reisman, Harnessing International Law to Restrain and Recapture Indigenous Spoliations, 83 
AMJ.INT'L L. 56-57 (1989). See also Abram Chayes, Pursuing the Assets of Former Dictators, PROCEEDINGS 
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countries will willingly accept their looted wealth, they will continue to 
deprive their fellow citizens of the funds needed for development, while in 
the same process increasing the sovereign debt. 
VI INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC) 
Commentators of intemationallaw acknowledge that one of the most 
important developments in the field was the establishment of a permanent 
International Criminal Court (ICC).664 The significance of the development 
lies in the fact that efforts to establish such a court have failed since the end 
of W orId War 1. According to Dr. Cherif Bassiouni who also served as Chair 
of the Drafting Committee at the ICC Conference, "since the end of World 
War I (1919), the world community has sought to establish a permanent 
international criminal court. "665 
OF THE 81 ST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 394 (1987) 
(Michael P. Malloyed. 1990). 
664 The Rome Statute o/the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. AlCONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998) reprinted in 
37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). 
665 CherifBassiouni, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 3 (1998)., cited in Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court: A 
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At the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries666 which was convened 
by the United Nations to finalize and adopt a statute to establish an 
international criminal court, were delegates from 160 countries and 
representatives from nongovernmental organizations.667 Upon the 
conclusion of the conference, the conferees voted overwhelmingly in favor of 
adopting the statute and the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).668 Since then, there has been tremendous support for the ICC which 
is evidenced by the number of countries that have signed the statute and 
ratified it.669 Consequently, on July 1, 2002, the ICC statute became 
effective after it was ratified by more than 66 countries.670 
Paradox of "Operation Enduring Freedom", Golden Gate University School of Law, Annual Survey ofInt'l & 
Comparative Law, Vol. IX, 2003. 
666 The United Nations convened the conference in Rome, Italy, from June 15 to July 17, 1998. 
667 See the Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183110, Annex II, III (1998). 
668 The conferees voted 120 in favor of adopting the statute, while 7 conferees voted against the adoption of the 
statute. The countries that voted against adoption are the United States of America, China, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and 
Libya. See also the Final Act, supra, note 253. 
669 As at February 18,2003, 139 countries have signed the statute, while 89 countries have ratified the statute. For 
further reading, see the Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, available at 
http://untreaty. un. org/Eng/ishlhible/ englishinternetbiblelpartIlchapter XVIII/treaty 10. asp 
670 Article 126 of the ICC Statute provides that the statute shall become effective after it has been ratified by 60 
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The ICC Statute empowers the Court to exercise complementary jurisdiction 
with the national courts in cases involving international crimes that fall under 
three main categories: genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.671 
The court's jurisdiction over other areas including the crime of aggression, 
terrorism and drug-related crimes were suspended until acceptable definitions 
of the words are agreed upon in the future.672 
ICC JURISDICTION 
As we stated earlier, the original jurisdiction of the ICC covers three main 
areas as follows: 
1. Genocide 
The drafters of the ICC Statute adopted the provisions of the Geneva 
• 
Countries. 
671 Art, 1,!d. 
672 Articles 5(1), (2), Id. 
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Convention of 1948 on the definition of'genocide'.673 In so doing, the 
ICC Statute clearly limits the jurisdiction of the court to cases where an 
accused is charged with the crime of genocide if s/he intentionally planned 
to destroy, in whole or in part, national, ethnical, racial or religious 
groups.674 This definition excludes acts of genocide intentionally directed 
against members of an opposing political group as well as other social 
groups that may not conveniently fall under the Geneva classifications.675 
2. Crimes Against Humanity 
Article 7 of the ICC Statute states that crimes against humanity must have 
been committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. Further, 
Article 7(2) elaborates that 'attack directed against any civilian 
population' includes a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts referred to in paragraph one pursuant to or in 
673 Article 6, Id 
674 Id 
675 It has been argued that the ICC Statute's definition of genocide will not cover crimes of genocide against 
members of an opposing political group and other social groups, e.g. as is the case involving the former Chilean 
dictator Augusto Pinochet. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Putting Limits on Lawlessness: From Nuremberg to Pinochet, 
Washington Post, Oct 25, 1998, cited in Chibueze, et al. 
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furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.676 
3. War Crimes 
The Court's jurisdiction over war crimes is triggered when the crimes are 
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes.677 This jurisdictional area appeared to have 
generated most controversy and opposition. In response to the controversy 
led by the United States government, Article 124 was approved under the 
transitional provision which permits a member to "opt out" of this 
provision for a non renewable period of seven years.678 
INVOCATION OF ICC'S JURISDICTION 
Under Article 13, the ICC's jurisdiction may be invoked by any of the 
following procedures: 
676 Id 
677 Article 8, ICC Statute, supra 
678 Article 124, Id 
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1. State Referral 
The ICC Statute provides for two principal ways that states may 
refer a breach of the provisions of the statute to the Court. The first 
instance may be from a State that is party to the Statute. Under this 
provision679, the State may refer the breach to the ICC prosecutor, 
who in tum, is required to investigate the complaint to determine its 
merits or otherwise. 
The second instance may be from a State that is not a party to the 
Statute. Under this provision680, a non party State may refer the 
case to the ICC prosecutor if either the crime was committed in its 
territory, or the accused person is a national of the non party State. 
2. Independent Prosecutor 
The ICC's Independent Prosecutor may initiate investigations based 
on complaints from victims of crimes covered under the statute, 
non-governmental organizations, or any other credible source. 
However, the Independent Prosecutor must first seek and obtain the 
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approval of the court's pretrial judges who must determine the 
merits or otherwise of the complaints.681 Consequently, if in the 
view of the judges the complaint warrants investigation and 
prosecution, they will approve of the investigation. If, on the 
contrary, they are of the opinion that the complaint lacks merit, they 
will disapprove of the investigation. Disapproval by the judges does 
not bar the prosecutor from subsequently ~epresenting the complaint 
if new facts and evidence arise in the future.682 
In order to check potential abuse of discretion by the Independent 
Prosecutor, the Statute also empowers the UN Security Council by 
resolution to stop a prosecution for an initial period of twelve 
months if the Security Council believes that such prosecution will 
negatively impact the Council '8 work. After the expiration of the 
initial twelve months period, the Security Council may renew its 
request indefinitely, in twelve month intervals.683 
679 Article 13(a), Id 
680 Article 12(3), Id 
681 Article 15(2), Id 
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3. Security Council 
The UN Security Council can, suo motu, refer a breach under the 
ICC Statute to the Court pursuant to the exercise of their functions 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
Such a referral by the Security Council, acting under the powers of 
the UN Charter, has given rise to the suggestion that the ICC acting 
under the direction of the UN Security Council, can exercise 
jurisdiction over nationals of States that are both parties and non-
parties to the S~atute. Such jurisdiction, it has been argued, may 
include both territorial as well as personal jurisdiction. Further, the 
logic is that the UN Security Council can lend its enforcement tools 
to the ICC if the State in question fails to cooperate with the 
ICC.684 
682 Article 15(5),Id 
683 Article 16,Id 
684 See Je1ena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and 
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INCLUSION OF THE CRIME OF EMBEZZLING PUBLIC 
FUNDS UNDER THE ICC STATUTE 
When high ranking public officials embezzle the public funds, like 
they do in most developing countries, the consequences are 
disastrous for the citizens. Such a criminal conduct deprives the 
country of the necessary funds to allocate to education, health, social 
infrastructure, as well as add to the sovereign debt of the country. 
The impact of such a conduct on the fragile economy is dangerous, 
while the moral implications on the citizens are far more dangerous. 
It is, therefore, my opinion that such a crime should be included 
under Article 7 of the ICC Statute, which covers the crimes against 
humanity. Such inclusion will serve as a deterrent to the heinous 
crime of embezzling public funds with impunity which is currently 
the case in most developing countries. 
The crimes enumerated under Article 7 of the ICC Statute should be 
Effectiveness, 29 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 291,297 (1998). 
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enlarged to include such a crime. Moreover, since the law 
enforcement agencies of the affected country lacks the courage to 
initiate prosecution under the country's legal system, the ICC must 
rise up to the occasion and be, "a new institution that gives hope to 
the entire world that we can hope to bring to justice those who 
transgress the most basic human principles."685 
VII CONCLUSION 
We must first acknowledge that the recommendations and suggestions so far 
proposed are in no way exhaustive. However, we believe that they will add to 
the pool of other suggestions and recommendations that have been proposed 
in other materials. While some of them will be fairly simple to implement in 
the short term, others will require tremendous diplomatic and leadership 
skills and determination to implement in the long term. 
685 A quote by Adriaan Bos, cited in John Hooper, u.s. Plan to Thwart War Crimes Court, Guardian Weekly, July 
316 
• 
Our belief is grounded on the conviction that the organizational structure of 
the international financial institutions (IFIs) as presently composed is grossly 
inadequate to realistically meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. 
Again, as we acknowledged earlier, these institutions have done fairly well in 
serving the needs of the twentieth century during which time they were 
formed. However, in light of the tremendous political, economic, and social 
challenges brought about by the twenty-first century, there is an urgent need 
to re-position these institutions for the present realities. 
Secondly, more adaptation and sensitivity is needed in the formulation of 
recovery programs formulated by the international financial institutions 
(lFIs). The one-size-fits-all strategy in program development is no longer 
working. Although it may be more cost effective for the institutions, it is not 
as effective as it should be given the negative outcomes. 
Thirdly, successful relief programs must do more than apply a band-aid 




Developing countries deserve sustainable development programs that will 
facilitate their immediate recovery as well as chart the course to a permanent 
healthy condition. 
Fourth, every effort must be put in place to discourage corrupt government 
officials from looting their national treasury and transferring their loot to 
their private accounts in banks located in developed countries. Also, efforts 
must be intensified to repatriate the already looted funds back to the 
government's treasury. Such a situation will greatly discourage such corrupt 
government officials from engaging in such criminal conduct. 
Fifth, the International Criminal Court (ICC), deserves the support and 
encouragement of all countries, particularly, the developed countries. 
686Experience has shown that municipal courts lack the jurisdiction and 
political will to try cases involving high ranking government officials who 
abuse their positions. It appears that the only hope left to bring such officials 
686 The opposition of the United States government to the ICC is unfortunate, given their pre-eminent leadership 
position in the world. Some of the actions it has taken in opposition to the ICC includes the withdrawal of their 
signature from the treaty, the enactment of the American Service-Members' Protection Act 2002, and the signing of 
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to justice will be the ICC. Again, the fear of prosecution after losing their 
political immunity will checkmate corrupt government officials while in 
office. 






The roles of the international financial institutions (IFIs) in the world 
economy have drastically changed. As the world expands in population, 
commerce, industry, technology, etc., the challenges that face the IFIs 
increase daily. These global developments have drastically changed the 
original goals, functions and roles of these IFIs.687 Consequently, the IFIs 
must develop new capacities in order to meet these evolving roles and 
challenges. The institutions that house the IFIs must also become more 
flexible and responsive to these evolving global challenges in order to remain 
effective.688 No doubt, the world in the 20th century when the major 
components of the IFIs were created is completely different from the world in 
this 21 st century that we currently live in. 
687 Refer to the Articles of the IMF, the IBRD, and the World Trade Organization, supra. 
688 The key institutions include the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, as well as the Paris Club 
and the London Club. 
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In order to establish a good basis to appreciate the evolving roles and 
challenges of the IFIs in developing countries, we chose to understudy three 
countries in different parts of the world. From Africa, we chose Nigeria.689 
In addition to the fact that this writer is a citizen of Nigeria, the country is the 
most populated country in Africa.690 A richly endowed country, with 
abundant human and material resources,691 Nigeria still fails to translate its 
abundant resources into a commensurate level of development since 
independence in 1960.692 From Asia, we chose the Republic of Korea 
(R.O.K.) The R.O.K. presents an interesting case in the league of developing 
countries.693 From a very poor and humble beginning, the R.O.K. 
successfully transformed its economy into an enviable one in a relatively 
short period of time. At the height of its glory, it became the beautiful bride 
of all the IFIs.694 However, when the economy began to suffer from the 
consequences of over-expansion, the same IFIs and its financiers treated 
689 See Nigeria under Chapter 5, supra. • 
690 The population of Nigeria is estimated to be over 120 million people. Infact, the result of the recently concluded 
census exercise puts the population at over 140 million. Ibid. 
691 Nigeria has produced many excellent professionals in almost all fields of human endeavors, who are equally 
spread all over the world as a result of the massive brain drain that the country experienced in the early 1990s. 
Nigeria also ranks as one of the major producers of crude oil in the world. Ibid. 
692 Unfortunately, inspite of all its natural and human resources, the country is still ranked as one of the poorest 
countries in the world. Principally, because the majority of the citizens lack the most basic necessities oflife like 
affordable housing, decent food, clean drinking water, good and affordable social infrastructure, jobs, etc. 
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them the same way that they treat other less successful countries.695 
From Latin America, we chose Brazi1.696 Again, one of the most populated 
countries in Latin America; Brazil has become a regular patron of the IFIs. 
With huge industrial and commercial base, the country, however, fails to 
elevate its status from one of the developing countries to a developed 
country.697 Which forces us to question: Why have these countries failed to 
become developed given the enormous influence and policy directives of the 
IFls in these countries? 
Many scholars have pondered this question in various forms and come up 
with equally varied responses.698 Although the responses vary from one 
scholar to another, there is a consensus that the underlying factors that attract 
the IFIs include decline in foreign exchange revenue, high level of national 
indebtedness, balance of payment crisis, corruption, etc. These factors cause 
the economies of developing countries to suffer serious economic imbalance 
693 Refer to the Republic of Korea under Chapter 5, supra. 
694 Ibid. 
695 Ibid. The economy of the R.O.K took a down tum in the late 1990s. 
696 Refer to Brazil in Chapter 5, supra. 
697 Ibid. 
698 See Okome, supra. 
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which consequently compel the government to seek help from the IFIs.699 
When the IFIs respond, they recommend corrective actions that involve the 
adoption of an adjustment program with very strict conditionalities. 
700Typically, the adjustment program imposes heavy costs on the affected 
society. Such costs, in turn, sets in motion, forces which are destabilizing to 
both economic and political transformation. 701 The garden variety of these 
costs include stabilization measures, inflation, unemployment and under-
employment, decline in social services, which in turn breeds violence and 
distrust for the government in power. 702 
We have argued earlier that the IF Is were created after World War II 
principally to facilitate the speedy repair of the economies of the European 
countries that had suffered enormous destruction during the war.703 We also 
argued that the developing countries were not in the consideration of the 
founders of the IFIs since most of them did not actively participate in the 
699 These conditions were present in the economies of Nigeria, the Republic of Korea, and Brazil when they were 
compelled to invite the IFIs. Refer to Chapter 5, supra. 
700 Ibid. 
701 Okome, supra, p. 268 
702 Ibid. 
703 Refer to Chapter 4, supra. 
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war, and consequently, did not suffer much destruction.704 Further, the 
leadership of the developing countries did not participate in the creation and 
formulation of the goals and objectives of the IFls.705 After all the countries 
that presently constitute the developing countries did not play active or 
critical roles in the propagation of the war. The implications of the non-
involvement of the developing countries in the formation and formulation of 
the goals and objectives of the IFls are enormous. For example, the IMF was 
created to specifically facilitate the speedy repair of the international 
monetary system after the war. 706 But the international monetary system that 
was in shambles was that of the European countries, not the system of the 
developing countries (emphasis mine). For example, the Fund's 
organizational structure as well as the power structure was created in a 
manner that gave the European countries the dominant control of the decision 
making apparatus of the Fund.707 
704 Ibid 
705 Ibid. 
706 See the IMF Articles, supra. 
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Another major component of the IFIs, the World Bank, was also created from 
the prism of the dominant European powers. The Bank was created 
principally to stimulate and support foreign investment. 708 We have argued 
that the goal of the Bank is to stimulate and support foreign investment which 
implies investment flowing from developed countries of Europe to developing 
countries like Nigeria, the Republic of Korea, and Brazil ( emphasis mine). 
This anticipated flow of investment did not envisage investment flow from 
developing countries to developed countries. Again, the Bank's 
organizational structure as well as the dominant powers of control was 
allocated to the countries that played critical roles in the formation of the 
Bank.709 The same applies to all the other members of the IFIs. 
By implication, since the IFIs were created by the leaders of the mainly 
European countries that won the war,710 with the mandate to serve the 
principal needs of the affected European countries, it is no wonder that the 
original roles of the IFIs were tailored for the European countries. It is, 
707 See the Fund's Quota System and the Special Drawing Rights system, supra Chapter 4. 
708 See the IBRD Articles, supra. 
709 Ibid. 
710 Although the US was a principal player in the World War II, and played a vital role in the formation of the 
World Bank, it did not suffer much destruction as a consequence of the war. The only part ofthe US that was 
affected by the war was the Pearl Harbor. 
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therefore, my position that upon creation, the original roles created for the 
IFls were to serve the European countries principally, and the developing 
countries by extension.711 
However, the current roles of the IFIs appear to have shifted and focused 
principally upon the developing countries. As the economies of the 
European countries have become more stabilized, the IFls have paid more 
attention to the economies of the developing countries. Further, as the 
economies of the developing countries continue to suffer from chronic 
distress, the leaders have been compelled to seek financial and technical 
assistance from the IFls. 712 
It is important to re-iterate that one of the primary purposes for the creation 
of the Fund is the provision of balance-of-payments finance for members 
experiencing temporary difficulties.713 Inclusive in the primary purposes 
was the mandate for the Fund to maintain high levels of employment, 
711 See the Articles of the IMF and the World Bank, supra. See also the Marshal Plan, supra. 
712 Refer to Chapter 5, supra, where we understudied the three sample developing countries of Nigeria, The 
Republic of Korea, and Brazil. Further, underlying the circumstances that compelled all three ofthem to seek the 
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income, and economic development through balance of payments 
support.714 The Fund has attempted to serve these current roles, particularly, 
in the developing countries by the prescription of economic reforms that 
impose strict conditionalities.715 Some of the garden variety conditionalities 
of the Fund include the prescription of privatization of public parastatals, 
devaluation of the currency, trade liberalization, removal of subsidy on 
critical components of the economy, etc.716 
It is worthy of note that the IFIs have strenuously emphasized their 
preference of market-oriented economy to the post-colonial state-led 
economy in almost all the developing countries.717 At the same time, they 
have attempted to convince the developing countries of Africa, Asia and 
Latin America that not only are the market-oriented economy the only 
solution, but one that can be attained in a relatively short period oftime.718 
Thus, they succeeded in creating the illusion of a quick-fix policy in the 
assistance of the IFIs was their unmanageable economic imbalance. 
713 See the IMF Articles, supra. 
714 Ibid. 
715 Refer to the case studies undertaken of Nigeria, the Republic of Korea, and Brazil under Chapter 5, supra. In all 




minds of the leaders and people of the developing countries. However, 
experience has proven that the market-oriented economic policy does not 
impact the economy in a short period of time; rather, it requires a consistent 
application over a relatively long period of time. 719 This may have 
contributed to the often expressed frustration of the government and peoples 
of the developing countries on the effectiveness of the market-oriented 
economic policy.720 
Compounding the fail~re of the market-oriented economic policy in the 
developing countries is the enormous toll that such policy takes on the 
sovereignty of the affected state. According to Dr. Okome, in the case of 
Nigeria, state sovereignty was eroded in four ways. First, the Nigerian state 
717 See Okome, supra, p. 120 
718 Ibid 
719 Again, in Nigeria under the Babangida administration, both the government and the citizens began to lose faith 
in the SAP when the gains failed to materialize in the short period of implementation. Rather, the pains of the SAP 
became so unbearable that the citizens began to oppose its implementation. 
720 Such expression of frustration on the failure of SAP in Nigeria can be seen in the conclusions of Professor A. H. 
Ekpo, a professor of Economics and Dean, Faculty of Management Science, University of Abuja. According to • 
Professor Ekpo, the World Bank's SAP in Nigeria in the early 1990 failed to achieve its objectives. First, production 
Was not stimulated; rather, speculation and commerce were encouraged. Foreign direct investment was not attracted 
to Nigeria as projected. Secondly, state involvement in the economy was reduced in some respects and increased in 
others. Third, the private sector failed to become the driving force in economic growth, contrary to the claim of the 
Bank. Fourth, privatization and commercialization led to increased prices for public utilities but no improvements in 
services, consequently, workers suffered from reduced real wages. Fifth, devaluation and the operation of the foreign 
exchange market led to economic distortions such as increased uncertainty and inflation. See A.H. Ekpo, Nigeria: 
Giant in the Tropics: A Compendium, Lagos, Nigeria, Gabumo Publishing Company, 1993. 
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lost its autonomy in the economic policymaking to the IFIs which dictated 
the state goals and objectives. Second, was the active involvement of World 
Bank and the Fund's staff in the policy implementation process by ensuring 
that the government kept to the terms of the policy. Third was the 
subordination of the domestic social contract to the payment and servicing of 
external debts. Fourth was the lack of a consciously and independently 
determined and articulated national interest. 721 
Like in Nigeria, the IFIs have succeeded in exercising their leverage in the 
developing countries when some common variables are present. Stallings 
identified these variables as inclusive of resource scarcity, combined with 
creditor unity, as well as credible sanctions from the multilaterals.722 No 
doubt, these variables were present in Nigeria when the country embarked 
upon the World Bank's prescribed Structural Adjustment Program. Same as 
in the Republic of Korea in the late 1990s, as well as in Brazil when they 
• 
721 Okome, supra, p. 180 
722 See Frieden in Stallings & Kaufman, ed. See also Jeffrey Frieden in Debt, Development and Democracy: 
Modem Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-1985. 
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were heavily under the Fund's policy.723 Although such leverage succeeds 
in forcing the hands of the leaders to adopt the IFIs' economic policy, it 
nevertheless fails to guarantee the successful implementation of the policy in 
the face of stiff domestic opposition.724 Again, according to Okome, the 
reasons for such failure lie in the following premises. First, the policy is 
perceived by the citizens as a foreign imposition.725 Second, the government 
is tom between a tough choice of striving to salvage the economy at the 
expense of economic hardship for the people. Third, in order to compel 
compliance, the government resorts to draconian laws and decrees, thereby 
further alienating the people from the policy.726 Such alienation provides a 
recipe for failure of the program, because "programmes of adjustment cannot 
be effective unless they command the support of government and of public 
opinion. "72 7 According to M. de Larosiere in the same address to the 
ECOSOC, he argued further that: 
723 Ibid 
724 A classical example is the case of Nigeria under General Ibrahim Babangida which was covered under the case 
study of Nigeria in Chapter 5. In the face of stiff domestic opposition to the SAP, Babangida resorted to draconian 
measures and decrees in order to contain the growing opposition to the SAP. At the end, Babangida was forced out 
of power, having failed in his dual political and economic reforms. 
725 Okome, supra, p. 122, where the author identified the one reason why the SAP policy failed in Nigeria as a 
result of lack of domestic commitment. 
726 Ibid. 
727 See M. de Larosiere; address to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), July 4, 1986., quoted in 
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" ... this support will be progressively harder to maintain the longer 
adjustment continues without some pay-off in terms of growth and while 
human conditions are deteriorating. Likewise, it is hard to visualize how a 
viable external position can be achieved if large segments of the work force 
lack the vocational skills - or even worse, the basic nutritional and health 
standards - to produce goods that are competitive in world markets. Human 
capital is after all the most important factor of production in developing and 
industrial countries alike. "728 
Consequently, we have seen that from the perspective of the developing 
countries, the IFIs have played not such a successful role. The leaders of the 
developing countries have suffered great political loss as a result of their 
invitation and subsequent adoption of the economic policy of the IFIs.729 
Infact, some of them have lost their political mandate when the citizens fail to 
Ihonvbere, J.O., Economic Crisis, Structural Adjustment and Social Crisis in Nigeria, supra. 
728 Ibid. 
729 In Nigeria, for example, the Shagari government, although democratically elected, was overthrown by a military 
government due to its minimal adoption ofIMF-imposed austerity measures. The military government of General 
Buhari which overthrew Shagari' s government was also overthrown in a palace coup by General Babangida who 
preferred a full-blown Structural Adjustment Program. General Babangida himself was equally forced to 'step aside' 




see the gains from the adoption of such economic policy.730 On the other 
hand, the citizens of the affected developing countries have resisted the 
imposition of such 'foreign' economic policy with the resultant loss of 
economic and political sovereignty.731 Further, Professor Ihonvbere argues 
that "the further impoverishment of already disadvantaged groups has only 
encouraged political opposition to the process of adjustment thus creating 
major problems, tension, waste and the diversion or abandonment of the 
adjustment process."732 The fallout of such sense of failure from the leaders 
and the led in the developing countries is that the IFls have become so 
distrusted and very unpopular in the larger segment of the developing 
countries.733 
Further, such sense of failure has provided the conducive political 
environment for some commentators to label the IFls as the veritable organs 
730 Ibid. See also Ihonvbere, lO., "Economic Crisis, Structural Adjustment and Social Crisis in Nigeria," World 
Development, Vol. 21, No.1, pp. 141-153, 1993, which reported that the Babangida's government suffered two 
attempted coups d'etat, six major religious riots, three serious nationwide protests and several riots and 
demonstrations by workers, farmers, the unemployed, students, traders and other disadvantaged groups as a result of 







for modem day economic and political imperialism.734 In other words, that 
the IFIs were created and funded b)the former European colonial rulers and 
although the developing countries have gained political independence from 
their former colonial rulers, the modem day colonialism continues through 
the instrumentality of the IFIs and their economic policies. 735 
The prevalent situation forces us to raise a very familiar question from the 
citizens and governments of most developing countries: Why did the IFls 
succeed in repairing the devastated economies of the European countries, 
while the economies of the developing countries remain chronically poor? Or 
put differently, why have the developed countries failed to formulate and 
implement a massive economic recovery plan for the developing countries in 
the size and speed of the Marshall Plan? 
While we are still pondering that question, it may be comforting to take into 
consideration the impact of the global challenges not just on developing 
734 See Ihonvbere, supra, p. 145, wherein Professor Aluko was quoted as saying that government officials "don't 
understand what SAP is all about. They swallow hook, line and sinker the economic policies from Europe and 
America which is second line of slavery ... " See also "Interview with Sam Aluko," Quality (Lagos), September 27, 
1990, p.28. 
735 It is important to distinguish the fact that although the United States of America is one of the founders of the 




countries, but also on the IFIs themselves. These global challenges that began 
in the late twentieth century and continued into tht21 st century have 
tremendously impacted the IFIs. The extent of the impact can not be fully 
analyzed in the context of this research; however, suffice it to say that it is 
sufficient to have changed the original goals and roles of the IFIs. 
We have seen that the economies of the developing countries have struggled 
all the way into the 21 st century. These economies are fragile and operate in a 
very precarious condition. It behooves the IFIs to be cognizant of the peculiar 
nature of these developing economies in their formulation of policies that 
impact these economies, particularly, the impact of the policies on the most 
vulnerable segment of the popu1ation.736 It is against this backdrop that we 
have argued with other learned scholars that a blanket or one-size-fits-all 
policy will not meet the challenges of these economies73 7, instead, 
"adjustment packages must be designed to take due cognizance of the 
specificities of these countries, the character of regimes, the content and 
context of national political discourses and the degree of governmental 
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credibility and accountability."738 We also argue that failure on the part of 
these IFIs to be sensitive to the consequences of their policies, particularly, in 
the developing economies, will result in catastrophic consequences for the 
affected economies in particular, and the rest of the world in genera1.739 
While the formulation and implementation of recovery economic policy is 
aimed at correcting the economic imbalance of an economy, effort must also 
be made to prevent some of the factors that give rise to such economic 
imbalance. Again, as we have argued earlier740, developed countries and 
their leaders have much to do to discourage the leaders of the developing 
countries from finding safe havens in their countries where they can deposit 
looted public funds. At the same time, the IFIs must insist on strict 
accounting of the funds that the leaders of the developing countries borrow as 
sovereign debts. Since such debts are borrowed on behalf of the country, the 
leaders must be held accountable if the funds fail to make it back to the 
government's treasury or be applied to the specific projects for which they 
736 Refer to Chapter 6, supra. Refer also to Ihonvbere, J.O., supra. 
737 Ibid. 




were borrowed. 741 The IFIs also have to work better at monitoring the 
economic performance of the developillg countries with a view to minimizing 
the consequences of a sudden collapse of the economy.742 Although this 
raises the familiar dilemma of how much involvement the IFIs should have in 
the economy of a sovereign country, it nevertheless provides us the present 
basis and need for a research such as this. 
In the final analysis, we hope we have reasonably articulated the 'original' 
and the 'current' roles played by the IFIs in the developing countries in 
general, with particular emphasis on Nigeria, the Republic of Korea and 
Brazil. The articulation of the roles of the IFIs does not translate into a 
rectification of the negative consequences of the roles, however; we feel 
comforted by the words of Charles F. Kethering that "a problem well stated is 
a problem half solved." 
1 , 
i 739 Ibid. 
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